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 we can have mental images without reading, 
or we can read without experiencing mental images, 
but imaginal activity as part of reading is common 
and a matter of degree. (Sadoski and Paivio 2001, 53) 
 
dobro máme přijímat a nemluvit o čtení. 
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Chapter 1. Mental imagery and literary 
narrative: a bird’s-eye view1 
1.1 Mental imagery 
 
If I was deeply interested in the course of a story, the interest was so violent as 
to be painful; I feared – I shrunk from the conclusion, or else I forestalled it. 
My pleasure arose, not from curiosity, or anxiety about events and results, but 
from the workings of the visual imagination – from a picture daguerreotyped 
upon my mind; a scene in which I was at once spectator and actor, for I al-
ways identified myself with some personage or other[.] (Coleridge 1851, 345–
346; my italics)2 
 
The above is a self-biographical note by Hartley Coleridge, English poet and 
essayist, the eldest son of S. T. Coleridge. Although it may not capture the 
typical way a gentleman would experience literary narratives in the first half 
of the nineteenth century, or at least not the typical way a gentleman would 
talk about his reading experience (see also Section 1.8 below), empirical data 
suggests it should be fairly easy to identify with for many readers of today. 
Mental imagery is now one of the commonest things people remember about 
their narrative reading in the long term (Kuijpers under review) and it corre-
lates reliably with various dimensions of reader response, most notably with 
affective and emotional appraisal (Krasny and Sadoski 2008). Even if the 
phenomenon of mental imagery were not interesting enough in its own right, 
further study would thus be warranted by its close link to emotion. Readerly 
emotion enjoys much renewed scholarly interest these days (see e.g. Miall 
                                                       
1 A version of this chapter (Sections 1.1-1.7) is forthcoming in Style 48 as “Literary Narrative 
and Mental Imagery: A View from Embodied Cognition” (Kuzmičová forthcoming). A ver-
sion of Section 1.8 was published as part of my “Words and Worlds of Literary Narrative: 
The Trade-off between Verbal Presence and Direct Presence in the Activity of Reading”, 
Bernaerts, Lars, Dirk De Geest, Luc Herman, and Bart Vervaeck (eds.), Stories and Minds: 
Cognitive Approaches to Literary Narrative, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 107–128 
(Kuzmičová 2013a). 
2 I am grateful to Andrew Elfenbein and his collaborators for pointing me to this quote 
(Elfenbein et al. 2011). 
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2011). However, the same cannot be said about mental imagery.3 Therefore, 
this dissertation narrows in on mental imagery in the reading of literary nar-
rative, alone and in its own right, whereas emotion and affect fall outside its 
general focus. This is not because I deem emotion and affect unimportant, in 
an intellectualist denial of Coleridge’s romantic pathos. Quite the contrary: I 
assume them to be ubiquitous in literary reading, but also to relate to read-
ers’ discrete mental images in such a plenitude of ways that they escape sys-
tematic scrutiny. Therefore, they will not be investigated explicitly. 
The dissertation will be structured as follows: The present Chapter 1 sets 
the general context of inquiry, while disentangling a number of key theoreti-
cal issues such as embodiment, consciousness, narrative, and the historical 
aspect of readers’ mental imaging. Most importantly, the chapter introduces 
a typology of four basic imagery varieties to be further dealt with. Each of 
the subsequent Chapters 2 to 4, then, deals closely with one imagery variety 
or pair of varieties and the underlying cognitive mechanisms. It should be 
noted, however, that Chapters 2 to 4 do not explore the discrete imagery 
varieties in the sense of providing a general survey of their properties. (This 
is done briefly in Section 1.6 of the present chapter.) Rather, each chapter 
looks into the imagery variety/varieties in question from its own special an-
gle, motivated by the nature of each imagery variety and the current state of 
research in literary theory. Questions asked throughout the dissertation in-
clude the following: 
 
a) What are the basic varieties of mental imagery in the reading of literary 
narrative? 
b) By what contents or narrative strategies are they most likely to be 
prompted? 
c) What is it like to experience a mental image of a particular variety? 
d) What are its psychophysiological underpinnings? 
e) How does a mental image of a particular variety relate to perception? 
f) How does it relate to higher-order meaning-making? 
 
But first of all: What is mental imagery in the reading of literary narrative? 
In this context, mental imagery stands for the various instances in which 
modern silent readers of narratives come to experience near-sensory phe-
nomena. Such experiences are common (Sadoski and Paivio 2001, 74) and 
largely compulsive. They come prompted by the particular narrative one is 
                                                       
3 In analytic aesthetics, there is an extensive literature on readerly imagination (e.g. Currie and 
Ravenscroft 2003; Walton 1993), where imagination is defined in terms of propositional 
rather than sensory content. For instance, it is possible to imagine a fictional world that differs 
from our own with regard to ethics or ideology, without necessarily forming a mental image 
of such a world. Because this dissertation deals with sensory imaging specifically, the broader 
term imagination will mostly be avoided. 
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reading rather than completely at the reader’s will. Such experiences can be 
grounded in any sensory modality. They can deploy the external senses, i.e., 
the visual (sight), the auditory (hearing), the olfactory (smell), the gustatory 
(taste) and the tactile (touch), as well as the internal senses, i.e., the intero-
ceptive (pain, hunger, etc.), the proprioceptive (balance, limb and organ po-
sition, etc.) or the motor/kinesthetic (movement-related proprioception: ef-
fort, acceleration, etc.). They can, and often do, combine several modalities. 
More specifically, the subclass of mental imagery to be dealt with will 
consist in what may be called tight (rather than loose) mental images. Tight 
images are mental images that are tightly connected to concrete existents in 
the story and/or to circumscribed verbal structures in the narrative discourse. 
For instance, upon encountering an “apple tree” in a verbal narrative, my 
mind may easily wander off to grandma’s delicious apple strudel and the 
unique odor in her kitchen. Yet this loose sort of imagery, perfectly common 
as it may be, cannot be accommodated by the conceptual framework of this 
dissertation. It is simply too difficult to predict based on narrative content 
and structure. This dissertation will only deal with such mental images trig-
gered by expression “X” consisting in a sensory representation of what the 
reader literally understands to be X. This is what I mean by tight mental 
images. 
One more example of loose imagery, or a phenomenon vaguely resem-
bling such imagery: Upon the reading of a narrative, I may suddenly become 
aware of my pulse and breathing, and transpose their rhythm onto the tempo-
ral flow of the story, with its accelerations and decelerations, its ups and 
downs. For a short while, my bodily processes fuse with an image of the 
story at an abstract, macrostructural level.4 Given the avenues taken in this 
dissertation, such mental images will likewise be excluded because they are 
virtually unpredictable. Readerly experience of rhythmical pulse and breath-
ing may very well be relevant, but only in other scenarios: Firstly, in cases 
when they are clearly experienced as first-person enactments of the pulse 
and breathing of a literary character. Secondly, in cases when they are con-
nected to auditory imagery of a passage qua discourse, e.g., to the reader’s 
vicarious hearing of “apple tree,” with its specific pronunciation and prosody 
(a highly rhythmical and aspiratory affair). The distinction between tight and 
loose imagery is of course a matter of degree. 
Even if narrowed down in this manner, mental imagery in the reading of 
literary narrative makes a sizable topic for a dissertation. The size of the 
                                                       
4 For a suggestive analysis of these and similar experiences, see a theoretical proposal made 
by Ellen Esrock (2004). In her article, Esrock calls these experiences “reinterpretations”, 
whereas currently she prefers (personal communication) to call them “transomatizations”. To 
my knowledge, the most comprehensive overview of embodied processes in literary narrative 
reading, largely overreaching what I have chosen to define as mental imagery combined with 
Esrock’s transomatizations, can be found in an article by Michael Kimmel (in progress). 
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topic is due to the diversity of our imagery experiences, caused by the elu-
sive variables of individual reader, text and reading situation (see also Es-
rock 1994, 179). But it is also due to decades of neglect within the two disci-
plines that have been most distinctly formative of this dissertation: literary 
theory and cognitive science. 
With respect to mental imagery, both disciplines were founded in the 
twentieth century in a denial of previous traditions such as classical rhetoric, 
aesthetics, nineteenth-century literary criticism and so forth on the one hand, 
and early modern (even ancient) philosophy and nineteenth-century psy-
chology on the other. These disciplinary predecessors acknowledged mental 
imagery as a legitimate, in some cases even supreme (for a review, see e.g. 
Sadoski and Paivio 2001, 11–41), form of human thought in general and 
language comprehension in particular. By contrast, most of twentieth-
century literary theory avoided the topic altogether, in spite of the obvious 
link between literariness (broadly defined; see also Section 1.7 below) and 
image generation. The first principled accounts of mental imagery in literary 
reader response appeared in the 1990s (e.g. Scarry 1999; Esrock 1994; 
Collins 1991). Their number to date is far from overwhelming, but it in-
creases steadily. 
Psychology and the broader field of cognitive science picked up mental 
imagery somewhat earlier than did literary theory, in the late 1960s, after 
half a century of oblivion. But a protracted battle known as the imagery de-
bate had to be fought before it was even established that mental imagery 
indeed is analogous to sensorimotor processes rather than being essentially 
propositional (for a review, see e.g. Kosslyn, W. Thompson, and Ganis 
2006).5 The imagery debate concerned mental imagery at large. The evi-
dence produced in favor of the sensorimotor (sometimes called “pictorial-
ist”) strand consisted mainly in data from experiments in which people were 
simply instructed to form specific images or to solve various problems. Cog-
nitive researchers first began to specialize in mental imagery in reading, 
specifically, at the turn of the millennium, although some prominent figures 
have been active in the field since the 1980s (e.g. Mark Sadoski; see Sa-
doski, Goetz, and Kangiser 1988). 
Even in the relatively narrow field of literary reader response, this history 
of mental imagery in the past century, largely shaped by the linguistic (and 
later computational) turn across disciplines, has already been detailed by 
several authors (Gleason 2009, 424–430; Esrock 1994; Collins 1991, 30–
46). Now, as a result of this history, there is too much to be said on the na-
ture of mental images to review this history one more time. Instead, let us 
proceed directly to what may be considered the current situation, referencing 
                                                       
5 Strictly speaking, the imagery debate is still considered unresolved by some of its protago-
nists (see e.g. Pylyshyn 2004). 
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earlier literary theory when appropriate in the further course of argument, 
especially in subsequent chapters. In the past decade or so it has become 
common to intermingle literary scholarship with cognitive science (Cohen 
2010). The contemporary second generation of cognitive science can indeed 
be very helpful to our advancing understanding of mental imagery and other 
lower-order (e.g. affective) aspects of reader response. However, its incorpo-
ration in literary and other theory is not wholly unproblematic. Before pro-
ceeding to the problems, let me briefly explain what makes contemporary 
cognitive science second-generation, and why it combines well with literary 
theoretical inquiry into mental imagery. 
1.2 Embodiment 
 
In the past, cognitive science would approach its central topics – i.e., percep-
tion, attention, language comprehension and so forth – with the assumption 
that the human mind works like a computer, engaging in symbolic processes 
at the end of which are the products we call perception, attention, language 
comprehension and so forth. According to such standard (so-called first-
generation) cognitive science, the mind is cleanly separable from the body. 
So-called second-generation cognitive science, now running parallel with 
new developments within the standard approach, researches perception, at-
tention, language and so forth only inasmuch as they are deeply grounded in 
the body. One of its major research programs is therefore known as “embod-
ied cognition.”6 For instance, under the traditional, first-generation view, 
visual perception may be defined as something like the retrieval and sym-
bolic encoding of detached visual information from the environment.7 Under 
the embodied, second-generation view, it may rather be understood as a 
process in which possible patterns of first-person bodily interaction are 
mapped onto the environment directly. That is to say, an environment cannot 
be visually cognized without the (automatic) assessment of bodily actions it 
invites the cognizer, in her specific situation, to do (see Chapter 2 for more 
                                                       
6 Alternatively, embodied cognition is also known as “grounded cognition” (Barsalou 2008) 
or “situated cognition” (Robbins and Aydede 2008). It should be noted that second-generation 
cognitive science encompasses much more than the framework of embodied cognition. Its 
radical departure from the mind-is-a-computer metaphor has led, for instance, to a rediscovery 
of affect and emotion and its decisive role in human thinking (for a groundbreaking contribu-
tion, see Damasio 1994). 
7 There were some famous exceptions to this view in the early days of cognitive science, such 
as James J. Gibson, the founder of ecological psychology (Gibson 1979), cognitive linguists 
George Lakoff and Mark Johnson (1980), or the team consisting of Francisco Varela, Evan 
Thompson and Eleanor Rosch (1991). 
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on this issue). Cognition is thus proposed to encapsulate the body and the 
bodily actions afforded by its surroundings.8 
In a sense, mental imagery amounts to the experience of actually contain-
ing within one’s body a piece of the outside world. Therefore, it is rightly 
considered one of the hallmark phenomena, and a key piece of evidence (see 
e.g. Wilson 2002), in the hands of second-generation cognitive science. But 
apart from what has been established, the business of defining second-
generation cognitive science, or its view of mental imagery, is complicated. 
Second-generation cognitive science does not have a canonical theory of the 
mechanisms behind mental imagery (but see Kosslyn, W. Thompson, and 
Ganis 2006 for a comprehensive proposal made from within standard cogni-
tive neuroscience). In fact, there is little agreement to date about the exact 
nature and extent of embodiment at large. As for mental imagery specifi-
cally, it is still mostly treated as an explanans – in visual cognition, language 
planning, language comprehension and so forth – rather than constituting a 
research subject in its own right. Maybe the invariants are too few for mental 
imagery to be investigated in aggregate. Could it be the case that the nature 
of what we call mental imagery varies deeply (even within discrete sensory 
modalities) depending on the overall purpose and situation? This intuition 
underlies much of the contents in this dissertation. 
Owing to the relative lack of primary focus on mental imagery and to the 
theoretical disparity within the research framework of embodied cognition, 
the primary references to cognitive research cited in this dissertation will 
consist in isolated reports of experimental studies (neuroimaging, psycho-
physiological, behavioral, pen-and-paper, and so forth) rather than full-
fledged theories. More ambitious theoretical writings will also be cited, in-
cluding a few of those produced within first-generation cognitive science, 
but it should be noted that I do not necessarily embrace each and every one 
of the theories as a whole. In some combinations, this might be logically 
impossible. What is important is that the empirical evidence these theories 
were originally meant to elucidate, and the wording and style with which 
they do so, support what I have to say about experienced embodiment in the 
reading of literary narrative. 
In each attempt at fusing literary theoretical speculation with (experimen-
tal) cognitive science, one could identify a host of methodological problems, 
starting from the trivial fact that the stimuli used in cognitive experiments 
usually do not bear the slightest resemblance to literary narrative. To get off 
the ground, I have chosen to accept most of these problems as a natural part 
of any interdisciplinary inquiry. In cognitive science, for instance, which is 
an interdisciplinary field in itself, it is perfectly normal to compare findings 
                                                       
8 Under a stronger view, the physical environment itself is sometimes proposed to be an inte-
gral part of the human cognitive system (for a review, see e.g. Wilson 2002). 
 
 18 
from studies using very different stimuli and methodologies. However, there 
are two problems that I would like to mention at this point. I will call them 
the problem of referential bias and the problem of consciousness. For illus-
tration purposes, let me quote two phenomena that significantly furthered, in 
two different stages, the research program of embodied cognition. Both be-
long to the domain of neuroscience that incidentally began to flourish, with 
fMRI and other new technologies, at about the time embodied cognition first 
became a widely accepted research program. Both are relatively well known 
by now, even readily cited by literary theorists. 
The first phenomenon stood at the very beginning of second-generation 
cognitive science. I am thinking of the 1980s/1990s discovery, made by Riz-
zolatti and collaborators, of so-called mirror neurons. Mirror neurons, first 
identified in the macaque monkey, consist in cell populations in the parietal-
premotor area that fire equally when an action (e.g. the grasping of a stick) is 
performed and when it is merely observed in a conspecific (for a brief intro-
duction, see Gallese and Lakoff 2005). The discovery has had wide-ranging 
consequences for the study of empathy and other processes of social cogni-
tion, which were traditionally thought to be based on indirect, higher-order, 
abstract theorizing rather than grounded in direct perception. Eventually 
some premotor activity corresponding to that of mirror neurons was reported 
to occur in the processing of action-related verbs and phrases (Aziz-Zadeh et 
al. 2006). But literary scholars did not await these latter findings in speculat-
ing about the workings of the mirror neuron system in the reading of literary 
narrative, for instance in readers’ empathizing with literary characters (Keen 
2006). Overall, redefinitions of literary narrative in terms of social cognition 
generally and empathy specifically, with or without explicit reference to 
mirror neurons, have gained considerable popularity (e.g. Mar 2011; Oatley 
2011) ever since. In some cases these redefinitions propose that the reading 
of literary narrative fosters empathy and social skill (Mar et al. 2006), or 
even altruistic behavior (Keen 2006), in real life. Some neuroscientists spe-
cializing in mirror neurons also draw the speculative conclusion that “when 
we read a novel, our mirror neurons simulate the actions described in the 
novel, as if we were doing those actions ourselves” (Iacoboni 2008, 94; my 
italics). One neuroscientist, Vittorio Gallese, even joined forces with a liter-
ary scholar, Hannah Chapelle Wojciehowski, in authoring a full-blown liter-
ary theoretical proposal along the same lines (Chapelle Wojciehowski and 
Gallese 2011; more on this below). 
The second phenomenon that I would like to mention is so-called somato-
topic cortical activation as observed in concept and language comprehen-
sion, including reading. For about a decade, accumulated evidence has been 
indicating that concrete language processing “mirrors” action (and percep-
tion) not only by virtue of mirror neuron activity. Apart from the proposed 
mirror neuron areas and the standard language areas of the brain, additional 
parts of the sensorimotor cortex become activated too. Importantly, the pat-
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tern of activation reflects the nature of the action or perception referred to, so 
that upon the processing of, e.g., the verb “grab” (when used in literal, non-
idiomatic phrases such as “grab the cake”, but not when used figuratively as 
in “grab the offer”), activity has been detected in the specific areas of the 
motor cortex responsible for hand movements (e.g. Raposo et al.; Pulver-
müller). Convergent evidence pointing toward a general notion of such em-
bodied simulation in language comprehension is now available from a vari-
ety of experimental contexts other than neuroimaging (measurements of 
covert muscle activation, behavioral experiments and so forth; for a review, 
see Fischer and Zwaan 2008). 
In one fMRI study published in 2009 (Speer et al. 2009a), somatotopic 
activation was also confirmed to occur in the processing of connected verbal 
narrative, particularly in passages where new actions or objects enter the 
stage. For instance, when the story protagonist is reported to pick up an ob-
ject, e.g., a textbook (the story was about seven-year old Raymond and the 
events of a day at school), this is reflected not only in the motor, but also in 
the visual area of the brain that would be active if the reader actually picked 
up the same object. The delayed extension of such findings to narrative was 
due to technical constraints; fMRI studies of connected discourse still verge 
on the impossible because the machinery is noisy, subjects are not allowed to 
move, and so forth. Similarly to the mirror neuron literature, this latter refer-
ence has already been adopted by literary theory (Wells-Jopling and Oatley 
2012). 
Further review of experimental evidence concerning mirror neurons, so-
matotopic activation (as defined above), and related phenomena will be pro-
vided in subsequent chapters. Let us now turn to the two problems arising 
from these phenomena, or more precisely, from their growing popularity 
among literary and other theorists: the problem of referential bias and the 
problem of consciousness. 
1.3 Referential bias 
 
As much as one should be impressed by the fact that the nonverbal, referen-
tial contents of narrative literature can be traced in one’s sensorimotor cor-
tex, or even in one’s musculature, there is evidence pointing toward somato-
topic and physiological activation of yet another kind: the verbal kind. That 
is, not only do we process sentences such as “He picked up his English 
workbook.” (Speer et al. 2009a, 991) in ways largely resembling the situa-
tions they refer to, we also process them in ways largely resembling the ac-
tivity of reading them out loud, or listening to them as overtly spoken by 
somebody else. 
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It has long been suggested that the vocal apparatus and auditory circuitry 
are actively involved in language comprehension including silent reading 
(Baddeley, Eldridge, and V. Lewis 1981). In line with this theory, recent 
studies have shown that listening to speech activates the recipient’s tongue 
muscles (Watkins, Strafella, and Paus 2003; Fadiga et al. 2002),9 that verbal 
auditory imagery activates the auditory cortex (for a review, see Hubbard 
2010), and crucially, that silent narrative reading activates the temporal 
voice areas associated with speech perception (Yao, Belin, and Scheepers 
2011). Simply put, silent reading entails “voices” in one’s brain. The conclu-
sion that narrative reading is a largely simulative and sensorimotor process 
thus applies to the verbal medium as much as it applies to referential con-
tents. From the viewpoint of literary theory, traditionally studying the many 
different ways in which nonverbal contents can be verbally conveyed, this 
should make perfect sense. Yet, interestingly, verbal simulations have en-
joyed far less popularity compared to their referential counterpart. In literary 
theory, at least as far as narrative prose is concerned, verbal simulations (and 
imagery) are largely unnoticed. This is what I mean by referential bias. 
In a sense, the referential bias in current literary theory may be a direct ef-
fect of the preceding decades of verbal hegemony epitomized in structuralist 
and poststructuralist thinking. Also, it copies a general tendency in cognitive 
science, including standard theories of mental imagery, to privilege referen-
tial over verbal images, and, within the referential domain, to privilege the 
visual over other sensory modalities.10 One notable exception from this ten-
dency is the dual coding theory of reading proposed by Mark Sadoski and 
Allan Paivio (2001; see also Figure 1), a uniquely integral11 theoretical pro-
ject bridging the intergenerational gap in cognitive science, both diachroni-
cally and synchronically speaking. Sadoski and Paivio postulate two parallel 
cognitive systems, the nonverbal (in my nomenclature: the referential) and 
the verbal, each with a potential to yield sensorimotor effects during reading 
(e.g. a visual image of a cup vs. the verbal auditory image /kup/).12 Although 
                                                       
9 It has been suggested that speech perception may likewise involve mirror neurons (for a 
review, see Lotto, Hickok, and Holt 2009). 
10 This is in line with how the notion of imagery is widely understood by the general public 
(see e.g. Connell and Lynott 2012). 
11 To my knowledge, there is no other unified theory of reading accounting for both referen-
tial and verbal imagery. 
12 My revision to Sadoski and Paivio’s nomenclature is motivated by a shift in perspective. 
Sadoski and Paivio primarily construct a theory of reading and literacy, and they do it at a 
time when most cognitive scientists consider human thought to be essentially propositional, 
i.e., verbal. Their emphasis on the nonverbal is therefore natural. Meanwhile, my theses pri-
marily concern mental imagery and are grounded in the framework of embodied cognition, 
where perceptual aspects of linguistic reference are assumed vital to human thought and 
language comprehension. The reason why I oppose the “referential” to the “verbal” rather 
than to the “nonreferential” should be evident: While referents fall outside the contents proper 
of what I call verbal imagery, an extended verbal stimulus probably would not be processed at 
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a major part of their imagery examples still belong to the referential domain 
and visual modality, other modalities and types of imagery are cited or at 
least recognized. 
 
Figure 1 Sadoski and Paivio’s general model of the dual coding theory (cited from 
Sadoski and Paivio 2001, 53). Under this model, what I have termed readers’ refer-
ential imagery and simulation processes belong to the right-hand system, while the 
left-hand system accommodates imagery and simulation processes pertaining to the 
text as verbal stimulus.  
 
In an attempt to further countervail referential bias, the present dissertation 
focuses on both referential and verbal mental imagery in the reading of liter-
ary narrative. If referential imagery is allowed more space (Chapters 2 and 3) 
than its verbal counterpart (Chapter 4), it is not because referential imagery 
is more common in the overall experience of reading (although it may be 
more expressly desired on the part of the reader; see Sections 1.7 and 1.8 
below). It is because referential imagery is much more complicated techni-
cally. While verbal auditory imagery simply inheres in the fact that narrative 
                                                                                                                                
all if it were strictly non-referential, i.e., if it fully lacked reference. Moreover, terms such as 
“verbal auditory imagery” are relatively common in imagery research; “verbal imagery” 
should thus be perfectly understandable. 
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reading is a verbal affair, referential imagery requires additional transfer, a 
“referential connection” (see Figure 1) as Sadoski and Paivio might put it, 
between the verbal and the nonverbal cognitive systems. Verbal auditory 
imagery is naturally sequential, in a one-to-one analogy to reading itself. But 
the format of referential imagery is also spatial, one-to-many, allowing a 
greater variety of outcomes and lower predictability. Some conjecture that 
the two cognitive processes may be mutually constraining (Fischer and 
Zwaan 2008, 837), whereas Sadoski and Paivio suggest that the verbal and 
the nonverbal can operate independently of each other (Sadoski and Paivio 
2001, 52). On the level of consciousness, both proposals may be correct in a 
sense (see Section 1.7 below).  
1.4 Consciousness 
 
Despite its undeniable positive qualities, even Sadoski and Paivio’s work is 
(partly) implicated in the second problem that needs to be mentioned at this 
point, i.e., the problem of consciousness. The problem arises whenever non-
conscious mental processes on the one hand and conscious experience (i.e. 
processes at least partly noticeable to the subject herself) on the other are 
treated as if they were the same thing. For instance, neuroscience research of 
the kind mentioned above is often cited, especially outside the home disci-
pline, with so much enthusiasm that the non-conscious processes central to 
this research – be they called “mental representation” as in first-generation 
cognitive science, including Sadoski and Paivio, or “simulation” as in the 
framework of embodied cognition – become more or less conflated with the 
notion of mental imagery.13 This happened when Speer et al.’s (2009a) fMRI 
study of somatotopic activation was first publicly announced in a newspaper 
article titled “Readers Build Vivid Mental Simulations of Narrative Situa-
tions, Brain Scans Suggest” (Everding 2009; my italics), stirring up a debate 
in literary theoretical circles (for further discussion of this event, see Ryan 
2011). Obviously, the “vividness” ascribed in the article to somatotopic acti-
vation is an experiential category, while somatotopic activation is not. In a 
similar vein, literary scholar Hannah Chapelle Wojciehowski and neurosci-
entist Vittorio Gallese use the mirror neuron literature to support the conclu-
sion that, “by means of the mirroring mechanisms,” literature “guides us into 
[…] imagined bodily experience” (Chapelle Wojciehowski and Gallese 
2011; my italics). Without denying the importance of Speer et al.’s study or 
the mirror neuron paradigm, which is paramount to this dissertation, it is 
                                                       
13 Another terminological note is in place here concerning the related notion of imagination. 
Apart from the frequent conflation with mental imagery, imagination is also sometimes used 
as a synonym for consciousness (e.g. Edelman and Tononi 2000). 
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probably fair to say that few readers vividly experience covert muscular 
activity and other motor imagery every time they read about a boy picking up 
a textbook from a desk. To say that one’s brain runs a simulation of X is not 
to say that one necessarily experiences X, or a mental image thereof. This 
distinction is not drawn often enough, or not explicitly enough. This is what 
I mean by the problem of consciousness. 
In literary theory, the problem of consciousness may be explained by the 
simple fact that humanities in general are ill equipped, conceptually speak-
ing, for dealing with subpersonal, i.e., non-conscious processes. Tradition-
ally, the phenomena studied in literary theory are by definition subject to 
reflective thought, or some other form of conscious experience. They are 
amenable to self-report and introspection. The same cannot be said about 
cortical blood flow as monitored by fMRI. However, the conflation of men-
tal representation/simulation with mental imagery and other conscious expe-
rience is not a problem restricted to the humanities. Cognitive experimenters 
themselves sometimes make similar rhetorical moves in both popular (e.g. 
Iacoboni 2008) and scientific (Zwaan and Madden 2005, 242) writing. While 
literary theorists (perhaps with the exception of psychoanalytic critics) tend 
to assume that consciousness is always there and directly accessible, cogni-
tive scientists have traditionally been biased in the opposite direction. Their 
problem with consciousness amounts to the fact that, in the experimental 
cognitive sciences, the notion of consciousness has long been ignored or 
even expressly rejected. Only recently have experimenters begun to learn 
how to tackle first-person experience and introspection (Jack and Roepstorff 
2003). 
To return to the dual coding theory, Sadoski and Paivio are more careful 
than most other authors in both literary studies and cognitive science about 
drawing the line between non-conscious and conscious processes, but they 
are still ambiguous on this point. In some places (e.g. Sadoski and Paivio 
2001, 53) they define imagery as a specifically conscious experience. How-
ever, they also seem to assume that the nonverbal (in my nomenclature: ref-
erential) imagery system is at work in all language comprehension, even 
when images are not expressly noticed by the comprehender (e.g. Sadoski 
and Paivio 2001, 74). This discrepancy may provoke questions: What ex-
actly is a mental image if it is not consciously experienced? If we do not 
notice it, how do we know the contents are really there as an image, i.e., 
something to be perceived directly? How do we know they are not really a 
quick series of amodal propositions concerning perceptual knowledge that 
simply happens to be accompanied by somatotopic cortical activation or, in 
behavioral experiments, prime specific action? 
The purpose of these questions, here and now, is mainly rhetorical. One 
should not worry about them too much. To some extent, mind/brain issues 
are always a matter of phrasing, and my own (intuitive) phrasing would not 
be much different from that of Sadoski and Paivio. As will soon become 
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evident, in what I have to say about mental imagery in the reading of literary 
narrative, I too rely heavily on evidence from non-conscious phenomena. In 
stressing the question of consciousness, my objective was not to challenge 
the dual coding theory, or second-generation cognitive science, or the aggre-
gate of cognitive literary theory for that matter. My objective was to show 
that and why I will only be using evidence from non-conscious phenomena 
in order to add weight to prior, i.e., independent, introspective observations, 
or to observations loosely inspired by the theoretical questions asked in ex-
perimental cognitive science. I will only be using this evidence in order to 
suggest which subpersonal cognitive and psychophysiological processes may 
underlie the conscious experience in question. That is, I will not proceed the 
other way around, from non-conscious evidence to introspective support, as 
would be the case in standard cognitive science (and in some cognitive liter-
ary theory; see Cohen 2010 for examples). Thus, I will follow cognitive re-
searchers Anthony Jack and Andreas Roepstorff, who argue that, “[w]here 
experiential phenomena are concerned, it is objective measures that must 
seek validation by establishing their correspondence with introspective 
measures, and not vice versa.” (Jack and Roepstorff 2003, xiii) 
1.5 Rationale 
 
It is only rational that literary theorists who draw on cognitive science in 
order to describe the effects of literary narrative should clearly state what 
their primary source of insight is, whether it is subpersonal scientific evi-
dence or something else. With experiential phenomena such as imagery or 
empathy, imagery’s more popular relative, it also makes sense that the pri-
mary source of insight is not subpersonal scientific evidence. This is because 
experience is first-person and utterly private and it is there regardless of 
what comes out of a brain scan. Still, between the two above-mentioned 
experiential phenomena, i.e., mental imagery and empathy, mental imagery 
may be special in this respect, because mental imagery and empathy are not 
of the same order. Consider this: You cannot be wrong about having experi-
enced a mental image, e.g., when reading about seven-year old Raymond in 
Speer’s experimental stimulus, picking up his English workbook from a 
desk. Similarly, you cannot be wrong about having responded with feeling in 
that moment (the episode is not totally free of affect, as Raymond acts 
“seemingly without any disappointment or anxiety”; Speer et al. 2009b). 
However, you can be wrong about your feeling having been an empathetic 
one. Upon further reflection, e.g., during class discussion, it can always turn 
out you were a poor (mind-)reader and misconstrued much of a literary char-
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acter’s motives and emotions.14 Of course, a mental image can also be mis-
taken. For a long time I used to form images of moose whenever I read 
“reindeer.” But my moose were mental images proper, while false empathy, 
though still a feeling, is no empathy. 
Judgements regarding the presence or absence of a mental image qua ex-
perience cannot be corrected from the outside, and mental imagery is there-
fore even more inextricably linked with consciousness than is empathy.15 
The questions asked here about mental imagery in the reading of literary 
narrative, if they are to be meaningful at all, will necessarily be shaped by 
this pre-requisite. I repeat the initial list of questions from Section 1.1 above: 
 
a) What are the basic varieties of mental imagery in the reading of literary 
narrative? 
b) By what contents or narrative strategies are they likely to be prompted? 
c) What is it like to experience a mental image of a particular variety? 
d) What are its psychophysiological underpinnings? 
e) How does a mental image of a particular variety relate to perception? 
f) How does it relate to higher-order meaning-making? 
 
Questions a) and d) have already been commented on or even partly an-
swered in the preceding Sections 1.2 (d), 1.3 (a) and 1.4 (d). As regards 
question a), we have seen that mental imagery in reading can basically be 
divided into the referential and the verbal. As regards question d), we have 
seen that referential imagery presumably feeds on (among other things) so-
matotopic cortical activation in the sensorimotor cortex, while verbal im-
agery may rather feed on activity in the cortical areas specialized in hearing 
in general and speech perception and speech production in particular. Let us 
now turn to questions b) and c). By what contents or narrative strategies are 
the particular image varieties likely to be prompted? What is it like to expe-
rience a mental image of a particular variety? When it comes to the treatment 
of questions b) and c) in literary theory, relevant literature will be cited 
piecemeal further down, in Chapters 2-4. But because they are both specifi-
                                                       
14 It is therefore doubtful that the reading of literary narrative should necessarily foster empa-
thy, or even altruistic behavior, in the reader. 
15 Also, the use value of mental imagery may be less obvious than the use value of empathy. 
Long-term effects of mental imagery on the reader, while perfectly plausible, are thus not in 
the center of researchers’ attention. However inconspicuously, mental imagery is useful nev-
ertheless, even from a practical point of view. For instance, susceptibility to mental imagery, 
which presumably increases with exposure to literary narrative (Kuzmičová, Dixon, and 
Bortolussi 2012), has long been known to enhance text comprehension and learning in chil-
dren (e.g. Gambrell and Bales 1986; Anderson and Kulhavy 1972). From the viewpoint of 
narrative pragmatics, ideologists may be interested to know that imagery has been found to 
positively affect both content memorability (e.g. Marschark and Hunt 1989) and persuasive-
ness (e.g. Green and Brock 2000). 
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cally literary and empirical at bottom, a few words ought to be said at this 
point about how they have been approached in empirical literary studies. 
Empirical literary studies are as yet a relatively small research field operat-
ing at the confluence of, among other disciplines, experimental psychology 
and literary theory. Their primary area of interest is literary reader response, 
with quantitative questionnaire analyses (e.g. Bortolussi and Dixon 2003) 
and qualitative analyses of free verbal protocols (e.g. Miall 2006) as their 
principal research methodologies. Their main asset compared to standard 
cognitive psychology is that their experimental setups adhere more closely to 
the authentic reading situation. Entire literary texts or larger portions thereof 
are often used as stimuli. 
As previously mentioned, it would be counterintuitive to claim that all the 
proposed embodied simulations, the referential as well as the verbal, con-
stantly elicit mental imagery. If this were the case, the reader’s mind, limited 
as it is in attentional resources, would be completely overtaxed. On the other 
hand, most of us would agree that at times, mental imagery indeed arises. So 
when does it happen? Based on empirical research investigating readers’ 
responses to extended narrative (literary or otherwise), the following con-
tents or aspects of narrative structure have been found to yield particularly 
strong referential imagery effects: climactic events (Sadoski et al. 1990), 
figurative language (Long, Winograd, and Bridge 1989), and concrete (as 
opposed to abstract) vocabulary (Sadoski, Goetz, and Fritz 1993; in this 
study, imageability is an assumed rather than measured characteristic of 
concrete vocabulary, while measured variables include readers’ interesting-
ness ratings and memory performance).16 To my knowledge, imagery of the 
verbal variety, i.e., readers’ vicarious hearing of the words on a page, has not 
been investigated empirically in relation to narrative.17 
In other words, extant empirical findings regarding imageability in narra-
tive are neither surprising nor many. This is because primary focus on narra-
tive imageability overall is relatively uncommon in empirical literary stud-
ies. When mental imagery is brought up at all, it is usually conceptualized as 
one of many dimensions on a scale devised to measure a more complex cog-
                                                       
16 Concreteness has recently been proposed, in non-literary/non-narrative experimental con-
text, to be outperformed by so-called perceptual strength. This means that abstract vocabulary 
is proposed to prompt just as much imagery as concrete vocabulary, provided it is perceptu-
ally salient, especially when strongly linked to one particular sense modality (e.g. “noisy”). 
Conversely, concrete words lacking in perceptual strength (e.g. “air”) have been found to 
generate little imagery (Connell and Lynott 2012). 
17 A few empirical studies have been conducted focusing on the effects of specific phonemic 
patterns on interpretation and affective response (for a review, see Miall 2006, 173–188). 
However, these studies are inconclusive as to whether these patterns are assumed to inform 
the reader’s consciousness directly. 
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nitive phenomenon, such as narrative transportation (Green 2004)18 or per-
ceived literariness (Miall and Kuiken 1995). As a consequence, researchers 
rarely ask subjects to do more than simply report if and to what extent (on a 
scale from 1 to n) a given stimulus text “calls up images” in their mind (e.g. 
Miall and Kuiken 1994). This of course tells the researchers nothing about 
what it is like, in terms of experience, to have these images and what they 
are really images of.  
That is to say, although literary reader response experiments are mostly 
clear with regard to the problem of consciousness in that they deal with 
readers’ conscious self-report, they have a nested consciousness deficit in 
that they fail to account in any detail for the felt quality of the reported expe-
rience.19 In pursuit of their own research objectives, few researchers worry 
about this deficit, even though mental imagery in the reading of literary nar-
rative is known to be, firstly, extremely common, and secondly, one of the 
two things people usually remember about their reading experiences in the 
long term (the other one being empathy; Kuijpers under review). What 
reader response experiments have shown about the truly experiential quality 
of narrative mental imagery can be mostly just gleaned from correlations. As 
previously mentioned, it has been found that imagery is locally correlated 
with affective appraisal (Krasny and Sadoski 2008; Sadoski, Goetz, and 
Kangiser 1988); but again, affect is not really a quality inherent to sensori-
motor imagery per se.20 
This dissertation tries to come to terms with the situation. As previously 
said, the general approach applied here is one of introspection. Although 
much of it is inspired or informed by writings in the philosophical tradition 
of phenomenology (e.g. Casey 2000), it is certainly not strictly speaking 
phenomenological. Still it is meant to be principled and systematic, and to 
offer a reflexive but far from uninvolved (see Ihde 2012: 32) account of the 
straightforward experience of literary narrative reading. It is also driven by 
pragmatic concerns in that it starts from things ordinary readers may say 
about their mental imagery experiences: As I was reading such and such, it 
felt as if I was really there, people may say for instance. The descriptions 
were so vivid they really made me see it, people may say. I could hear voices 
in my head, people may also say. For what I know, this dissertation is one of 
                                                       
18 Transportation is a term sometimes used to refer to the depth of the reader’s overall in-
volvement in a narrative. 
19 For a remarkable exception, see the studies of Mark Sadoski and collaborators (1988) and 
Karen Krasny and Mark Sadoski (2008), where subjects were asked to rate imageability in 
general as well as describe it freely in more specific terms. 
20 To be clear, I do not wish to deny empirical literary studies their scientific merit. Yet, hav-
ing also conducted an experiment in which imagery was rated on a numerical scale 
(Kuzmičová, Dixon, and Bortolussi 2012), I realize the paucity of information thus obtained. 
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relatively few attempts, in some cases (Chapter 4) perhaps the first one, to 
further question what lies in these statements, and how informative they are. 
Stemming from literary theory initially, the approach taken in this disser-
tation does not meet the standards of empirical science. On the other hand, it 
allows one to think about phenomena that may be near-impossible to inves-
tigate experimentally (despite there currently being a progressive phenome-
nological strand in empirical literary studies, see e.g. Sopčák and Kuiken 
2012). The above-mentioned straightforward reading experience to be ac-
counted for is, obviously, largely my own. That makes the dissertation a 
risky business. Readers can always disconfirm introspective observations, 
partly or across the board. Experience from previous critical encounters sug-
gests that objections may roughly follow two lines. 
Firstly, some may object that the sort of imagery experiences to be de-
scribed below presuppose abnormal levels of imaging and embodied aware-
ness overall. Not all readers would spontaneously report experiencing mental 
imagery, vivid or not. Alternatively, some readers may recognize imagery 
experiences of one particular kind but not others. This criticism is fair 
enough. Susceptibility to mental imagery is indeed known to vary across 
individuals (e.g. Sadoski and Paivio 2001, 74), people are sometimes divided 
into visual vs. verbal learners (e.g. Sadoski and Paivio 2001, 58), some 
cross-cultural variation is likely, and so forth. Reams of psychological litera-
ture are available on such individual differences, although it has also been 
shown that there are very few non-imagers in the absolute (Marks 1973). 
This dissertation does not aspire to cover everybody’s narrative reading ex-
periences. It does aspire, however, to cast light on the experiences of those 
readers who may call themselves imagers at large.21 Although I have no in-
tention to impose a norm, I do not believe mental imaging is an immature or 
superficial form of reader response as some literary theorists have suggested 
(see e.g. Esrock 1994, 180), and I am inclined to suggest that it enriches 
one’s reading experience indiscriminately on its aesthetic dimension. 
A second line of criticism may evolve in response to the contents of this 
dissertation. There may be readers who will agree with me on the general 
depth and variety of imagery phenomena to be described, but disagree with 
my specific descriptions of these phenomena in ways unaccounted for by the 
most generic cross-population differences (low vs. high imagery susceptibil-
ity, tendency for schematic vs. replete imaging, visual vs. verbal mental 
style, etc.). My suggestion then is that they try to formulate, publicly or only 
for themselves, which ones of my conclusions they disagree with, and why. 
                                                       
21 If interested, others may consider the possibility of actively boosting their own embodied 
awareness, and with it presumably also their imagery capacity. Interviewing strategies have 
recently been designed in the experimental cognitive sciences that enable participants to 
heighten their embodied sensitivity in a comparably non-intrusive way (Petitmengin 2006). 
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This would be a particularly welcome sort of critical response. It would 
mean that half of my objectives were fulfilled notwithstanding, i.e., the ob-
jective of turning others’ attention toward what, when and how they men-
tally image in the course of reading. It would prove that language (in this 
case, the words that combine into the whole of this dissertation) can do to 
mental imagery what it has been proposed to do to feelings: not only de-
scribe them, but also “constitute, clarify, and enhance them,” and perhaps 
even “induce novel and often surprising experiences” (Colombetti 2009, 4). 
Why may objections of the latter sort be considered a proof of the ability of 
language to clarify one’s mental imagery experiences? Because, with some 
notable exceptions (Gleason 2009; Scarry 1999), there is little evidence that 
mental imagery in the reading of literary narrative is commonly reflected 
upon in such detail as below. 
With regard to the sort of detail to be scrutinized, preliminary comment is 
still on hold for questions e) and f) in our list: How does a mental image of a 
particular variety relate to perception? How does it relate to higher-order 
meaning-making? Other detail will likewise be heeded, but these two ques-
tions are somewhat more central than others. However, the significance of 
each of the two questions, and thereby also their meaning, changes substan-
tially according to which generic variety of mental imagery we are talking 
about – referential or verbal? – and which specific (sub-)variety of the two 
varieties it is. Before explaining these asymmetries, let me therefore proceed 
to a typology that will chart the range of mental imagery experiences in the 
reading of literary narrative. There will be four rather than only two basic 
varieties. 
1.6 Mental imagery experiences: the four varieties 
 
Until this point I have discussed two varieties of mental imagery: the refer-
ential and the verbal. The referential and the verbal may be understood as 
two possible values of a variable called, for instance, the domain of imagery. 
If we are to answer the questions central to this dissertation, however, identi-
fying the domain of imagery is not enough. For instance, consider the fol-
lowing snippet from Ernest Hemingway’s novel The Garden of Eden: 
The breeze from the sea was blowing through the room and [David] was read-
ing with his shoulders and the small of his back against two pillows and an-
other folded behind his head. 
(Hemingway 1995, 45) 
 
Suppose the hypothetical reader of these two lines focuses, as most readers 
usually do, on the one human character present on the scene. The reader-
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imager may then easily form a referential image of David as conjured from 
within: enacting David’s familiar body posture; experiencing the breeze and 
the pressure of pillows against his back and head, a quick view of the pages 
in David’s book, perhaps even a glance of the indistinct furnishings of a 
room. Alternatively, one may form an image of the scene as conjured from 
without: visualizing a sketchy male figure half-sitting on a sofa or bed, a 
book in his hands, a pillow behind his head (the ones behind David’s back 
are likely occluded unless he is visualized from the side rather than en face). 
Obviously, these two images, albeit equally referential, yield qualitatively 
very different experiences. One puts you in David’s shoes, the other does 
not; or, as Hartley Coleridge put it, one makes you an actor, the other makes 
you a spectator of sorts. Therefore, it is necessary to introduce a second 
variable. This second variable will henceforth be referred to as stance. 
Stance in mental imaging can be either inner as in the former image of 
David conjured from within, or outer as in the latter image of David con-
jured from without. That is, although all mental images are necessarily inter-
nal to the imager’s body, their contents differ in the degree to which the 
imager’s body is felt to be actively at work. Taken together, the two vari-
ables, domain of imagery and stance,22 effectively slice up the field of our 
imagery experiences into four, combining in four possible ways into four 
distinct imagery varieties. Let us now proceed to a systematic overview, and 
further characterization, of the four varieties. And let us keep in mind from 
the very beginning that, even though separated here for the sake of clarity, 
the four varieties characterized below are meant to serve as prototypes only, 
constituting in fact a continuum of sorts (see also Section 1.6.5 below) and 
thus allowing for quick transitions and in-between experiences. For a dem-
onstration, consider the continued quote: 
The breeze from the sea was blowing through the room [A] and [David] was 
reading with his shoulders and the small of his back against two pillows and 
another folded behind his head [B]. He was sleepy after lunch but he felt hol-
low with waiting for her and he read and waited. Then he heard the door open 
and [Catherine] came in and for an instant he did not know her. She stood 
there with her hands below her breasts on the cashmere sweater and breathing 
as though she had been running. 
“Oh, no,” she said. “No.” 
                                                       
22 There is also the important variable of sensory modality. Is the image in question visual, 
auditory, olfactory, gustatory, tactile, motor and so forth, or alternatively: which of these 
modalities does it combine? Sensory modality will, however, be treated in the present chapter 
as a dependent rather than independent variable, since it combines with the previous two 
variables in largely predetermined ways. For instance, a verbal image cannot be olfactory or 
gustatory. An interesting exception may perhaps be found among the anomalous experiences 
of synesthetic readers. 
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Then she was on the bed pushing her head against him saying, “No. No. 
Please David. Don’t you at all?” 
He held her close against his chest and felt it smooth close clipped and 
coarsely silky and she pushed it hard against him again and again. 
“What did you do, Devil?” [C] 
She raised her head and looked at him and her lips pressed against his and 
she moved them from side to side and moved on the bed so her body was 
pressed against his. [D] 
(Hemingway 1995, 45; my italics) 
 
Briefly, here is what is happening in this inconspicuous but far from trivial 
passage (see also Chapter 4, where this excerpt is reused): David and Cather-
ine are on honeymoon. It is the 1920s. Unexpectedly to David, Catherine 
comes home one day with her hair cut short in a new, provocative way. 
 Depending on various circumstances pertaining to the individual reader’s 
moods and inclinations as well as to the unique dynamics of each particular 
reading session, the passage may prompt the following varieties of imagery. 
1.6.1 Enactment-imagery 
 
Enactment-imagery is the former of the two varieties exemplified in 1.6 
above: it belongs to the referential domain and it is experienced from an 
inner stance. It amounts to vicarious experiencing proper of the referential 
contents of a given passage. For instance, upon the reading of Segment [B] 
above, a reader imaging in the enactment mode may adopt David’s first-
person sensorimotor experience so closely as to feel the pressure of a pillow 
against her neck, or squint imperceptibly in an attempt to fixate on the letters 
in David’s book in the shade of an afternoon (we have been told at this point 
that the room has sunshine in the morning). 
Enactment-imagery is probably the dominant aspiration of modern liter-
ary prose with respect to referential imaging, and it is often considered one 
of the most aesthetically rewarding experiences (e.g. Collins 1991, 96). It 
tends to be experientially very rich and robust and it is commonly remem-
bered in the long term (see Sadoski, Goetz, and Kangiser 1988). In spite of, 
or perhaps by virtue of, its experiential richness, it is felt to be extremely 
short-lived during the very act of fluent reading. It is multimodal, often fus-
ing many different sensorimotor modalities, external (e.g. the sight of letters 
on a page) and internal (e.g. the position of one’s arms when holding a book, 
and the muscular tension therein). Whenever such fusion takes place, a sense 
of first-person presence arises relative to the virtual environment of the story 
(for more on the notion of presence and its ties to enactment-imagery, see 
Chapter 2). For a brief moment, then, you are really there, in the shoes of an 
experiencer, in the storyworld, physically linked to David’s (imaged) pillows 
behind your back and his (imaged) book in your hand. The link between the 
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experiencer (and thus also the reader) and the imaged environment need not 
be “literally” physical such as the one between David and his book. Some-
times it is enough that a literary character is simply referred to be looking at 
something, or even just reflecting upon it, for the reader to enact the charac-
ter’s embodied stance vis-à-vis this something. The presence of an experi-
encer (or a strong implication thereof) in the text is, however, a pre-requisite 
of enactment-imagery. 
Enactment-imagery is felt to occur spontaneously, surprising the imager 
at times, and seemingly without much cognitive effort. In important ways, 
enactment-imagery mimics direct perception, it is perceptually mimetic (for 
more on the notion of perceptual mimesis, see Chapter 3). It entails a sense 
of medium transparency. In the instant of experiencing enactment-imagery, 
the reader-imager comes as close as one possibly can to forgetting that the 
experience was in fact mediated by a string of words on a page. The imager 
is directly situated with regard to the storyworld, experiencing no mediating 
filter between her embodied mind and the referential text contents. With 
respect to the narrative at large, the image in turn is perfectly situated, fitting 
seamlessly into the surrounding flow of reading experience. The last two 




Description-imagery is the latter of the two varieties exemplified in 1.6 
above. It belongs to the referential domain and it is experienced from an 
outer stance. Outer stance refers not only to the fact that the internal senses 
are shut off in description-imagery, which employs the visual modality 
alone. It also points to the fact that, as a consequence, the imager’s embodied 
mind is situated outside the storyworld.23 Let me restate my above example. 
My contention that David, in Segment [B], can also be imaged from without 
clearly suggests that even though the explicit or implicit presence of an ex-
periencer (in this case, David) is a necessary pre-requisite of enactment-
imagery, it is not a sufficient pre-requisite. That is, experiencers can also be 
imaged outwardly as objects of description, rather than inwardly as subjects 
of sensorimotor experience proper. This is at the core of description-
imagery. 
                                                       
23 A similar distinction, within the realm of free visual imaging, is drawn by philosopher 
Bernard Williams (1999, 39). Williams argues that one can visualize an object (e.g. a flower 
on a desert island) as perceptually experienced by oneself from within an imaged world (my 
enactment-imagery), or without any perceptual involvement in the imaged world, i.e., without 
imaging one’s own visual perception of the object (my description-imagery). 
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Description-imagery shares some characteristics of enactment-imagery in 
that it yields visual images of objects extended in space, but it is not enactive 
because the experience differs in important ways from direct perception. One 
of the main differences is that the verbal medium is not felt to be fully trans-
parent. Rather than approaching the stretch of text as someone who is expe-
riencing the contents of the mental image directly, the reader thus ap-
proaches it as someone who is being verbally informed of an object (or, in 
this case, a human character) having such-and-such properties or behaving in 
such-and-such manner. For instance, when processing Segment [B] above, 
the visualization of a sketchy male figure reading with a pillow behind his 
head is then experienced as a compliant response to somebody’s (the 
author’s or narrator’s) instructions (see also Scarry 1999, 199) to form a 
visual image of a male figure reading with a pillow behind his head. There-
fore, the image is not experienced to have arisen spontaneously, or not par-
ticularly so. Rather, the reader becomes aware of the cognitive effort in-
vested in the imaging process. The pace of reading is felt to have slowed 
down as the image is being consciously conjured in the reader’s mind. As a 
consequence, the image lacks the experiential richness of enactment-
imagery. 
I have suggested above that enactment-imagery is cued by references to 
literary characters having sensorimotor experiences, especially when physi-
cally linked to the environment by way of direct interaction (e.g. by virtue of 
being seated with pillows amassed behind their back, holding a book in their 
hand). What kind of cues, then, would typically prompt description-
imagery? Given the multimodal sensuous qualities of Hemingway’s prose, 
especially the introductory reference to breeze inviting the reader to form a 
cutaneous enactment-image from the outset (Segment [A]; see also Section 
1.6.5 below), the rendition of David provided in Segment [B] is not a very 
good example. As it is, Segment [B] is much more likely to prompt enact-
ment-imagery. But imagine an alternative version of Hemingway’s passage, 
one in which the pillow behind David’s head is minutely described in several 
long sentences detached from any sense of a person’s perception, action or 
reflection, e.g., as being folded in a particular way and tilted at a particular 
angle, the decorative pattern of the case consisting of minuscule florals of 
such-and-such colors forming such-and-such complicated ornaments. In this 
version, that Hemingway personally would never have written, the flow of 
narration would be interrupted by a static, thickly descriptive bit. Such are 
probably the passages that most often (but far from always) prompt descrip-
tion-imagery, especially when centered around isolated inanimate objects 
(rather than people or larger spatial configurations, see also Section 1.6.5 
below), which cannot be imaged from within. 
To the extent that a description is noticeable as a pause in narrative, a de-
scription-image is not always organically situated (in contrast to enactment-
images) with respect to the preceding flow of reading experience. It may 
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rather be perceived as a semi-autonomous experience. Nor is the reader-
imager’s embodied mind situated with respect to the referential contents 
directly, but only through a filter of verbal communication. At times, this 
filter itself becomes the object of the reader’s mental imagery, while the 
referential contents of a description (or other text structure) fade away from, 
or simply never enter, the reader’s conscious imagery (for more on descrip-
tion-imagery, see Chapter 3). 
1.6.3 Speech-imagery 
 
This is where we are entering the domain of verbal imagery. The first variety 
to be discussed is speech-imagery. Speech-imagery is verbal and it is experi-
enced from an outer stance. What does it mean? It means that speech-
imagery yields verbal auditory images with only a moderate degree of em-
bodied agency. More specifically, it puts the reader in the position of a vi-
carious listener, someone who is receiving the text as if it were spoken out 
loud by an extraneous speaker. So, upon the reading of Segment [B], the 
reader may suddenly feel as though she were hearing the voice of an imper-
sonal narrator, telling her about David spending his afternoon with a book, a 
bunch of pillows behind his back. In retrospect, during a brief instant of 
mental retention occurring now and then throughout the act of reading, the 
reader may even have the impression that there was actual pitch, timbre, 
volume, pace and so forth to the narrator’s voice. 
Again, given the referential suggestiveness of Hemingway’s prose, this 
variety of imagery may not be terribly likely to occur with Segment [B] un-
less the reader is specially predisposed, for instance by a particular weakness 
for rhythm, or by having previously heard the elegant audio edition of the 
novel (Hemingway 2006). Speech-imagery is, on the other hand, quite likely 
to occur with Segment [C] in the same passage (“What did you do, Devil?”). 
Then of course it is not the bland voice of an impersonal narrator what the 
reader images to be hearing (see also Section 1.6.5 below), but the manly 
bass (or whatever voice type the reader happens to fancy) of a full-blooded 
character, David. In typical speech-imagery cues such as David’s question, a 
higher degree of orality is detectable compared to most other instances of 
literary narrative, including Segment [B]. 
In speech-imagery, the verbal medium can never be experienced as fully 
transparent, because language, or human speech more specifically, consti-
tutes the contents proper of a verbal image. However, speech-imagery may 
still seem comparably immediate, because it comes on quickly, spontane-
ously and without effort. Therefore, it may also be experienced as relatively 
robust in terms of experience, despite being limited to the auditory modality. 
Similarly to description-imagery, the situation of the reader is a communica-
tive one rather than one of a direct (referential) experiencer. Similarly to 
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enactment-imagery, speech-imagery is very short-lived, as it is perfectly 
situated with respect to the surrounding flow of narrative experience. No 
lags, delays, or pauses in the flow need to arise for speech-imagery to be-
come fully experienced. 
In fact, speech-imagery marks a degree of situatedness often accompanied 
by referential imagery of the communicative situation (which is not to be 
confused with imagery of the referential contents proper). That is, the reader 
may not only hear David utter his question, but also see him do it (or alterna-
tively see Catherine, David’s interlocutor, or both as engaged in their con-
versation). Needless to say, this combinability of speech-images with various 
nonverbal images of communicative situation does not make such speech-
images referential per se. As long as an image represents the sound of a cir-
cumscribed verbal structure (“What did you do, Devil?”) rather than its non-
verbal contents (hard to define as they are in the case of a question), it will 




Rehearsal-imagery belongs to the verbal domain and it is experienced from 
an inner stance. That is, while the voice imaged in speech-imagery belongs 
to a speaker outside the reader’s body, putting the reader in the position of a 
vicarious listener, the voice imaged in rehearsal-imagery belongs to the 
reader, putting her in the position of a vicarious speaker. The distinctive 
corporeal feature of rehearsal-imagery vis-à-vis speech-imagery is that it is 
consciously felt to deploy the reader’s vocal cords and the muscles in her 
mouth and throat. It is literally inner in that it originates in the reader’s ar-
ticulatory apparatus. Thus rehearsal-imagery is not only auditory, it is also, 
and necessarily, kinesthetic. There need not be much of a voice for one to 
experience rehearsal-imagery, as long as one “feels the vibes.” In fact, there 
cannot be as much voice as in speech-imagery (the pitch, timbre, volume, 
pace and so forth), because the only sound to be imaged is the reader’s own 
subvocalizing. When it comes to hearing, subvocalization is perceptually 
impoverished. It may have rhythm, but not a full-fledged melody, for in-
stance. 
Compared to the other three imagery varieties, rehearsal-imagery may be 
slightly more difficult to predict based on text cues alone. Depending neither 
on the referential imageability of the text contents (as enactment- and de-
scription-imagery do) nor on the notional presence of a distinct speaker (as 
speech-imagery does), rehearsal may be allocated much more randomly. 
Still, in its context, Segment [B] may not be the most persuasive example of 
a sentence to prompt rehearsal-imagery. Segment [D] should work a little 
better: “She raised her head and looked at him and her lips pressed against 
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his and she moved them from side to side and moved on the bed so her body 
was pressed against his.” Rendering in so many words an event that intui-
tively should be referentially quite imageable, the length of this sentence is 
likely to make some readers impatient. Another way to put it: Because of its 
syntax, the sentence is in particular need of explicit rhythm and parsing, for 
both of which it depends on the reader’s articulatory apparatus. For optimal 
comprehension, many readers may thus experience sentences akin to the 
present one by way of rehearsal-imagery. 
Similarly to description-imagery (as compared to enactment-imagery), the 
embodied experience of rehearsal-imagery entails significantly more cogni-
tive effort as compared to speech-imagery. Reading is felt to lag behind the 
text as it were, because this is where the limits of the verbal medium are 
tried, the reader becoming fully aware of language in its opacity. With the 
reader’s own vocal apparatus as its medium proper, the mental image feels 
far from spontaneous or immediate. The reader’s experience is non-situated 
both with respect to the preceding flow of reading overall and with respect to 
the referential contents of the image. For at the very point of experiencing 
rehearsal-imagery, the reader imaginatively partakes neither in direct percep-
tual experience nor in communicative speech, as the words are being 
mouthed over for her to make any basic sense of them at all.24 Although 
weak in terms of auditory perception, rehearsal-imagery is an imagery vari-
ety nevertheless. In certain markedly literary types of narrative prose (see 
also Section 1.7 below), it may also be the dominant variety (for more on 





                                                       
24 Subvocalization resembling of the corporeal basis of rehearsal-imagery is sometimes in-
volved in what may provisionally be termed speech-enactment-imagery. For instance, as a 
result of Hemingway’s subtle casting of the situation, David’s question in Segment [C] can in 
fact be enacted from David’s perceptual and communicative vantage point. That is to say, the 
reader can adopt the doubly inner stance of a speaker-cum-experiencer without the verbal 
medium of literature seeming in the least opaque. Segment [C] taken in isolation, this imagery 
experience may superficially seem to correspond to rehearsal-imagery. Yet, from the view-
point of the broader situation encompassing several sentences preceding Segment [C], it may 
rather be defined as anything but rehearsal-imagery. (I am grateful to Martin Pokorný for 
bringing this to my attention.) The focus of this dissertation being the basic varieties of mental 
imagery, a fuller analysis of such complex, composite imagery experiences has yet to be 
elaborated. 
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Figure 2 Imagery continuum 
 
My above descriptions of the four imagery varieties are summarized in Fig-
ure 2. Apart from imposing a much needed order onto the many distinctive 
qualities and variables recounted above, Figure 2 puts additional emphasis 
on an aspect hitherto unspoken: the four imagery varieties can be conceptu-
alized as interlinked in a single experiential continuum. That is, what the 
double-headed arrows in Figure 2 are meant to show is that each pair of ad-
jacent varieties may sometimes be experienced to shade off into each other 
in the fluent course of reading. One could speculate that within the two basic 
domains of imagery, the referential and the verbal, such transitions may be 
experienced as relatively smooth (but see Chapter 4), whereas between the 
two domains, they may be more readily perceptible. Between domains, they 
may require an instant of imageless processing so as to allow the reader time 
for a (presumably cognitively taxing) figure/ground reversal from the refer-
ential to the verbal or vice versa. In addition, the double-headed arrows re-
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mind us that what was described in Sections 1.6.1 to 1.6.4 are just proto-
types, and that various kinds of in-between experiences are conceivable, at 
least within domains, combining the properties of two different imagery 
varieties. 
 Logically speaking, it would not make much sense to talk about “proto-
typical” in-between phenomena. However, let me single out one possible 
case of in-between imagery for each domain. Starting with the referential 
domain, what kind of experiences may be located in the midst of the arrow 
that links enactment-imagery with description-imagery? I have proposed that 
enactment-imagery, amounting to first-person enactment of the embodied 
stance of a direct experiencer, requires that the presence of an experiencer is 
indeed mentioned, or strongly implied, in the text. I have also proposed that 
description-imagery, amounting to visualization from the perspective of an 
extraneous spectator, is most reliably prompted by descriptions (detailed) of 
inanimate objects, which cannot possibly be imaged from within. 
Then how about descriptions (more or less detailed) of spatial configura-
tions such as rooms, buildings, landscapes and some such? Even though they 
refer to the inanimate, they certainly can be imaged from within. To the ex-
tent that an impersonal description of an uninhabited space seems compel-
ling, the reader can therefore readily adopt the vantage point of a direct ex-
periencer-spectator without necessarily adopting the vantage point of a liter-
ary character. This is the kind of image one may easily form for Heming-
way’s Segment [A] if read in isolation (“The breeze from the sea was 
blowing through the room”). Technically, this image would be neither an 
enactment-image nor a description-image, feeding primarily on the cutane-
ous sense and only very little on the visual.25 
For some, the in-between experience may even persist throughout the 
subsequent Segment [B], the reader instantaneously becoming a quiet spec-
tator watching David from somewhere in his room. That is, due to the intro-
ductory reference to breeze, the improbable description-image of David de-
fined in Section 1.6.2 would in most cases rather correspond to this in-
between variety. However, if this in-between imagery were to be reliably 
sustained, Segment [B] would probably need to refer to inanimate objects 
only, or alternatively, render the human character (or several characters, thus 
complicating the process of perspective-taking) more generically, e.g.: 
                                                       
25 That is to say, I am only moderately inclined to adopt the idea (e.g. MacWhinney 2005) that 
all language comprehension involves distinct perspective taking, unless this idea is simply 
meant to suggest that human comprehenders cannot step outside their own bodies. Analo-




The breeze from the sea was blowing through the room and a man/two people 
was/were reading with his/their shoulders and the small of his/their back 
against two pillows and another folded behind his/their head.  
 
In any case, such outer image would only persist until the first mention, in 
the subsequent sentence, of David’s inner feelings of being sleepy and hol-
low. That mention reliably locates the perceptual center inside David’s body, 
arousing enactment-imagery instead. 
In-between experiences may also occur in the verbal domain. In fact, one 
such experience has been described (or nearly so) in Section 1.6.3 above. I 
am thinking of the kind of speech-imagery (or nearly so) one may experi-
ence when mentally imaging sentences that can only be attributed to imper-
sonal narrators, e.g., the one informing us about David’s quiet afternoon. 
The voice of this modern, ontologically indistinct sort of narrator who does 
not make the slightest effort to introduce him- or herself as a speaker in his 
or her own right (e.g. by overtly commenting on what is happening, or ad-
dressing the “Dear Reader”) may often sound rather bland, impoverished, 
impersonal. More precisely, albeit seemingly extraneous to the reader’s 
body, the only voice imaged in many such scenarios is the reader’s own sub-
vocalizing. Strictly speaking, this variety of verbal mental imaging corre-
sponds neither to speech-imagery (it is not properly voiced) nor to rehearsal-
imagery (first-person articulatory activity does not reach the reader’s con-
sciousness). 
Unlike the referential kind of in-between imagery often prompted by spa-
tial description, this verbal kind of in-between imagery cannot be easily pre-
dicted to occur with a specific type of text cue. It can only be predicted in a 
most generic way, by saying that it is likely to occur when the narrator is 
ontologically indistinct, refraining from judgement, commentary, and oral 
residues of the “Dear Reader” family (see also Section 1.8 below).26 Like in 
the referential domain, the boundary between what is prototypical and what 
is in-between is thin, partly because transitions happen in a matter of milli-
seconds. It may even seem hairsplitting, which is why in-between varieties 
were not plotted onto the continuum in Figure 2, and why they will not be 
explored in subsequent chapters. Like in the referential domain, moreover, 
my last example of in-between imagery experience makes it obvious that the 
question of imageability and image variation largely boils down to the ques-
tion of embodied figuration (Is there a human body felt to be acting/speaking 
in the text?), the explicitness thereof or, even more precisely, the degree 
thereof (see also Caracciolo 2011). 
                                                       
26 Alternatively, in-between verbal imagery may be common in the reading of narratives 
employing stylistic strategies such as free indirect discourse and stream of consciousness, 
where characters’ utterances are at times consistently fused or intermingled with the ones 
attributable to impersonal narrators. 
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1.6.6 The asymmetry between the referential and the verbal 
 
With the basic and in-between imagery varieties tentatively described, this is 
the point to go back to questions e) and f) in our introductory list: 
 
e) How does a mental image of a particular variety relate to perception? 
f) How does it relate to higher-order meaning-making? 
 
This is the point to explain that question e) will only be tackled in the refer-
ential domain (Chapters 2 and 3), while question f) will only be tackled in 
the verbal domain (Chapter 4). A few comments on this asymmetry will help 
further clarify the structure, rationale, and theoretical assumptions underly-
ing the dissertation as a whole. 
For e), let me start defending the asymmetry from the negative end, i.e., 
beginning with the verbal domain. While a specific theory of perception 
especially relevant for this dissertation will eventually need to be spelled out 
(see Chapter 2), “perception” will now simply stand for real (as opposed to 
merely imaged) sensory experiences of a world out there, without further 
qualification. Having said that, it is fairly easy to explain why e), a question 
of major interest in the philosophy of mental imagery in general, will be left 
aside with respect to verbal imagery. Suffice to recall the one distinctive 
difference already established between the two verbal imagery prototypes: 
speech-imagery and rehearsal-imagery. As defined above, rehearsal-imagery 
(in contrast to speech-imagery) has only little to do with what is commonly 
understood as perception proper, i.e., with the external senses, more specifi-
cally with hearing. It has already been established that rehearsal-imagery is 
utterly perceptually impoverished. Instead, rehearsal-imagery depends for its 
existence primarily on kinesthetic self-awareness directed toward the mouth 
and throat, from which the sense of hearing oneself subvocalize arises by 
association. That is, one probably knows from common linguistic experience 
that specific movements of one’s vocal cords, when palpable, tend to bring 
about specific sounds. Thus one becomes particularly prone to hearing some-
thing during subvocalization. 
Moreover, unlike in the other imagery varieties, mental imagery of real 
auditory perception is only one part of this “something” to be heard. Most 
readers will hopefully agree that rehearsal-imagery often sounds more like 
one’s whisper than like one’s voice in fuller, externally audible performance. 
And as far as this whisper component is concerned, it may be difficult to 
determine how much of it is merely imaged and how much of it is, in fact, 
real. For in the experience of rehearsal-imagery, one’s vocal cords are not 
merely imaged to be moving, they are really moving, and sometimes also 
really, if barely perceptibly, whispering. The only thing that certainly is per-
ceptual imagery pure and simple, then, is the occasional tone of one’s sub-
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vocalization. (If rehearsal were strictly subvocal, there would never be a 
tone.) 
Even if the relative perceptual poverty can be considered a reason enough 
to avoid describing rehearsal-imagery in perceptual terms primarily, substan-
tial observations may still be made about the discrete auditory perceptual 
qualities of speech-imagery (the above-mentioned pitch, timbre, volume, 
pace and so forth). However, such observations will not be made in this dis-
sertation but in a rather cursory manner. The reason for this is that the de-
scriptions of the four basic imagery varieties provided in Chapters 2 to 4 are 
meant to be, and function best when presented as, contrastive descriptions. 
As may have become obvious in the introductory outline of the four imagery 
varieties (Sections 1.6.1 to 1.6.4 above), the nature of description-imagery 
becomes clear only when properly contrasted against the standard of enact-
ment-imagery. The respective qualities of speech-imagery and rehearsal-
imagery, in turn, only become clear when contrasted against each other. 
Since speech-imagery and rehearsal-imagery are so obviously incommen-
surable with regard to perception, they will further be contrasted primarily 
with regard to other facets of the experience, namely higher-order meaning-
making (more on that soon), rather than perception. 
Before question e) is abandoned for another while, let me briefly com-
ment on its crucial role in further charting the referential domain of imagery. 
That enactment-imagery is in important ways analogous to actual perception 
is assumed and self-evident yet by no means trivial. This analogy will consti-
tute the main topic of Chapter 2. What makes the nature of actual perception 
a suitable catalyst in the process of contrasting enactment-imagery with de-
scription-imagery is, among other things, the ease with which the two im-
agery varieties are commonly conflated in relation to real-world perceptual 
experience. Literary scholars and critics often speak about “vivid,” even 
“perceptually mimetic” or “illusionistic” visual descriptions when referring 
to utterly static descriptive passages. Such conflations are flawed. They are 
flawed not only in that they confuse vividness with meticulosity, they are 
also flawed in that they seem to assume that description-imagery is analo-
gous to perception in any other than the most basic, referential sense (i.e. the 
sense that description-imagery refers to objects and object categories we 
usually know from perceptual experience). Granted, my own introductory 
definition of description-imagery (Section 1.6.2 above) may also appear to 
suggest that description-imagery is just a perceptually weaker form of en-
actment-imagery. Most of Chapter 3 will be dedicated to arguing against 
such a simplified view of description-imagery. In a certain respect, then, 
enactment-imagery and description-imagery may likewise be considered 
incommensurable with regard to perception. Given how commonly the two 
experiences are conflated, however, they are clearly incommensurable in a 
less obvious, and more productive, way than the verbal varieties of imagery. 
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Now let us proceed to question f): How do the discrete imagery varieties 
relate to higher-order meaning-making? Or rather: Why does it make sense 
to ask this question about verbal imagery, but not so much about referential 
imagery? For the time being, the following may serve as a shorthand defini-
tion of higher-order meaning-making (to be elaborated in Chapter 4): 
Higher-order meaning-making stands for any conscious conceptual thought 
experienced simultaneously with a mental image in the fluent course of read-
ing. This time, let us start affirmatively rather than in the negative. Once 
more, let us start with rehearsal-imagery, the fourth and last imagery proto-
type. I have said earlier in this section that rehearsal-imagery only partly 
consists of imagery, because some of its contents are real, perceptual in fact. 
There is another way in which rehearsal-imagery is less of an autonomous 
imagery phenomenon when compared to the other three imagery varieties. I 
am thinking of its similarity to inner speech, i.e., free conceptual thought as 
experienced in a subvocal yet linguistic format. Inner speech is something 
most people engage in most of the time, not only during advanced problem 
solving, but also in the shower, or in the line at the grocer’s when they let 
their minds wander freely (for a review, see e.g. Vicente and Martinez Man-
rique 2011). 
An experiential continuum of sorts may thus be drawn between what it is 
like to have rehearsal-images and what it is like to simply be aware of one’s 
own thinking, for instance in the course of interpreting a stretch of text. With 
speech-imagery, the situation is similar. It is similar in that speech-imagery, 
just like rehearsal imagery and inner speech, is propositional in nature. At 
the same time the situation is different, because in speech-imagery, language 
is imaged to occur inside one’s mind yet originate elsewhere (in the vocal 
apparatus of an imaginary speaker). That is to say, speech-imagery and re-
hearsal-imagery each share important phenomenal features of inner speech 
proper, although they are partly different features in each case. Hence the 
obvious and non-trivial relevance of higher-order meaning-making to verbal 
imagery. This nexus between verbal imagery and higher-order meaning-
making constitutes the main topic of Chapter 4, the final chapter of this dis-
sertation. 
Finally, let me elaborate on why question f) will not concern referential 
imagery. (A reasonably detailed exposure of this problem would require a 
separate treatise.) Throughout the history of literary theory, opinions diverge 
widely concerning the compatibility or incompatibility of higher-order 
meaning-making, or interpretation as they say, with referential imagery. The 
generations of literary scholars who denigrated referential imagery as a su-
perficial, even immature form of reader response largely assumed referential 
imaging to preclude interpretation (Esrock 1994, 180). Theorists working in 
the wake of phenomenology suggested that the two forms of response may 
indeed be equally important for the overall reading experience yet mutually 
constraining in the course of reading (Iser 1980, 60). With the current up-
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surge in embodied, second-generation cognitive approaches to literature, it is 
now becoming more and more common to assume that referential imagery is 
somehow necessary for interpretation to occur (e.g. Chapelle Wojciehowski 
and Gallese 2011; Spolsky 2011). 
Endorsing the framework of embodied cognition, these contemporary 
theoretical proposals are certainly well-founded scientifically and philoso-
phically. However, few of these proposals (for exceptions, see Caracciolo 
2012; Cuddy-Keane 2010) explicitly deal with the problem of consciousness 
as defined above (Section 1.4). Even fewer consider the question of simulta-
neity: It is unclear whether they refer to bits of higher-order meaning as ex-
perienced to occur simultaneously with each discrete referential mental im-
age, or larger complexes of interpretation arising cumulatively in retrospect, 
perhaps after the last mental image has vanished and the reader has closed 
the book. Last but not least, they tend to avoid the following questions: What 
is the distinctive quality of higher-order meaning-making in terms of phe-
nomenal experience? If higher-order meaning always boils down to embod-
ied, pre-linguistic imagery the way second-generation cognitive science sug-
gests, how does one know at any given instant that one is really engaging in 
conscious interpretation rather than “just” mental imagery? 
My suggested answer to these questions has already been hinted on: One 
basic experiential feature of the fragmentary ad hoc interpretations occurring 
now and then throughout every reading session is that they are at least partly 
verbal in format, similarly to verbal imagery (and similarly to inner speech). 
On the level of consciousness, they are borne by questions and propositions 
resembling the likes of “What does X mean?”, “This is significant with re-
spect to Y.”, and so forth (see also Chapter 4). This is not to say that ques-
tions such as these must be rehearsed in full for interpretation to get going. 
Thought is often much quicker than that. 
That conscious thought, such as occurs in interpretation, is experienced as 
essentially verbal is not a new idea, although in its broader applications (i.e. 
when applied to the non-conscious substrate of all higher-order cognition 
rather than limited to conscious thought experience; e.g. Fodor 1980), it is 
now largely rejected. Unfortunately, a detailed argument in support of this 
idea falls outside the scope of this dissertation. At this point the idea needs to 
be accepted for the sake of my further argument. Assuming it is accepted, 
my reason to exempt the referential domain from reflections on compatibil-
ity with higher-order meaning-making can be briefly explained by the fol-
lowing: Verbal imagery and conscious conceptual thought share a funda-
ment, i.e., the verbal format. Due to this common fundament, they are pre-
sumably subject to some form of mutual interference. Referential imagery, 
on the other hand, is by definition nonverbal in format. 
Having circled back to cognitive science, let me continue with further ref-
erence to Sadoski and Paivio’s dual coding theory (see also Section 1.3 
above). Sadoski and Paivio suggest that the two parallel cognitive systems, 
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the nonverbal (in my nomenclature: the referential) and the verbal, albeit 
interconnected by the mechanisms of linguistic reference (hearing the word 
“cup” can activate the mental image of a cup, and vice versa), operate inde-
pendently of each other. This is similar to what I have just suggested for 
referential imagery on the one hand and conscious conceptual thought on the 
other. Conscious conceptual thought should thus be placed on the left-hand 
side in Sadoski and Paivio’s schema (Figure 1 above), together with all the 
other verbal phenomena (Sadoski and Paivio 2001, 46–47). Importantly, this 
means that referential imagery may connect with conscious conceptual 
thought in a potentially unlimited number of ways. But without the common 
fundament, i.e., without the possibility of mutual interference, there is no-
where to start in theorizing the countless possible interconnections in a con-
cise and systematic manner.  
Now what exactly is meant above by mutual interference? Here is one ex-
ample from the sphere of visual cognition: Under some circumstances, visual 
referential imagery may be more fully at work when people listen to text 
being read out loud compared to when they read it themselves. The standard 
argument for this hypothesis is that the listening mind runs lesser risk of 
getting visually overtaxed from simultaneous processing of letters on a page 
(Sadoski and Paivio 2001, 46). In my view, an analogous risk is pressing in 
the nexus of verbal imagery and higher-order meaning-making (too many 
verbal processes may need to be handled simultaneously), but not so in the 
referential domain. The impossibility of concise systematic theorizing apart, 
what does this analogy entail in practical terms? It may entail that referential 
imaging guarantees unrestrained, i.e., generally greater, occurrence of con-
scious conceptual thought as compared to verbal imaging. However, things 
are not as simple. Once more, the problem of consciousness complicates the 
matter, because it is not only the discrete modal systems (e.g. the visual or 
the verbal) that can get overtaxed, but also consciousness at large. Our atten-
tional resources are notoriously limited. Consequently, during the more ro-
bust instances of enactment-imagery, one’s embodied mind is likely too busy 
anyway with the vicarious sensory experience to simultaneously manage 
higher-order meaning-making. In the brief instant one really gets to see, feel, 
hear or smell the storyworld, the storyworld is simply there and there may be 
little need or even possibility for simultaneous interpreting (see also Section 
1.8 below).27 
To sum up, general attentional constraints being the only thing certain in 
the nexus between referential imagery and higher-order meaning-making, it 
would be too difficult to theorize that nexus in this dissertation. Having just 
                                                       
27 Furthermore, the communicative aspect of reading remaining backgrounded (see Figure 2 
above) in enactment-imagery, there may be relatively little intentionality perceived on the part 
of the reader, and thus no use for interpretation in the sense of disentangling an underlying 
intention. 
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devoted considerable time to the respective difficulties in addressing ques-
tion e) in the verbal domain and question f) in the referential domain, let me 
now turn to such matters that can be addressed more productively, although 
they will expressly be addressed in the present chapter only. I will start with 
a few more reflections on the above-mentioned attentional constraints, and 
on how generally valid they are when it comes to the reading of literature. 
As a natural outcome of these reflections, the next section will also delimit 
and explain the one half of the main title of this dissertation (Mental Imagery 
in the Experience of Literary Narrative) that has had to remain in obscurity, 
namely my working notion of “literary narrative.” 
1.7 Narrative, literariness, and prose 
 
As suggested by the reference to “narrative” in my dissertation title, what 
has been and will be proposed regarding the workings of readerly mental 
imagery is not meant to apply to literary reading across the board. For cer-
tain instances of literary reading, such as the reading of much modern (non-
narrative, i.e., lyric) poetry, the above proposed mechanisms of mental im-
age generation are only valid if modified. The necessary modification will be 
proposed further down in this section. 
On the other hand, if “literary” reading is defined loosely as reading for 
leisure rather than practical (e.g. educational) purposes, then my account of 
the basic imagery varieties is likewise valid for a great deal of nonliterary 
reading. For instance, a simple piece of journalism or a cookbook recipe may 
sometimes prompt more vivid mental imagery, following the patterns out-
lined in Section 1.6 above, compared to the most accomplished novel.28 In a 
certain sense, then, the artistic merit of a text is not decisive for the instanta-
neous presence or absence of imagery, and the presence or absence of im-
agery is no reliable indicator of a text’s artistic merit, although mental im-
agery arguably is one of the things that elevate one’s reading experience to 
the realm of the aesthetic. 
Besides, not every literary narrative (i.e. narrative written and perused for 
leisure rather than practical purposes) is perceived as strikingly imageable, at 
least not in the sense of referential imagery. In many cases, other, more 
highly conceptual qualities overrule one’s imagery (or more precisely, one’s 
embodied simulation), which then remains backgrounded and barely acces-
sible to consciousness. Still I have settled for delimiting my imagery descrip-
tions to literary narrative. Now, having loosely defined the literary, what 
                                                       
28 The obvious difference being that the daily news or cookbook recipes, unlike literary narra-
tives, are rarely read with the express objective of experiencing mental imagery. 
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exactly is “narrative”? Narratologist David Herman characterizes narrative 
as follows: 
(i) a mode of representation that is situated in – must be interpreted in light of 
– a specific discourse context or occasion for telling. This mode of representa-
tion (ii) focuses on a structured time-course of particularized events. In addi-
tion, the events represented are (iii) such that they introduce some sort of dis-
ruption or disequilibrium into a storyworld, whether that world is presented as 
actual or fictional, realistic or fantastic, remembered or dreamed, etc. The rep-
resentation also (iv) conveys what it is like to live through this storyworld-in- 
flux, highlighting the pressure of events on real or imagined consciousnesses 
undergoing the disruptive experience at issue. (Herman 2009, 9) 
 
In his definition, Herman refers to typical narrative qua enclosed semiotic 
entity, e.g., a completed text or a representative excerpt thereof. The defini-
tion is compelling, particularly when confronted with the above excerpt from 
Hemingway’s The Garden of Eden (Section 1.6, reprinted further down in 
this section), a narrative token exemplary for many of the theses put forward 
in this dissertation. Considered as a whole, this Hemingway quote has all the 
elements proposed by Herman under i-iv. However, discrete mental images 
do not wait until one has finished reading the whole. They occur instantane-
ously in the flow of reading and are subject to modulation on the sub-
sentential, even (in the case of verbal imagery) phonemic level. They may 
well be co-determined, through the reader’s tacit expectations based on pre-
vious reading experience, by all of Herman’s four “elements of narrative.” 
But in the very instant the reader is experiencing a discrete mental image, 
attentional constraints will likely force one of the elements to dominate over 
the others (see Figure 3 below): “what it’s like” (iv) for enactment-imagery, 
elementary “worldmaking” (iii) for description-imagery, discourse or telling 
(i) for speech- and rehearsal-imagery. In each instant, the other two will be 
relegated to outside consciousness. (Abbreviated labels in quotation marks 
are Herman’s own; Herman 2009, 9) 
Before I go on characterizing narrative with further help from Herman’s 
definition, let me now briefly return to my above account of the four im-
agery varieties. The account suggests that in-between experiences and more 
or less gradual transitions are possible (Section 1.6.5), while various sorts of 
attentional trade-off nevertheless impinge. For instance, awareness of the 
verbal medium (as necessitated by Herman’s element i) is precluded in en-
actment-imagery. More generally, the linear continuum does not allow the 
two farthermost imagery experiences, i.e., enactment-imagery and rehearsal-
imagery, to meet. There is no single in-between experience to perceiving 
something as fully unmediated and fully mediate. In other words, the respec-
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tive experiences of referential and verbal imagery may be, to a certain de-













“What it’s like” 
(iv) 
“Worldmaking” 
(iii) “Discourse or telling” (i) 
Figure 3 Imagery continuum (basic) with Herman’s “elements of narrative” 
 
This is the point to further modify my claims regarding the basic mecha-
nisms, particularly the latter attentional trade-offs, in readerly mental im-
agery by delimiting their validity to narrative only. I will thus offer my own 
tentative (and consciously circular) definition of narrative, and eventually 
also contrast narrative mental imagery to mental imagery in (lyric) poetry, 
thus tentatively characterizing (lyric) poetry. 
Obviously, one of Herman’s four elements fell out of my alignment with 
the four imagery varieties, namely what Herman himself abbreviates as 
“event sequencing” (ii). This is not because I fail to see its importance. 
Rather, I consider event sequencing, or the reader’s underlying expectations 
(whether constantly fulfilled or instantaneously frustrated) toward singling 
out “particularized events,” to be a necessary pre-requisite for the other ele-
ments to add up to narrative. While all the other elements, even in combina-
tion, may occur in the lyric or essayistic genres, and while their presence in a 
full-fledged narrative can sometimes be quite inconspicuous (for instance, 
you get relatively little sense of what it is like “to live through the story-
world” from Old Norse Sagas), event sequencing is in my view the one es-
sential and omnipresent feature of narrative and narrative reading proper (see 
also Meister 2008). 
This is reflected in the imagery experiences narrative gives rise to: The 
perceptual experience propelled in enactment-imagery represents a percep-
tual event. Description-imagery, the impoverished cousin of enactment-
imagery, stands out as a perceived lack of such events. Speech-imagery rep-
resents discourse as a speech event. Finally, the distinctive feature of re-
hearsal-imagery is that it is perceived as failing to do so. And the modifica-
tion to be made now is the following: My continuum as reprinted in Figure 
                                                       
29 As previously mentioned (and in contrast to Sadoski and Paivio), some researchers assume 
that referential and verbal imagery, or referential and verbal simulation more precisely, are 




3, and the attentional trade-offs it implies, works only as long as the reader 
remains to be on the lookout for discrete events and approaches the verbal 
medium as a means (Ingarden 1973a, 91) of representing such events. 
In the opening of this section I drew a false opposition between narrative 
on the one hand and poetry on the other. The correct opposition is one be-
tween prose and poetry and between narrative and lyric, respectively. That is 
why the lyric has been used as an additional qualifier in brackets. For an 
illustration of this point, see the following bit of modern narrative (and ut-
terly imageable) poetry, a poem entitled “Poem” by William Carlos Wil-
liams: 
As the cat 
climbed over 
the top of 
 
the jamcloset 




then the hind 
stepped down 
 
into the pit of 
the empty 
flowerpot 
(W. C. Williams 1991, 253) 
 
There are, however, particular reasons to why I have opted for the false op-
position. Not only does the term “lyric” have obsolete connotations, having 
been traditionally reserved for such literature that draws largely on the sub-
jective states of one or several individuals (a definition that happens to 
match much of modern narrative) rather than objective events. The term 
“poetry” brings in connotations far more important for my purposes. In fact, 
it is meant here to refer to such moments in a text and the reading thereof 
when language seizes to be perceived primarily as a mere medium serving to 
represent a series of events. For the most primitive of examples, consider 
once more my excerpt from The Garden of Eden, specifically David’s ques-
tion: 
The breeze from the sea was blowing through the room and [David] was read-
ing with his shoulders and the small of his back against two pillows and an-
other folded behind his head. He was sleepy after lunch but he felt hollow 
with waiting for her and he read and waited. Then he heard the door open and 
[Catherine] came in and for an instant he did not know her. She stood there 
with her hands below her breasts on the cashmere sweater and breathing as 
though she had been running. 
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“Oh, no,” she said. “No.” 
Then she was on the bed pushing her head against him saying, “No. No. 
Please David. Don’t you at all?” 
He held her close against his chest and felt it smooth close clipped and 
coarsely silky and she pushed it hard against him again and again. 
“What did you do, Devil?” 
She raised her head and looked at him and her lips pressed against his and 
she moved them from side to side and moved on the bed so her body was 
pressed against his. 
(Hemingway 1995, 45; my italics) 
 
“Devil” is not the commonest way of addressing a wife at honeymoon. If it 
is not the most inventive of metaphors, it is certainly not petrified. As such it 
is a perfect instance of narrative language with pronounced potential of 
drawing attention to itself, or what has also been known as stylistic “fore-
grounding.” So let us posit a reader to whom this metaphor, upon first en-
counter, appears very fresh and striking. While one would probably be hesi-
tant to consider it lyric, as long as there are readers to whom it is striking, 
“Devil” is certainly poetic talk on David’s part, hence my previous use of the 
term “poetry.” Another way of putting it is that poetry (at least under the 
same school that coined the term “foregrounding,” i.e., structuralism) may 
be understood as such literary language that markedly deviates from the 
readers’ instantaneous stylistic expectations. A third traditional notion that 
comes to mind is “literariness” narrowly defined (for the notions of fore-
grounding and literariness, see e.g. Miall and Kuiken 1994), i.e., defined not 
as the opposite of practical purpose or some such (see above), but rather as a 
local feature of a text and its reception that can be present to lesser or greater 
degree. Apparently, it is not (or not primarily) literariness in this latter sense 
that the title of this dissertation is alluding to. 
Deliberately written by its author in utterly simple sentences and limited 
vocabulary, The Garden of Eden as a whole scores relatively low on local 
literariness (or poetry or foregrounding) in this sense. David’s “Devil” hap-
pens to be one of very few instances of figurative language occurring 
throughout the book. All the more reason for our hypothetical reader to be 
struck by the unconventionality of it. Now, to this hypothetical reader, the 
metaphor seems so fresh that a shift in focus takes place, a shift from the 
monitoring of narrative events to reflecting upon the linguistic choices made 
in their representation. There comes an instant of non-narrativity as it were. 
What does this mean in terms of mental imagery? In other words, how may 
(lyric) poetry be characterized with regard to the discrete imagery varieties? 
In a prototypical case of the poetic (or foregrounded or literary), here is 
what may happen: One, the metaphor seems so fresh that the reader has to 
mouth it over in subvocal rehearsal in order to make some basic sense of it 
(rehearsal-imagery). Two, it also seems fresh precisely by virtue of yielding 
a visual image of a Devil, rather than a woman who has just had her hair cut, 
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or a blended visual image (Gleason 2009) of both (description-imagery). 
Three, the reader’s surprise at the metaphor informs her auditory perception 
of David as a speaker (speech-imagery). And four, the reader might even 
come to wonder how emotional David must be about his wife’s haircut since 
he is using a metaphor as fresh and strong as this one. Consequently, the 
reader may identify with David and image his perceptual vantage point in-
cluding his body posture, with the chunk of a pillow behind his back and the 
breeze from the sea against his skin (enactment-imagery). Importantly, all 
that may happen in a fraction of a second and be perceived as simultaneous. 
This, I would like to suggest, is distinctive about (lyric) poetry, as well as 
any stray poetic devices occasionally employed in prose narrative, when it 
comes to mental imagery. The four discrete imagery varieties are there and 
one may even find some intrinsic value in describing them one by one, but 
there is little use in trying to tease them apart into a temporal sequence. For 













Figure 4 Poetic imagery continuum 
 
The multi-headed arrow is meant to signify that the four imagery varieties 
may potentially be experienced to combine and intermingle rather than just 
sequentially phase out into each other, which is the case in narrative. In other 
words, in the skilled, aesthetically replete reading of poetry, our normal at-
tentional constraints may be required to loosen up. This is probably one of 
the reasons why (lyric) poetry is often considered, even by many of the most 
perceptive readers of narrative, as enormously difficult to read. For these 
readers, too many things keep happening simultaneously to their mind in 
(lyric) poetry, including too many sorts of mental imagery. This is also why 
the systematic description of imagery processes in poetry, not to speak of 
empirical study, may prove extremely difficult to undertake. 
Having previously brought up the two classical oppositions narrative vs. 
lyric and prose vs. poetry, a few words remain to be said about the last term 
in the equation, i.e., prose. Traditionally, prose is the plain style of delivery 
that is organized freely, without an underlying stylistic, especially rhythmi-
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cal, idiosyncrasy vis-à-vis ordinary communication.30 Given what has just 
been asserted regarding the poetic, prose in this technical sense, often in 
combination with generally prosaic, i.e., relatively mundane, imageable con-
tent matter (as found for instance in Williams’ “Poem”), may serve as a con-
cise qualifier of the kind of literary narratives this dissertation will primarily 
refer to, explicitly or implicitly.31 It will primarily refer to the large family of 
modern literary narrative aspiring to yield (here and there, some way or an-
other) mental images of the referential kind. In other words, it will primarily 
refer to the comparably plain and down-to-earth branch of literary narrative 
where a storyworld is set up with enough coherence and similarity to the 
actual world for the reader to deploy her own perceptual experience, and 
where the prose representing narrative events is transparent enough for those 
events to mostly remain in focus at the cost of the linguistic medium. Simply 
put, it will primarily refer to narratives that may fairly be viewed as referen-
tially biased in themselves. Because no matter how inadequate referential 
bias may be in scholarly work on mental imagery (see Section 1.3 above), 
the (non-scholarly) modern reader’s elementary desire for referential evoca-
tion remains an established fact. One epitome of such plain, referentially 
evocative prose is precisely the work of Ernest Hemingway, which can be 
found to comment upon its own guiding principles in several places in The 
Garden of Eden, such as the following: 
It was a very young boy’s story, he knew, when he had finished it. He read it 
over and saw the gaps he must fill in to make it so that whoever read it would 
feel it was truly happening as it was read and he marked the gaps in the mar-
gin. (Hemingway 1995, 201) 
 
This is not to say that literary examples in subsequent chapters will consist 
only in quotes from Hemingway, or only in quotes from twentieth-century 
fiction in English.32 For instance, a great deal of imagery phenomena (most 
notably in Chapter 2) will be illustrated by examples picked from another 
                                                       
30 It should be noted, however, that ordinary spoken and presumably also unedited written 
communication often is rhythmically and otherwise (e.g. automatic alliteration) patterned 
(Jefferson 1996). Non-consciously on the part of the speaker, even the seemingly plainest of 
prose thus deploys poetic devices. Therefore, the opposition between poetry and prose, simi-
larly to the opposition between narrative and lyric, must be seen as a gradient rather than a 
strictly categorical distinction.  
31 In the particular case of Chapter 3, I will be referring to “literary prose” and some such 
interchangeably with my present usage of “literary narrative”. This is because in Chapter 3, 
the notion of narrative also operates as a macro-level text-type within the larger genre, in a 
binary opposition to the notion of description. 
32 If anything, this is rather to say that literary narratives systematically flouting the basic 
conventions of worldmaking (e.g. some of the work of Samuel Beckett), would make the 
opposite of good examples in the context of this dissertation. 
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literary tradition notoriously steeped in the perceptual, namely from the 
modern French novel. Nevertheless, all literary and linguistic choices below 
should be viewed as more or less random. The theoretical theses to be pre-
sented should resonate, in some form and with some individuals, with a 
wider array of modern literate cultures and readership. This of course is a 
statement in need of a historical disclaimer. I will provide one now, in the 
closing section of this chapter.  
1.8 Referential vs. verbal imagery in the history of 
reading 
 
Despite the general theoretical aspirations of this dissertation, it must be at 
least briefly acknowledged that reader response, likely including the nature 
of mental imagery, is historically determined. If the psychophysiological 
substrates of reading have been found to vary synchronically across today’s 
cultures (Saenger 2000, 1–6), then it is more than likely that they have also 
been changing diachronically within the broadly conceived Western moder-
nity (say, post-Gutenberg European and American culture) which sets the 
norms and boundaries of most literary theory. We cannot produce robust 
evidence of how silent reading was structured on a psychophysiological 
level in the past. But we can speculate about how it was experienced by 
means of deduction from the antecedents of narrative theory such as ancient 
rhetoric, from historians’ accounts of reading practices, and from the evolu-
tion of literary narrative as such. At a glance, the three perspectives seem to 
converge. 
In rhetoric, poetics, and other writings prefiguring narrative theory, as 
well as in historical scholarship dealing with the practices of reading, refer-
ences to mental imagery are comparably rare. Since pre-Aristotelian antiq-
uity (Halliwell 2002, 20), a figure of speech was in use comparing literary 
composition to “putting events before one’s eyes.” However, a systematic 
account of how that process was meant to affect reception was not put for-
ward. Rather, as far as explicit mentions of the discrete sensorimotor modali-
ties are concerned, aural qualities enhancing verbal imagery seem clearly to 
prevail, starting with Aristotle’s (1995, 123) comments on how Homer 
evokes characters’ voices and continuing throughout medieval and early 
modern accounts of reading, whether out loud or silently, as a largely aural 
experience (Ong 2002, 119). Although the quality of poetic vividness (enar-
geia), most famously addressed by Demetrius (1995, 473–479) and occa-
sionally invoked in post-medieval rhetorical writing (see e.g. G. Alexander 
2010), was commonly understood to entail a readerly vision of sorts, it is 
unclear whether the term was ever used to denote referential imagery in my 
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sense, especially not in the sense of enactment-imagery. Apart from one 
single reference to the visual, Demetrius himself seems to present vividness 
as a matter of vicarious hearing pertaining mainly to verbal imagery (more 
specifically, speech-imagery) and of the reader’s affect and higher judge-
ment. In sum, mentions of sensorimotor processes relevant for referential 
imagery seem to be relatively sparse in older theoretical writings,33 and it is 
unlikely that they would capture what modern narrative is capable of accom-
plishing in terms of vicarious perception. 
To turn to the history of reading practices, cultural theoretician Walter J. 
Ong (2002, 155–157) asserts that literary narrative did not emancipate itself 
from classical, orality-driven rhetoric until as late as the 1800s. In accor-
dance with his assertion, historians of reading suggest that the engrossed 
reader of the sentimental era still engaged in narrative texts as if they were 
instances of codified oral (and, one may thus assume, largely aural) narra-
tion, while seeking imaginary friendship with the author or protagonist 
(Wittmann 1999, 295–297). This sort of reading strategy seems largely to 
favor verbal imagery over referential imagery. Furthermore, when embodied 
reader response was theorized by aestheticians and physiological literary 
critics Edward Bain, Grant Allen, and others working in the latter half of the 
nineteenth century (Dames 2007, 25–69), these authors did not define read-
erly embodiment (such as muscular tension or neural excitation) in ways that 
would account for referential imagery. Rather, perceived embodiment was 
assumed to result from rhythm of speech, speed of narration, and other char-
acteristics of the narrative qua verbal utterance – yet another fact pointing up 
how verbal imagery may have constituted the standard of readers’ imagery 
experience.34 
Finally, clues about readers’ experiences of imagery can be gleaned from 
the evolution of literary narrative itself. To pick just one of many examples, 
the French novel for instance did not see the now typical profusion of per-
ceptible objects in characters’ environments, and characters’ frequent inter-
actions with these objects so suitable for eliciting enactment-imagery, until 
as late as the nineteenth century. They seem to have made a sudden appear-
ance as part of an overall shift of content, a movement away from the sub-
lime and universal toward the particular, quotidian and experiential. This 
shift, which (in the case of French literature) can be traced back to the scenic 
                                                       
33 It should be noted, however, that these writings were always subject to official political 
agendas and may not provide a truthful picture of actual cultural practices. 
34 On the other hand, the very generation of readers who traded listening for silent reading 
may also have had a strong habit of free referential imaging (or simply mind-wandering) 
based on their previous experience as passive audience (see also Section 1.6.6 above). In such 
case they may have carried over the habit into silent reading or, conversely, their referential 




craftsmanship of Flaubert, must have had consequences for readers’ expecta-
tions regarding the two domains of mental imagery and the distribution of 
attention between them. More specifically, the shift toward the perceptual 
and experiential may have relocated readers’ focus from verbal imagery to 
referential imagery, and within referential imagery, toward imagery of the 
enactment variety. Moreover, there are many reasons to believe that this 
same shift had gradually yet irreversibly modified the practice of literary 
narrative reading in general, including the reading of pre-1800 narrative, 
making it an ever more referentially biased, multimodally embodied activity, 
oriented toward enactment-imagery in particular. On the level of narrative 
structure, the gradual exploitation of sensorimotor experience was paralleled 
by a phasing out of the omniscient narrator (who had still routinely ad-
dressed the “Dear Reader” at the beginning of the nineteenth century) and of 
other oral residues such as a linear, moral-driven plot. In other words, it was 
accompanied by a significant loss in overt prompters of verbal (i.e. speech-) 
imagery. After all, in everyday oral narrative, vivid renditions of perceptible 
objects and bodily interactions with such objects are comparably rarely 
heard. 
Last but not least, the period in which such sensorimotor detail surfaced 
in the French novel roughly coincides with the moment in the history of 
reading when literary narratives, too, ceased to be commonly heard. Despite 
the fact that mentions of silent reading date back to the times of Saint 
Augustine and that silent reading was widespread in certain contexts by the 
end of the Middle Ages (Saenger 2000), reading aloud was presumably the 
mode in which literary narratives were received by a substantial part of the 
European public until as late as the nineteenth century (Lyons 1999, 342–
344). Throughout the 1800s, there is abundant evidence that authors explic-
itly envisioned their novels to be read aloud, and that they read their own 
prose aloud when writing (see also Rubery 2008). In contrast to current criti-
cisms of the audiobook, early phonographic recordings of novels were often 
hailed by commentators of the time, who perceived them as a natural con-
tinuation of established reception patterns (Camlot 2011). Around 1900, 
collective practices of reading aloud (in forms considered largely uncustom-
ary only a few decades later) still occurred on a regular basis (Ong 2002, 
146; 154). The subsequent abrupt disappearance of reading aloud may have 
further reinforced the shift in imageability imposed on the reader’s mind by 
the novelties of literary style. It may have made vicarious voicing less read-
ily accessible.  
Assuming that the hypothesis of an attentional trade-off between referen-
tial and verbal imagery in silent reading is correct, preliminary evidence thus 
suggests that referential imagery is not only historically determined, but also 
a fairly recent phenomenon (but see my introductory quote from Hartley 
Coleridge, Section 1.1). This applies specifically to referential imagery in its 
perceptually stronger variety, i.e., enactment-imagery. Readers’ inclinations 
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toward enactment-imagery may also have been increasing steadily through-
out the twentieth century due to the sensory revolution gradually imposed 
upon culture by new media from photography to computerized virtual real-
ity. In fact, these inclinations may be ever so pressing now that film and 
digital entertainment have gained narrative hegemony over literature. While 
static verbal descriptions may not have seemed so tediously slow and de-
tached to the visual art connoisseur of the nineteenth century who was capa-
ble of spending hours in front of a single painting, they naturally do so to the 
digital generation, who interact with dynamic artificial narratives such as 
computer games on daily basis.35 
Ironically, although the experience of enactment-imagery may historically 
coincide with the rise of modern narrative theory itself, both theoretical and 
empirical studies have been largely negligent of its workings, as well as of 
the three “older” varieties description-imagery, speech-imagery, and re-
hearsal-imagery. This dissertation is an attempt to fill the gap. 
 
                                                       
35 I am grateful to Alice Jedličková for bringing this latter point to my attention. 
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Chapter 2. Enactment-imagery: presence and 
bodily movement36 
By what twist did language suppress the sense most important to survival? 
(Berthoz 2002, 25)  
 
2.1 Presence and bodily movement 
 
The present chapter deals with enactment-imagery. More specifically, it 
deals with such enactment-imagery that involves bodily movement. The 
chapter differs from the remaining two in that it deals with the underlying 
non-conscious simulation37 processes at least as much as it deals with the 
conscious imagery variety at issue (for the distinction between simulation 
and imagery, see Chapter 1, Section 1.4). This is because its main goal is to 
single out one particular effect that the two mental processes have in com-
mon, an effect that can robustly inform one’s aesthetic appreciation of a 
literary narrative at large. This effect can be built up and sustained globally 
throughout longer stretches of text or even entire book-length narratives, and 
while it is no doubt largely conscious and perfectly reportable, it usually 
cannot be aligned with a single stream of vivid mental images. 
The effect in question will henceforth be referred to as presence. Presence 
stands for the subjective sense of having physically entered the tangible en-
vironment of a storyworld, of “being there.”38 Used in this particular sense, 
                                                       
36 This chapter is an extended and revised version of my “Presence in the Reading of Literary 
Narrative: A Case for Motor Enactment”, Semiotica 189(1/4): 23–48 (Kuzmičová 2012a). 
Some of the ideas presented in this chapter are further developed in my “The Words and 
Worlds of Literary Narrative: The Trade-off between Verbal Presence and Direct Presence in 
the Activity of Reading”, Bernaerts, Lars, Dirk De Geest, Luc Herman, and Bart Vervaeck 
(eds.), Stories and Minds: Cognitive Approaches to Literary Narrative, Lincoln: University of 
Nebraska Press, 107–128 (Kuzmičová 2013a). 
37 In this chapter, all references to the processes of embodied simulation will be limited to the 
referential domain only (see Chapter 1, Section 1.3, for a definition vis-à-vis the verbal do-
main). 
38 See also Marie-Laure Ryan’s term spatio-temporal immersion (Ryan 2001, 130–139) ⁠. 
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presence is a well-established notion in interactive media psychology (see 
e.g. Schubert, Biocca, and Regenbrecht 2001). In a nutshell, the central hy-
potheses of the present chapter can be summarized as follows: Presence is 
effectively prompted by references to certain types of bodily movement. 
While it may become most palpable during the brief instances of motor en-
actment-imagery proper, it can presumably be sustained throughout longer 
stretches of text (especially in readers less susceptible to imagery) with the 
help of mere non-conscious motor simulation. This is what motivates my 
extensive treatment of non-conscious processes. 
Let’s assume that, at least since about the times of Flaubert, many literary 
authors have constructed entire passages of their narratives so as to render 
particular situations spatially compelling. Let’s also assume that, at least 
since about the same period, most readers have responded to these efforts in 
a collaborative manner, with presence, often accompanied by vivid spatial 
imagery, arising as a result of successful matching of reading practices to 
cues intrinsic to the text. Most readers would probably agree that presence is 
a key ingredient in the broader phenomenon of reader immersion. Leaving 
aside other similarly pre-conceptual components of immersion – affective 
appraisal (see J. Robinson 2007) ⁠ and emotional response (see Miall 2006) ⁠, 
suspense (see Gerrig 1998) ⁠, or rhythm and flow of verbal imagery (Chapter 
4) – this chapter will make a few elementary proposals toward how presence 
may be cued in narrative literature, co-producing immersion. Contrary to 
certain common assumptions, I will argue that there is no direct relationship 
between the degree of detail in spatial description on the one hand and pres-
ence on the other. In line with what has been established in Chapter 1, I will 
also argue that in cases when presence is propelled by discrete mental im-
ages, these images belong to the variety of enactment-imagery rather than 
description-imagery. Ultimately, the below descriptions of presence aim at 
further exposing enactment-imagery as number one ingredient, on the refer-
ential side of the imagery continuum (see Chapter 1, Section 1.6.5), in the 
embodied enjoyment of literary narrative. 
Given that in most cases there is substantive consensus, even within liter-
ary academia, as to which narratives are particularly spatially immersive and 
which rather categorically resist such experience (e.g. Ryan 2001, 120–139) ⁠, 
prototypical presence cues ought to be possible to isolate. I will make an 
attempt at isolating them theoretically, both in terms of narrative content 
(Which types of content are particularly productive at eliciting presence, and 
why?) and construction (Which ways of embedding this content in the narra-
tive text are particularly well suited for such purposes?). Interactive media 
theorists (e.g. Biocca 2002) ⁠ would classify my endeavor as an attempt at 
addressing what they call “the book problem,” i.e., the conundrum of how to 
account theoretically for the linear, low-tech medium’s capacity to transport 
readers into virtual three-dimensional environments. 
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For the sake of argumentation, I will invoke theories and experimental re-
sults stemming from a plethora of disciplines: narrative theory and literary 
aesthetics, research in text and discourse processing, media psychology, 
phenomenology, cognitive and experimental psychology and neuroscience. 
Once again, this eclecticism is not meant to distract readers from my main 
object of study, which is the aesthetics of narrative literature, but rather to 
instrumentally narrow down their focus toward particular instances in the 
fluent process of reading. I am well aware of the multiple epistemological 
ruptures between (a) neuronal activity in real-world situations, (b) human 
behavior and (c) the pre-linguistic experience of such behavior on one hand, 
and (d) fluent readerly experience of narrative literature as based on (e) the 
multiple, complex operations of discourse comprehension, some of which 
may be traceable in (f) the neural substrates of reading, on the other. Like 
neuroscientist Vittorio Gallese and other specialists whose work I will be 
referring to, however, I am reluctant to believe that each of these phenomena 
constitutes an impermeable ontological domain of its own. Therefore I will 
draw a tentative line of inter-theoretical speculation from (a) all the way 
down to (f), while trying to single out when (d) is most likely to adhere phe-
nomenally to (c). All of (a)-(f) will operate throughout the entire chapter, 
and the key focus will be modulated among its three main sections approxi-
mately as follows: 2 (c); 3 (c)-(d); 4 (d).  
The argument will be structured so as to facilitate partial testing, and any 
serious attempt at experimental validation is welcome.39 Literary text sam-
ples will be taken mainly (but not only) from three works of francophone 
novelists, all of which have been noted for their spatial, perceptual or situ-
ational qualities, as well as for their focus on the quotidian: Gustave 
Flaubert’s (1972 [1857]) ⁠ Madame Bovary (favoring detailed description), 
Alain Robbe-Grillet’s (1957) ⁠ La Jalousie (favoring detailed description) and 
Jean-Philippe Toussaint’s (1988) ⁠ L’appareil-photo (lacking detailed descrip-
tion). 
As previously stated, the main idea I am advocating is that a higher de-
gree of presence, the sense of having physically entered a tangible environ-
ment, is best achieved when certain forms of human bodily movement are 
rendered in the narrative, as compared to when they are not. This applies 
                                                       
39 After an earlier version of this chapter was accepted for publication in early 2010 
(Kuzmičová 2012a), a first attempt at empirical validation was carried out in collaboration 
with Peter Dixon and Marisa Bortolussi, University of Alberta. The results of this experiment 
(Kuzmičová, Dixon, and Bortolussi 2012), in which subjects read series of literary passages 
manipulated on a pair of variables while assessing various aspects of their immediate re-
sponse, have not yet been published in print. However, they do confirm some of the basic 
hypotheses to be presented in this chapter, with the proviso that they do so for experienced 
literary readers specifically. Readers unaccustomed to reading literary narrative showed a 
slightly different pattern of response. 
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when the motor content in question is either explicitly mentioned (e.g. “John 
picked up his wallet and opened it.”) or very strongly implied, i.e., inevitable 
to infer from the viewpoint of local coherence (see McKoon and Ratcliff 
1992) ⁠ – such as in “John checked to see if he had enough change. But the 
inner pocket of his wallet was empty,” which does not make sense unless the 
act of grasping and opening a wallet is inferred by the reader. Gallese (2000) ⁠ 
suggests that the human motor system should be thought of as the missing 
thread interconnecting the three domains of neuronal activity, behavior and 
experience. I suggest this thread should be thought of as extending all the 
way down to the vicarious experience elicited in narrative reading, a view 
toward which we are currently receiving some empirical clues in the form of 
behavioral and neuroimaging data. 
Before proceeding any further, a few prerequisites must be spelled out: 
1: By presence, I do not mean a detailed situational model held active in 
the reader’s working memory, corresponding to propositions such as: “There 
is another room next to the one the characters are standing in right now”; 
“Character X and character Y are currently present, but character Z is not.” 
Nor do I mean the ease of retrieving such detail when necessary, e.g., in 
comprehending anaphoric reference. Extensive theoretical and experimental 
work has been done to address these issues, and I will refer to some of it in 
order to support my claims. Presence is most likely a composite effect of 
several variables interacting with each other. But if I were to isolate one 
conscious cognitive phenomenon characteristic of presence, it would not be 
propositional knowledge of the fictional environment at issue. Rather, pres-
ence typically manifests itself as vivid yet extremely short-lived referential 
imagery. Although spatial modeling presumably is affected by such imagery, 
empirical studies have shown that experienced vividness of a stimulus does 
not necessarily stand in any direct relationship to memory accuracy (see 
Ericsson 2003, 6) ⁠. 
2: By referential imagery, I do not mean visual imagery only, as has been 
the case in nearly all theoretical work on perceived vividness in literary nar-
rative so far (e.g. Esrock 1994; but see Esrock 2004) ⁠. Imagery encompasses 
any conscious vicarious experience whatsoever of what is most commonly 
referred to as perception, i.e., the notorious five external senses, but also the 
internal senses, including, crucially, the senses of bodily movement. Catego-
rization of the internal senses varies across authors and scholarly traditions. 
As hinted in the opening to Chapter 1, they are sometimes divided into the 
interoceptive (pain, hunger etc.), the proprioceptive (balance, limb and organ 
position etc.), and the kinesthetic (effort, acceleration etc.). For the sake of 
simplicity, these three categories will be collapsed in the present chapter into 
the broader category of proprioception, encompassing all internal senses, 
regardless of their relation to bodily movement. When special emphasis will 
be put on the motor aspects, proprioception will be referred to as kinesthesia, 
alternatively as the motor mode. The five external senses (sight, hearing, 
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smell, taste, touch) will sometimes be referred to in aggregate, and in opposi-
tion to proprioception, as exteroception. 
2.2 Bodily movement in real-world experience 
 
Hypothetically, the wider the range of sensorimotor modalities simultane-
ously active in referential imagery, the more vivid the vicarious experience. 
However, referential imagery does not seem to come in neatly synchronized 
multimodal packages. Referential imagery in general differs substantially 
from the structure of real-world experience, without the discrete modality 
tracks necessarily overlapping, or fitting into any preconceived model of 
spatiotemporal order. Referential imagery elicited in the strictly linear proc-
ess of near-naturalistic language (i.e. fluent discourse) processing, in particu-
lar, has been suggested to follow a modulative logic of gradual meaning 
integration within sentences, occurring not with each and every noun or verb 
of sensorimotor content, but rather at distinct uniqueness points, i.e., nodes 
of situational disambiguation (examples will be provided further down). 
With constant regard to these assumptions, I suggest that minimal instances 
of comparable sensorimotor unity (encompassing both proprio- and extero-
ception) prompting multimodal referential imagery on the verge of veracity 
may occur, if ever, when triggered by reference to bodily movement. 
What lies behind this accentuation of the motor mode is, apart from intro-
spection, a phenomenologically and neuroscientifically informed view of 
movement, interaction and agency as formative of and intrinsic to all actual 
perception. “The world makes itself available to the perceiver through physi-
cal movement and interaction,” writes philosopher Alva Noë (2006, 1) ⁠, one 
of a community of philosophers and scientists who have recently made an 
effort to reconcile the two domains of knowledge in order to advocate a cen-
trality of bodily movement in perception, cognition, experience and subjec-
tivity (see also Berthoz and Petit 2008; Gallagher and Zahavi 2007; Sheets-
Johnstone 1999) ⁠. Among many other pieces of evidence, Noë refers to the 
clinical cases of congenitally blind patients who remain “experientially” 
blind for some time after their cataracts have been removed, taking people’s 
faces for blurs in their visual field, because their visual sensations are still 
decoupled from patterns of movement. Noë infers that vision in the sense of 
a conscious experience of size, shape, voluminousness and distance of an 
object is always due to the perceiver’s sensorimotor understanding, based on 
previous eye- and body movements related to that or a similar object. 
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As for the neuroscientific branch of this rather broadly conceived – and 
by all means philosophically disparate – intellectual community, Rizzolatti 
and Gallese (1988) ⁠ showed already in the 1980s that the mere process of 
visually attending to an object is partly based on covert preparation of a bod-
ily action to be borne upon that object, a finding which has been repeatedly 
replicated ever since (see Berthoz and Petit 2008) ⁠. Moreover, in real-world 
experience, bodily movement is formative, in a literal sense of the word, of 
so-called peri-personal space, i.e., the space immediately adjacent to the 
head, arms and legs, constrained by their instantaneous action radius. Inter-
estingly, unlike other extraneous stimuli, any stimulus which enters the near-
est strata of peri-personal space – the “gelatinous medium surrounding our 
bodies” (Graziano and Gross 1995, 1031) ⁠ – has been found to be cortically 
coded in a multimodal fashion, with the very same neurons responding to the 
stimulus regardless of whether it is audial, visual or tactile (see Serino, 
Farnè, and Làdavas 2006) ⁠. This phenomenon is commonly manifested in 
daily experience: We tend to sense the presence of new objects, let alone 
moving creatures, in our peri-personal space without having to see them 
first. 
If presence is a function of spatial vividness, in which the motor and sen-
sory modes should optimally converge, and if the physical world we live in 
is not truly perceived and experienced unless interacted with via bodily 
movement (be it overt or covert), then the reader’s sense of having physi-
cally entered a tangible environment must somehow be linked to narrative 
renditions of bodily movement. Furthermore, the fictional environment thus 
entered is unlikely to feel literally tangible unless physical stimuli are men-
tioned to occur within the moving literary character’s gelatinous medium, 
i.e., unless the furnishing of the fictional world is reached, grasped, manipu-
lated, leaned against etc. In other words, the most stimulating movements of 
them all ought to be transitive movements, particularly when object-directed, 
as opposed to self- or person-directed. Moreover, these movements ought to 
be volitional rather than unintended, because volitional movements entail 
particular attentional focus on the environment interacted with, such that is 
absent from reflexive or otherwise unintended movements (see Allport 
1987) ⁠. As indicated above, perception is currently being viewed by scientists 
and philosophers alike as an auxiliary of action. I suggest that in the linear 
process of reading, the relation is often the reverse: the object-directed 
movement of a literary character may, especially under certain conditions to 
which I will proceed later, prompt a vivid multimodal image of the environ-
ment it is being performed in and upon. 
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2.3 The literary character’s bodily action visualized vs. 
simulated 
 
Until this point, the main claim of my argument has not diverged radically 
from that of philosopher Thor Grünbaum. In a contribution to narrative the-
ory, Grünbaum (2007) ⁠ draws the novel narratological distinction between 
“summarizing action-narration” (“In the company of a Dane and two Nor-
wegians I left the old Lübeck in the evening...”) and narrative renditions of 
“bodily movements” (“He moved a thin shrunken brown hand gently in the 
air in time to his praise...”) on the one hand, and narrative renditions of 
“simple bodily actions” (“[She] pulled the blind, leaned her brow against the 
cool pane...”) on the other. The latter may seem to correspond roughly to 
what I have in mind when accentuating transitive bodily movement, because 
in phenomenological thought, on which Grünbaum is prone to elaborate, 
transitive movements (when volitional) are a subset of bodily actions, the 
term action referring to purposeful movement in general (e.g. Gallagher and 
Zahavi 2007) ⁠. Simple bodily actions, Grünbaum argues, usually come short 
of theoretical treatment in plot-narratology (e.g. the work of Ruth Ronen), 
which attends mostly to summarizing action-narration, as well as in dis-
course-narratology (e.g. the work of Gérard Genette), which would rather 
tend to study the technique of rendition employed in the case of bodily 
movement (as defined by Grünbaum). Simple bodily actions do serve a dis-
tinct function in narrative, nevertheless, which Grünbaum identifies in rather 
general terms as a “visualizing” function. At this point my approach departs 
from Grünbaum’s. 
I agree that in order to stimulate the reader’s referential imagery, a bodily 
movement must be comparably dynamically veracious, i.e., that the time the 
text passage takes to read ought to be commensurable with the duration of 
the movement as performed in the real world. This is in part what distin-
guishes “simple bodily actions” from “summarizing action-narration” and 
narrative renditions of “bodily movement” (the simple interaction with a 
window blind would span a much longer stretch of text if it were rendered in 
such detail as the formerly cited hand movement), although Grünbaum does 
not spell it out that way, his major focus resting elsewhere. What I disagree 
with is Grünbaum’s assumption that dynamically veracious bodily actions 
are normally visualized from a third-person perspective, thus prompting 
mere description-imagery at best, which puts the reader in the position of a 
detached witness (mere kinematic veracity would suffice in such case; see 
Schwartz 1999 for the distinction) ⁠. Rather, I suggest that they are often 
simulated from an enactive first-person perspective, which is primarily what 
makes them a vehicle of presence and immersion. Referential imagery, as 
has been pointed out, encompasses all sensorimotor modalities, including the 
utterly private cutaneous sense responding vicariously to the cool window-
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pane mentioned in Grünbaum’s window blind excerpt. Hence when I claim 
that the character’s bodily movement prompts a vivid multimodal image in 
the reader, I assume that the reader experiences the phenomenon of motor 
simulation (see also Chapter 1, Section 1.2),40 a cognitive process featuring 
sensory traces related to the movement in question (proprioception) and to 
the object it is directed at (exteroception). The resultant flash of sensorimo-
tor unity may in some way feed on what physiologists call the motor schema 
(see Schmidt 1975) ⁠, i.e., a relational memory schema linking action to its 
sensory outcome. 
Motor simulation stands for the referential covert movement that has been 
unequivocally proven, both in behavioral and neuroimaging experimental 
setups, to occur when literal (i.e. non-metaphorical, non-idiomatic) bodily 
movement sentences are processed (see Fischer and Zwaan 2008 for a re-
view) ⁠. When people listen to or read sentences referring to bodily move-
ment, the motor and pre-motor areas of their cortices become somatotopi-
cally activated (see also Chapter 1, Section 1.2) – the hand area of the motor 
strip responding to hand-related action words, the feet area to feet-related 
action words etc. (e.g. Raposo et al. 2009; Aziz-Zadeh et al. 2006) ⁠. When 
they need to perform a motor task, e.g., manually rotate a knob, in order to 
make their way through a sentence (so-called reading-by-rotation), their 
motor performance is speeded up or slowed down if the sentence refers to a 
similar movement performed in the same or opposite direction, respectively. 
Numerous behavioral studies in the field have been conducted by cognitive 
psychologists Rolf Zwaan, Lawrence Taylor and colleagues (e.g. Zwaan, L. 
J. Taylor, and de Boer 2010; L. J. Taylor and Zwaan 2008; L. J. Taylor, Lev-
Ari, and Zwaan 2008; Zwaan and L. J. Taylor 2006; Zwaan 2004) ⁠, who have 
not only studied motor simulation proper, but focus equally on visual motor 
simulation (simulated visual perception of moving objects) and other forms 
of visual simulation in discourse processing. As for neuroimaging, conver-
gent results from a study of embodied simulation in which the experimental 
stimuli consisted of entire narrative passages (27 clauses each) were pub-
lished in 2009 (Speer et al. 2009a) ⁠. 
In other words, if a theory of language comprehension elaborating on the 
principles of naïve realism – self-evident from the viewpoint of many liter-
ary readers – would have brought about ridicule among cognitive scientists 
only a couple of decades ago, experimental evidence supporting such theo-
ries abounds in current (second-generation) cognitive science, adding to the 
research framework of embodied cognition (see also Chapter 1, Section 1.2). 
                                                       
40 In the context of psycholinguistics and discourse research, embodied simulation is also 
known as sensorimotor resonance (e.g. L. J. Taylor and Zwaan 2008). In citing this research, I 
have decided to replace “resonance” with “simulation” for the sake of unity, despite the latter 
term’s polysemous, and currently also somewhat inflationary nature.  
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As mentioned in Section 2.2 above, motor simulation appears – and so does 
reportedly its perceptual counterpart – to be modulated in accordance with 
gradual semantic disambiguation and instantaneous linguistic focus (e.g. L. 
J. Taylor and Zwaan 2008; L. J. Taylor, Lev-Ari, and Zwaan 2008; Zwaan 
and L. J. Taylor 2006) ⁠. For example, the two sentences “John opened the 
beer can.”/“John opened the book.” differ substantively as to what kind of 
movement is covertly simulated. Indeed, simulation in such cases has been 
found to reach its peak of intensity as the reader is processing the point of 
uniqueness, i.e., the post-posited disambiguating object noun (“the beer can” 
vs. “the book”) and/or an action-related (“quickly”) – as opposed to merely 
agent-related (“obediently”) – adverb, should there be any. 
These exemplary sentences call for a brief exposition on affordance, a 
phenomenon closely related to motor simulation. The term was given cur-
rency in James Gibson’s (1979) ecological theory of visual perception, cap-
turing the utterly interactionist nature of sensory attention, eventually con-
firmed by Rizzolatti and Gallese (see Section 2.2 above) and many others. 
Affordance stands for the interaction potential of each and every object in 
the environment, as constrained by the object’s shape, weight, volume and 
other properties on the one hand, and the motor capacities of the perceiving 
individual on the other (the lamp switch in my office affords pressing to me, 
but not to my little son). 
While Gibson ascribed affordance to artifacts (i.e. manufactured objects, 
also called tools), natural objects and animals alike (a tree affords climbing, 
a horse can be ridden on), current cognitive science reserves the term, alter-
nately narrowed down to “microaffordance” (e.g. Borghi 2005; Ellis and 
Tucker 2000) ⁠, for hand-manipulable artifacts primarily. The reasons for this 
terminological shift are multiple. For example, subjects in neuroimaging 
(e.g. Grèzes et al. 2003; Chao and Martin 2000; see Martin 2007 for a re-
view) ⁠ and behavioral (e.g. Glover et al. 2004; Tucker and Ellis 2004; Tucker 
and Ellis 2001; Ellis and Tucker 2000; Tucker and Ellis 1998) ⁠ experiments 
show accurate somatotopic cortical activation (activity in the pre-motor cor-
tex corresponding to hand movement, triggered automatically by the word 
“hammer”) or other signs of simulation (faster manual task response if the 
content of a stimulus affords the same hand movement as required by the 
task), respectively, when exposed to pictures or names of artifacts, but not 
when exposed to pictures or names of natural objects or animals. This is 
probably due to the fact that artifacts have canonical (“hammer”-“grasp the 
handle with a power grip, lift and pound”) and non-canonical (“hammer”-
“plant in the soil”) affordances, which is not usually the case with natural 
objects and animals (see Borghi 2005) ⁠.41 
                                                       
41 Also, for natural objects and animals, affordances are not as central to the cognitive proc-
esses of categorization and prototype and basic-level judgement as they are in the case of 
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For each individual to be capable of performing the various motor tasks 
of daily life, the motor circuitry is assumed to feature a vast register of dis-
tinct motor programs (e.g. Engelkamp and Zimmer 1984) ⁠. Because of affor-
dances, these motor programs are more complex and fine-grained for transi-
tive than for intransitive movements. The difference is assumed to affect 
motor simulation in language processing, with transitive movements eliciting 
more simulation than intransitive ones, provided they are volitional. Non-
volitional movement sentences such as “John stumbled.” have been pre-
dicted to elicit no simulation at all, as our repertoire of motor programs is 
limited to volitional movements exclusively (Zwaan, L. J. Taylor, and De 
Boer 2010), yet another argument in favor of the aforementioned precondi-
tion of volitionality. To operate with this precondition when studying simple 
bodily actions in narrative may be tricky, because utterances like “Acciden-
tally I grasped the handle of the dagger with my hand.” are sparse in litera-
ture, with the exception of stories where the bodily movement in question 
connects to other events – as does for instance the movement of Emma’s 
lover-to-be in Madame Bovary: “Sans qu’il s’en aperçut, tout en causant, 
Léon avait posé son pied sur un des barreaux de la chaise où Madame 
Bovary était assise.” (Flaubert 1972 [1857]: 166) ⁠ [“While he talked, Léon 
had unconsciously placed his foot on the bar of Madame Bovary’s chair.” 
(Flaubert 1995 [1950]: 97) ⁠] In other words, volition and intentionality of 
transitive bodily movement is rather instantaneously inferred and mostly 
presupposed – in the affirmative – by the reader, as is continuously guessed 
the action’s significance for the story plot. The issue of perceived intention-
ality in reading, however interesting, falls outside the scope of this chapter. 
Suffice to point out that, as far as real life movement observation is con-
cerned, transitive movements are much more readily judged intentional than 
intransitive ones (see Jeannerod 2006, 102) ⁠. 
Quite naturally, in comparison to other transitive movements, those di-
rected at objects with canonical affordances, such as beer cans, books, ham-
mers and daggers, provide more powerful clues (eventually verified or not) 
to the observer or reader about what intentions may be involved. Thus in 
addition to being volitional, transitive and dynamically veracious, the most 
immersive bodily movements of them all ought to be movements directed at 
everyday artifacts. The more familiar the object vicariously acted upon, 
whether in a canonical or a non-canonical manner, the stronger is probably 
the movement’s immersive potential in terms of simulation and multimodal 
referential imagery (see also J. W. Lewis 2006) ⁠. 
                                                                                                                                




2.4 Simulation as experience: examples from non-
literary motor enactment 
 
Two important and closely interrelated questions may arise: If simulation is 
intrinsic to naturalistic language comprehension in general, what explanatory 
value do these findings have for literary aesthetics in particular? Even if 
hypothetically applicable to the study of literary reading, what would all 
these advanced neuroimaging and behavioral scientific paradigms have to 
tell us about the reader’s conscious experience (see also Chapter 1, Section 
1.5)? In both cases a brief version of the answer would go approximately as 
follows: It is my conviction that in the reading of literary narrative, embod-
ied simulation is continuously boosted toward the threshold of conscious-
ness. Its peaks and valleys of intensity are more robust than in non-literary 
reading, yet following a logic not completely dissimilar from that of situ-
ational integration within the stimulus sentences and textoids used in ex-
perimental psychology. In line with the basic conceptual distinctions drawn 
in Chapter 1, all simulation of such variety will further be referred to as ref-
erential mental imagery, more specifically as enactment-imagery. Enact-
ment-imagery or any other imagery proper, unlike simulation, reaches the 
reader’s consciousness. It is noticed. 
Thanks to space-related enactment-imagery, we feel that we undergo vi-
carious experience even when engaging with “physical stories” (see Mar 
2004) ⁠, i.e., literary narratives which, similarly to Toussaint’s L’appareil-
photo, invite comparably little attribution of mental states to characters.42 
Motor enactment-imagery specifically sometimes elicits a level of muscular 
activity that is not only amenable to self-report, but draws instant attention of 
the reader to itself. What the reader experiences in such instances of motor 
enactment is akin to what phenomenologists call the sense of movement 
ownership (a sense of performing a certain movement), yet decoupled from 
any sense of agency (a sense of being the originator of that movement), such 
that would normally accompany the same volitional movement in a corre-
sponding real life situation (see Gallagher 2000) ⁠. Hypothetically, whatever 
kind and rank of literary character can become the originator of a movement 
thus enacted, even an animal character can. Various factors involved in 
reader identification – e.g., personal sympathy, degree of conspecificity, 
prominence of the character in the story – may however be at play. 
                                                       
42 This is not to say that explicit access to a character’s conscious thought or emotion in itself 
negatively affects spatial imagery. However, particularly thick mental state attribution pas-
sages probably outperform spatial imagery in the competition for the reader’s finite (con-
scious) simulation resources. 
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Our ability to reflexively attune our muscular activity and proprioceptive 
sensations to others’ becomes tangible in diverse situations outside the 
realms of language comprehension. One can for example dream of perform-
ing the actions of somebody else, possessing another person’s body, doing 
things one has never done before, or even belonging to another species, with 
the motor content of the dream achieving as high a degree of intensity so as 
to become easily visible to the naked eye of a third-person observer (see also 
Berthoz and Petit 2008, 272) ⁠. In movie and theater spectatorship, one can 
adopt the tactile sensations of a character, a phenomenon that has been corti-
cally mapped in some detail (see Keysers et al. 2004) ⁠, or simulate beyond 
the non-conscious the movements performed on stage, displaying strong 
efferent leakage (i.e. measurable changes in physiological reactivity; see 
Cuthbert, Vrana, and Bradley 1991 for a review)⁠. 
Two decades ago, the discovery (by Rizzolatti, Gallese and colleagues) of 
several neuron populations in the parietal-premotor area, most famously of 
the so-called mirror neurons and canonical neurons, which fire equally dur-
ing volitional action execution and during passive observation of the same 
action when performed by a conspecific, awoke a massive wave of interest 
in these and similar phenomena – ranging from empathy and social cognition 
to motor skill acquisition (see also Chapter 1, Section 1.2). One subclass of 
these neurons has been found to fire only for transitive movements involving 
artifacts, and another one at the mere sight of artifacts, all of these subclasses 
being assumed to relate in some way or another to action goals and inten-
tions (see Gallese and Lakoff 2005 for a brief introduction) ⁠. As enactment in 
literary reading can partly be elucidated by reference to linguistic simulation 
processes, so can much of spectator response in the performing arts probably 
be elucidated by reference to this mirroring effect intrinsic to all action ob-
servation.43 
The dissociation between movement ownership and agency entailed by 
enactment of either kind is by no means trivial. Authors sometimes charac-
terize shared mental representations like those of motor simulation and neu-
ronal mirroring as “neutral in the sense that they represent ‘an’ action rather 
than ‘my’ action, ‘your’ action or ‘x’s’ action” (Legrand 2006, 104) ⁠. Such 
formulations may be at odds with our intuitions as to how we acquire motor 
skills through action observation. As a matter of fact, a violin student learns 
from attending to her teacher’s play, not just somebody else’s, neither to 
violin play in some disembodied sense. Her skills advance if and only if she 
matches her own covert movements to the teacher’s. This may happen irre-
spective of whether the person in the teacher position is a peer of hers or an 
                                                       
43 Likewise, a link between motor simulation in language processing and mirror neurons is 
assumed, but has yet to be specified (see Fischer and Zwaan 2008, 828–831) ⁠.  
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aging virtuoso giving her a master class. Yet the two alternatives will neces-
sarily lead to different qualitative results. 
I would like to suggest that in reading, analogously, we literally incorpo-
rate the movements of other agents, despite these agents’ dubious ontologi-
cal status as literary characters. We can experience motor enactment of 
commensurable intensity when reading about Emma Bovary and Winnie-
the-Pooh, or even resonate more with the latter if prompted, but the content 
of our experience will partly be constrained by physical properties ascribed 
to the particular agent (e.g. capability or incapability of prehension, respec-
tively) as well as by other circumstances currently active in our working 
memory, whether explicitly mentioned or strongly implied, which may affect 
the manner of movement execution. If people take significantly longer time 
to imagine walking along a given trajectory when told they are carrying a 
heavy load (see Schwartz 1999) ⁠, and if their imagery performance – sponta-
neous or not – is shaped by real biological constraints (see Parsons 1994) ⁠, 
then simulating grasping with a bear’s paw should differ qualitatively from 
simulating grasping with a healthy adult’s hand. On a more fully experiential 
note, studies of interactive media have shown that people need only very 
little fictional stimulation to adopt a distorted view of their own bodies, our 
body schema appearing to be less stable than usually believed (see Biocca 
2002) ⁠. Of equal importance as the agent’s alleged body are the readers’ own 
physical properties and their previous sensorimotor experience, yet another 
precondition speaking in favor of objects such as artifacts, and events such 
as artifact manipulation, both belonging to a very basic level of cognition 
and life experience at large. 
Hence bodily movement execution on the one hand and literary reading 
about such on the other can and ought to be – contrary to what most cogni-
tive scientists believed until recently – viewed as two points of one experien-
tial continuum, with even less distance in between than probably assumed by 
most avid readers. To endorse this view requires a move no less natural than 
does endorsing the thought of Marc Jeannerod (2006, 53–54), a physiologist 
and philosopher who defines motor imagery — in line with the main argu-
ment of the present chapter — as action that merely lacks an overt execution 
phase.44 Although in reading “[Pooh] stood on a chair, and took down a very 
large jar of honey from the top shelf.” (Milne 1992 [1926]: 61) ⁠, the reader 
never maintains the belief45 that she has moved herself, the less in the agen-
tive sense implied by this last transitive verb (sense of agency), she can still, 
                                                       
44 Jeannerod also gives examples of pathologies in which the brain’s inhibitory mechanism 
does not function properly. Such impairments can manifest themselves in compulsive imita-
tion (so-called imitation behavior) or compulsive object manipulation (so-called utilization 
behavior). 




mostly without noticing, experience the coming into being of Winnie-the-
Pooh’s clumsy power grip as the bear is getting hold of the jar (sense of 
ownership). 
2.5 Motor simulation eliciting presence 
 
It is commonplace that literature of the nineteenth century and beyond often 
makes us sensitive to perceptual aspects of daily experience that are nor-
mally passed unnoticed. This belief has lied at the heart of much literary 
aesthetics since the early twentieth century. Defamiliarization as such, 
whether referential as initially captured by Viktor Shklovsky’s (1990) ⁠ theory 
of estrangement, or purely verbal as first addressed in Jan Mukařovský’s 
(1976) ⁠ theory of foregrounding, often receives the main portion of credit 
when a piece of written discourse is recognized for its aesthetic qualities. I 
have no intention to dispute this idea. Neither am I interested in delving into 
a history of the human sensorium, because I understand it to be just as much 
commonplace that presence, a perceived naturalness of spatial experience, 
shapes the impact of whatever narrative one is reading (see also Green 
2004) ⁠. What I intend to do instead is tentatively identify the optimal balance 
between defamiliarization and naturalness, outlining in rather general terms 
which literary treatment of (dynamically veracious, transitive) bodily move-
ment may elicit presence at its best. The diachronic aspect needs to remain 
bracketed (but see Chapter 1, Section 1.8). 
I have noted above that in motor enactment-imagery, motor simulation 
temporarily refrains from being non-conscious. I have also noted that it 
sometimes elicits a level of muscular activity that is not only amenable to 
self-report, but draws instant attention of the reader to itself. Hence the task 
of defining the forms of motor simulation which most directly induce a sense 
of presence, double as presence already is in its unique position in between 
naturalness and defamiliarization, splits into yet another two questions, 
whose intent differs but in degree: When does motor simulation elicit pres-
ence? (Section 2.5.2) When is presence-eliciting motor simulation most 
likely to transgress the threshold of readers’ consciousness and manifest 
itself as motor enactment-imagery? (Section 2.5.3) Before these two ques-
tions are answered, further prerequisites concerning presence as such must 
be put forward.  
2.5.1 Presence as background 
 
Even though occasionally attended to by the reader, presence as a continuous 
function of a particular reading session or a series of some such sessions 
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probably operates in the background of higher cognitive processes involved 
in literary comprehension, analogously to what psychologist Seymour Ep-
stein (1998) ⁠ calls the experiential system. Not only so in the self-evident 
sense that it does not interfere with the fluency of reading, but also in that it 
leaves space for evaluative thought on the part of the readers, who may find 
themselves busy making predictions concerning the plot, or associating the 
events to their own private concerns, or even interpreting them more auda-
ciously in accordance with hermeneutic or whichever semiotic patterns (see 
also Chapter 1, Section 1.6.6). This is possible due to the instantaneous and 
extremely short-lived nature of the vivid spatial imagery triggered by pres-
ence cues. Contrarily to what some adversaries of immersion theory and 
similar concepts might think, the idea of presence does not suggest that the 
reader is following the narrated events from “within” the storyworld, exclu-
sively and consistently, throughout the entire text.  
As has already been mentioned, presence seems to be positively corre-
lated, albeit not in an uncomplicated one-to-one relation, with immersion 
(see also Green 2004) ⁠. Any detailed account of this correlation, or of its rela-
tionship with the higher-order processes listed above, falls outside the scope 
of this dissertation. However, an important assertion to be made about both 
presence and immersion is that, similarly to Jean-Marie Schaeffer (2010) ⁠, 
philosopher of art, I believe neither of the two to fully block the reader’s 
sensitivity toward the outer physical world. Quite the opposite, some veridi-
cal exteroceptive (e.g. auditory, tactile) stimuli from the environment in 
which one is reading can enhance or be enhanced by the vicarious stimuli 
triggered by the narrative. For example, while reading Emily Brontë’s 
Wuthering Heights on a windy day, one may be prone to coupling one’s 
auditory sensations to the fictional world of the novel. Drawing on introspec-
tion, I take it for evidence in favor of Schaeffer’s theory, according to which 
immersion entails augmented sensitivity altogether, that a second watching 
of a particularly immersive piece of footage usually awakens memories of 
the circumstances under which one saw it previously. 
For a narrative to elicit a stable level of presence, references to compara-
bly dynamically veracious, transitive bodily movement ought to be scattered 
evenly throughout the text. In this respect, there is a rather telling contrast 
between Toussaint’s L’appareil-photo and Robbe-Grillet’s La jalousie. Both 
novels begin in a scenic manner. In their opening sequences – crucial as 
these are for further adjustment of readerly expectations – bodily actions are 
being carried out in clearly indicated environments, rather than displaced or 
abstract events of a wider time span being summarized. If one takes a por-
tion of text from the very beginning of L’appareil-photo (corresponding 
roughly to a volume of 4000 words) and a commensurable portion from the 
very beginning of La jalousie, and counts the number of explicit or strongly 
implied references to transitive bodily movement, the quantities amount to 
114 for the first 21 pages of L’appareil-photo (about 190 words per page) 
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and 35 for the first 24 pages of La jalousie (about 170 words per page). In 
L’appareil-photo, the number of occurrences per page is comparably stable – 
0 (2 pages), 1-6 (11 pages), 7-12 (8 pages) – and evenly distributed through-
out the text, whereas in the sample taken from La jalousie, the references are 
accumulated in a few clusters of mostly three pages at a time. Each cluster is 
followed by another two to three pages with no references to transitive bod-
ily movement whatsoever, despite the fact that acting humans are reported to 
be perceived. The quantities per page are: 0 (12 pages), 1-3 (9 pages), 4-6 (3 
pages). These opening excerpts are representative of the two novels at large. 
Toussaint refers to transitive bodily movement at least three times as of-
ten as does Robbe-Grillet, a striking disproportion, given that La jalousie is 
construed as a fine-grained, circular account of what is seen by a man obses-
sively observing the behavior of others. Meanwhile, L’appareil-photo could 
be characterized as a straightforward, nearly conversational, first-person 
account of a few episodes from everyday life. Importantly, during each of 
the long, fully static pauses occurring in La jalousie, any hitherto conceiv-
able sense of presence collapses, leaving the reader with a strong sense of 
detachment instead, one that in my view prevails more or less throughout the 
entire novel. In terms of referential imagery, scattered description-images 
(and possibly some in-between enactment/description images) are the only 
effect thus achieved. 
Hence the rules and patterns of presence seem to resemble of the mood-
cue system in film structure and spectatorship outlined by film scholar Greg 
Smith: to sustain presence, the text must provide the reader with a “periodic 
diet” (G. M. Smith 2003, 42) ⁠ of references to bodily movement. An optimal 
density of cuing seems uneasy, but also unnecessary, to define. Overexpo-
sure to raw presence cues as characterized until this point, such that would 
cause saturation and loss of effect, remains hypothetically possible. Yet such 
a narrative would most probably not invite much aesthetic appreciation, ap-
proximating a mundane instruction manual instead. I will now turn to the 
aforementioned balance between naturalness and defamiliarization. In so 
doing I will narrow down my definition of the cues in question here, and 
describe presence in terms of its very local and instantaneous – rather than 
global and continuous – nature, a step which will further clarify why there 
should be little risk of cue overdose, if any. 
2.5.2 Presence as (unmarked) balance  
 
What I mean by balance between naturalness and defamiliarization in ren-
dering transitive bodily movement is closely related to a notion of unmarked 
proportion between the kinesthetic, the otherwise proprioceptive and the 
exteroceptive aspects of the narrated event. That is, not only should the 
agent-object interaction as described in the narrative ideally not transgress a 
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certain level of granularity, because then it would most probably slide into a 
kind of slow motion and cease being dynamically or kinematically vera-
cious; it also needs to display some similarity with the distribution of atten-
tional focus such as would normally occur in a corresponding real-world 
action. 
With the exception of stories where artifacts themselves are invested with 
high conceptual significance (Edgar Allan Poe’s Stolen Letter, Georges 
Perec’s Les choses), nearly any narrative rendition of object-directed move-
ment as such potentially constitutes a vehicle of defamiliarization – in the 
very general sense that it makes explicit the “gapped middle,” or “penulti-
mate subevent” (i.e. a step that in everyday communication is naturally omit-
ted; see Talmy 2000) ⁠, a typical subgoal in a more complex sequence of ac-
tions. Classified as “minor detail” by discourse theorist Catherine Emmott 
(1997, 243) ⁠, the sole act of, for example, pushing a door open, would usually 
not be included in a non-literary narrative if not implying or leading to some-
thing rather unusual, the less would it be considered a full-fledged event 
worth telling in daily conversation. On the other hand, in the literary cases 
where it fulfills the function of a presence cue, its way of rendering motor 
experience would not stretch too far beyond its being simply and briefly 
mentioned, as in the following excerpt from L’appareil-photo: 
Profitant d’une légère accalmie, nous nous remîmes en route, et, après avoir 
marché une bonne demi-heure sous la pluie, comme nous passions devant un 
grand hôtel, je proposai à Pascale de nous y arrêter pour boire un café, ou 
même un thé si elle voulait, j’étais prêt à tout. A tout. Je poussai la porte de 
l’hôtel et aperçu un portier en habit d’apparat, redingote et gilet gris, qui 
faisait une petite pause dans le hall sur une chaise de service. (Toussaint 1988, 
88) ⁠ 
[Taking advantage of a slight lull, we went on our way, and, after having 
walked for a good half-hour in the rain, as we passed a large hotel I asked 
Pascale if she would like to stop and have coffee, or even tea if she preferred, 
I was up for anything. For anything. I opened the hotel door [pushed the hotel 
door open] and caught sight of a doorman in full regalia, frock coat and gray 
waistcoat, who, seated in a lounge chair, was taking a break in the lobby. 
(Toussaint 2008, 77; my literal translation added in nested square brackets) ⁠] 
 
For exactly in laconic mentions like this one, does it ever so closely resem-
ble a real-world experience of motor interaction, which belongs to the do-
main of procedural, i.e., nonverbal and largely non-describable, knowledge. 
Otherwise, the right proportion between kinesthesia, other proprioception 
and exteroception, or the flash of sensorimotor unity as I call it elsewhere in 
this chapter, may fail to arise, with other effects, embodied or disembodied, 
arising in the reader instead. 
Defining kinesthesia, physiologist Alain Berthoz poses the following rhe-
torical question (Berthoz 2002, 25) ⁠: “By what twist did language suppress 
the sense most important to survival?” It is aptly answered by Anthony Mar-
 73 
cel, medical scientist and philosopher, who affirms that, as a rule, we have 
very poor direct proprioceptive awareness when carrying out a bodily action, 
and reminds us that we tend to be primarily focused on the object we are 
interacting with (Marcel 2003, 67). Hence my premise that simulated transi-
tive movement may serve well to elicit a multimodal enactment-image of the 
outer environment acted upon, and my belief that simple mentioning of the 
movement does the best work in making both the movement – be it mundane 
(e.g. pounding a nail into a wall) or extraordinary (e.g. picking up a coin 
with one’s foot, stepping on a nail) – and the environmental fragment as 
veracious as possible in the reader’s mind. 
A perfectly adequate distribution of attentional focus is again impossible 
to define, as the situations in which a movement occurs can vary endlessly. 
Nonetheless, based on what has just been said, one can at least assume that a 
sense of disproportion easily arises when inner sensations are accounted for, 
especially if richly so. Proprioceptive accounts may well enhance embodied 
empathy and draw the reader’s attention to the processes inside her own 
body (see also Esrock 2004) ⁠, but they do not in themselves elicit presence, a 
phenomenal sense of connection between body and environment. Here are 
two examples of such proprioceptive cuing from Madame Bovary, one brief, 
another slightly more elaborate:  
Emma se sentait faible en marchant[.] (Flaubert 1972 [1857]: 175) ⁠ 
[As she walked along, Emma began to feel weak. (Flaubert 1995 [1950]: 
104) ⁠] 
 
Elle se tenait immobile, de peur que la moindre émotion ne la fit vomir. Ce-
pendant, elle sentait un froid de glace qui lui montait des pied jusqu’au coeur. 
(Flaubert 1972 [1857]: 459-460) ⁠ 
[She kept quite still, afraid that the least agitation might make her sick. She 
began to feel an icy coldness mounting from her feet towards her heart. 
(Flaubert 1995 [1950]: 327) ⁠] 
 
Neither of these two examples renders inner sensations connected to transi-
tive movement, pertaining to locomotion instead, and both render abnormal 
circumstances. To a certain degree, nearly any movement escapes verbaliza-
tion in terms of proprioceptive sensations, as long as the latter conform to 
what is perceived as common. Still the proprioceptive element is particularly 
evasive to conscious awareness when the movement in question is transitive. 
Jeannerod (2006, 53–55) ⁠ points out that object-directed actions (i.e. purpose-
ful object-directed movements) only enter full consciousness in their own 
right when they are either delayed due to an obstacle, incomplete, or 
blocked. All of Jeannerod’s examples entail pain (e.g. grasping too hot a 
cup) or physical impairment (e.g. loss of motor skill after a stroke). A few 
examples of how these kinds of experience translate into language can be 
found in Flaubert’s novel: 
 74 
Comme elle fut longtemps avant de trouver son étui, son père s’impatienta ; 
elle ne répondit rien, mais, tout en cousant, elle se piquait les doigts, qu’elle 
portait ensuite à sa bouche pour les sucer. (Flaubert 1972 [1857]: 72) ⁠ 
[She was so long finding her work-box that her father lost patience with 
her. She made no answer; but as she sewed she pricked her fingers, and then 
she put them to her mouth and sucked them. (Flaubert 1995 [1950]: 28) ⁠] 
 
Emma se sentait faible en marchant ; les cailloux du trottoir la blessaient[.] 
(Flaubert 1972 [1857]: 175) ⁠ 
[As she walked along, Emma began to feel weak. The pebbles on the foot-
path hurt her feet. (Flaubert 1995 [1950]: 104) ⁠] 
 
In both of these cases, an inference is strongly invited by the text for a refer-
ential image to become complete: the object (a needle) in the first one, the 
transitive movement itself (a step or a series of steps) in the second one. In 
both cases, however, it is the object that the success or failure, normality or 
abnormality, of the transitive movement is measured against. The needle has 
been grasped improperly, the pebbles are too hard for the treading soles of 
Emma Bovary. Here the environment remains in focus, outperforming pro-
prioception, which in turn has only been given the briefest mention. Given 
that presence stands for the sense of existence within a particular environ-
ment, the exteroceptive cue in the form of an object must always remain in 
focus if presence is to arise at all. An extensive proprioceptive account of 
one singular transitive movement, uneasy to imagine and difficult to find in 
actual narratives as it is, would violate the balance.  
Yet in arousing presence, there is equally an upper limit for what qualifies 
as natural focus toward the exteroceptive side of the sensorimotor contin-
uum. Contradicting the economy and selectivity intrinsic to normal attention, 
meticulous descriptions of the outer world may paradoxically make it quite 
difficult for the reader to image what is being described (see Chapter 3), or 
even cause her to refocus onto the linguistic medium as such rather than 
image anything at all. Much of this chapter, similarly to Grünbaum’s article 
(see Section 2.3 above), stems from an effort to explain that in contrast to 
what is often assumed, passages of detailed visual description usually do not 
elicit presence. Not unless an obviously dynamic, bodily element is inter-
spersed throughout; not as long as they are static and conform to the narrow 
definition of description as “a narrative pause interrupting the presentation of 
the chain of events” (Pflugmacher 2008, 101) ⁠. Robbe-Grillet’s novel, for 
instance, abounds in detailed static environment descriptions, such as the 
following: 
Sur la table de la salle à manger, le boy a disposé un unique couvert, en face 
du buffet long et bas qui occupe presque toute la cloison entre la porte ouverte 
de l’office et la fenêtre fermée donnant sur la cour. Les rideaux, qui n’ont pas 
été tirés, laissent à découvert les six carreaux noirs de la fenêtre./ Une seule 
lampe éclaire la grande pièce. Elle est située sur la table, dans son angle sud-
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ouest (c’est à dire du côté de l’office), illuminant la nappe blanche. A droite 
de la lampe, une petite tache de sauce marque la place de Franck : une empre-
inte allongée, sinueuse, entourée de signes plus ténus. De l’autre côté, les ray-
ons viennent frapper perpendiculairement le mur nu, tout proche, faisant res-
sortir en pleine lumière l’image du mille-pattes écrasé par Franck. (Robbe-
Grillet 1957, 144–145) ⁠ 
[On the dining room table the boy has set a single place, opposite the long, 
low sideboard which takes up almost the entire wall between the open pantry 
door and the closed window overlooking the courtyard. The curtains, which 
have not been drawn, reveal the six black panes of the window. / A single 
lamp illuminates the large room. It is placed on the southwest corner of the ta-
ble (that is, toward the pantry), lighting up the white cloth. To the right of the 
lamp, a little spot of sauce marks Franck’s place: an elongated, sinuous stain 
surrounded by more tenuous markings. On the other side, the lamp’s beams 
strike perpendicularly against the nearby naked wall, showing quite clearly in 
the full light the image of the centipede Franck squashed. (Robbe-Grillet 
1965a, 104) ⁠] 
 
Although these descriptions may evoke the path of a traveling gaze, thus 
prompting an in-between enactment/description experience (see Chapter 1, 
Section 1.6.5), any bodily movement of the central experiencer would have 
to be inferred by the reader on unsteady grounds. 
Thanks to the highly repetitive structure of La jalousie, some readers may 
be able to reconstruct a decently accurate spatial model by the time they 
reach this particular passage in the novel. Nonetheless, experimental studies 
have shown that even spatial modeling, i.e., the deliberate retrieval of spatial 
information from memory, is significantly facilitated when readers expect a 
story character to be reported to move, as opposed to when they do not (see 
Rapp, Klug, and H. A. Taylor 2006) ⁠.46 Mental modeling notwithstanding, the 
unusual poverty in references to bodily movement in the above passage pre-
vents one from simulating active physical contact between body and envi-
ronment, and from developing a sense of having delved into that environ-
ment. By contrast, the following passage from L’appareil-photo enhances 
presence through consistent dynamization (and, in a sense, narrativization) 
of the environment: 
Comme elle avait vraiment très froid, elle finit par se lever, le manteau sur les 
épaules, et, écartant du bras un petit rideau de chintz, partit à la recherche d’un 
chauffage d’appoint dans un réduit minuscule, très sombre, où, dans une 
douche désaffectée, à côté d’un anorak azur qui pendait à un cintre, avait été 
                                                       
46 Also, it is telling that when asked to spontaneously describe enclosed environments of the 
kind present in La jalousie, people often adopt a dynamic egocentric perspective, taking their 
interlocutors on mental tours (see H. A. Taylor and Tversky 1996; Linde and Labov 1975) ⁠. 
They tend to address their interlocutors as “you”, telling them where to go and how to orient 
themselves within the environment at issue, and indicate the position of rooms and objects 
with respect to this moving you. 
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entreposées plusieurs piles de documents. Elle m’avait demandé de la suivre 
pour l’aider dans ses recherches et, tandis que je feuilletais pensivement 
quelques vieux dossiers d’inscription dans l’obscurité, elle déplaça une caisse 
mal fermée de laquelle dépassaient des cônes de stationnement orange et attira 
vers nous une bouteille de gaz, que surmontait un petit radiateur, au foyer gril-
lagé. (Toussaint 1988, 24–25) ⁠ 
[As she was really cold, she got up, a coat covering her shoulders, and, 
pushing aside a chintz curtain [with her arm], left to look for another portable 
heater in a tiny dark storage room, where, in a shower no longer used, next to 
an azure anorak dangling on a hanger, were stacked several piles of papers. 
She had asked me to follow her to help her look and, while I pensively flipped 
through some old registration applications in the darkness, she moved a 
poorly closed box spilling over with orange parking cones and found [pulled 
toward us] a small propane tank for cooking topped with a little radiator with 
a grilled front. (Toussaint 2008, 22; my literal translation added in nested 
square brackets) ⁠] 
 
Incidentally picking up the example of Flaubert’s writing, the literary semi-
otician Roland Barthes (1989) ⁠ once famously commented on the indexical 
function of “insignificant” quotidian artifacts. Barthes argues that the men-
tion of such artifacts in narrative helps create what he called the reality ef-
fect. If, for the sake of a thought experiment, Barthes’ concept of reality 
effect were understood as denoting presence, his discriminating observation 
would only be giving one half of the picture. For references to everyday 
objects, particularly those less devoid of practicality than the bibelots and 
some such (“un polypier touffu” [“some branching coral”]) of Mr and Mrs 
Bovary’s rooms, enhance presence only inasmuch the objects appear in the 
close peri-personal space of an explicitly (instantaneous presence) and/or 
habitually (continuous presence) moving human individual; or possibly if the 
narrative, through concentrated cuing, invites the reader to immediately an-
ticipate such an event. In electrophysiological studies of mere action obser-
vation, the inchoate muscle tension intrinsic to action preparation has been 
found to arouse corresponding event-related potentials (i.e. a motor simula-
tion of action preparation) in the observing individuals (see Kilner et al. 
2004). This finding makes some psychologists (Zwaan, L. J. Taylor, and De 
Boer 2010) ⁠ believe that verbal reference to action preparation may have 
analogous simulation effects in readers. 
Put differently, in a literary narrative, implicit object affordances alone 
usually do not suffice for interaction dynamics, and the subsequent sense of 
presence, to arise. If scholars discussing presence in high-tech virtual envi-
ronments can advantageously ground their reasoning in a broadly defined 
concept of affordance, arguing that the virtual environment “is perceived and 
understood by mentally combining potential patterns of actions” (Schubert, 
Biocca, and Regenbrecht 2001, 267) ⁠, it is precisely because the computer-
ized interfaces they study actually entail real motor interaction on the part of 
the user, who is kept busy manipulating the joystick, the keyboard, or the 
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like. As far as the book medium is concerned, interaction can only be vicari-
ously enacted by the reader based on a character’s reported motor activity.  
Moreover, behavioral experiments (Borghi and Riggio 2009) ⁠ show that 
despite the above-mentioned cortical activation detected in the processing of 
isolated artifact nouns, it is unlikely that in sentences or discourse, these 
nouns activate a particular action – i.e., one corresponding to the canonical 
affordance (e.g. “hammer”-“pound”) – by default, regardless of the specific 
task referred to in the surrounding text. Rather, the motor information acti-
vated by the object name seems to be modulated by the co-occurring verb 
(e.g. “see” vs. “grasp”).47 In line with the main argument of this chapter, the 
same experimenters suggest that simulation is more robust and precise for 
action sentences than for observation sentences, based on their finding that 
manual response times measured on an object recognition task were faster 
when the response was primed by the verb “grasp” as compared to “see.” To 
rephrase my formulation from above: Given that presence stands for the 
sense of existence within an environment, not only the exteroceptive cue in 
the form of an object, but also the bodily movement itself must always re-
main in focus. As far as presence is concerned, one cannot do without the 
other. 
How a bodily movement ought to be rendered in order to appear vera-
cious and induce presence, has already been foreshadowed in various ways. 
It has also been said that if presence is to reach a peak, proprioceptive and 
kinesthetic cues should be comparably restricted, regardless of whether the 
movement in question is mundane (canonical) or not. To adopt a similarly 
simplistic language, these two kinds of bodily movement can be directed at 
two different kinds of objects: mundane (basic-level, e.g., “hammer”) or 
extraordinary (parts of mundane objects, or objects less commonly interacted 
with at a particular place and time). All these distinctions are certainly a 
matter of degree, and partly also of individual reception. I omit transitive 
movements that strongly contradict human biomechanics (e.g. picking up a 
hammer with one’s foot) or semantic sensibility (e.g. squeezing a window; 
see also Klatzky et al. 1989) ⁠, assuming that, albeit stimulating to the reader’s 
embodied imagination, these may be difficult to enact. 
The more mundane and/or basic-level an object, the less exteroceptive, 
i.e., in most cases visual, description is required. In fact, for artifacts of daily 
use proper, the proportion between amount of text and the sense of presence 
may be a roughly reverse one: only when such artifacts are passed compara-
bly unnoticed does the environment emerge as truly lived (see also Chapter 
                                                       
47 In narrative, perceived affordances are also co-determined by previous reading experience. 
(I am grateful to Michael Kimmel for bringing this point to my attention.) For instance, for a 
reader well-acquainted with vampire narratives, the mention of a pointed pole may be more 
stimulating in terms of referential simulation/imagery as compared to a novice. 
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3, Section 3.5.3), rather than contemplated upon, like in the following pas-
sage from L’appareil-photo: 
Elle rentra aussitôt et, pendant qu’elle répondait, j’attendis en face d’elle, dé-
plaçant des objets du bout de doigts sur son bureau, ouvrant quelque registre. 
Dès qu’elle eut raccroché, elle me demanda où j’en étais dans la constitution 
de mon dossier, et nous fîmes ensemble une manière d’inventaire de tous les 
documents que j’avais déjà réunis. (Toussaint 1988, 10) ⁠ 
[She went to answer it and, while she was talking, I waited next to her, 
slightly moving objects on her desk [with my fingertips], opening random 
drawers [some folders]. Once she had hung up, she asked me how my applica-
tion was coming along, and together we made a sort of inventory of all the 
documents I had already gotten together. (Toussaint 2008, 9–10; my literal 
translation added in nested square brackets) ⁠] 
 
Much has happened in cognitive science since its early times, but it will al-
ways remain true that sensory experience escapes replete verbal report into a 
much higher degree than other, higher forms of cognition do. Moreover, the 
borderline between verbally evoking and conceptualizing is especially thin 
when perception of quotidian artifacts is concerned, which may be known to 
the reader of a particular place and time inside out. In the following passage 
from La jalousie, a colonial-style table is being described way beyond im-
mediate evocation: 
La table est un disque de métal percé de trous innombrables, dont les plus gros 
dessinent une rosace compliquée : des S partant tous du centre, comme les 
rayons deux fois cintrés d’une roue, et s’enroulant chacun sur soi-même en 
spirale à l’autre bout, sur la périphérie du disque. / Le pied qui le supporte est 
constitué par une triple tige grêle dont les branches s’écartent pour converger 
ensuite à nouveau, par un changement de la concavité, et s’enroulent à leur 
tour (dans les trois plans verticaux passant par l’axe du système) en trois vo-
lutes semblables, qui reposent sur le sol par leur spire inférieure et sont ac-
colées ensemble au moyen d’un anneau, un peu plus haut sur cette même 
courbe. (Robbe-Grillet 1957, 124–125) ⁠ 
[The table is a metal disc pierced with innumerable holes, the largest of 
which form a complicated rosette: a series of S’s all starting at the center, like 
double-curved spokes of a wheel, and each spiraling at the outer end, at the 
periphery of the disc. / The base supporting the table consists of a slender tri-
ple stem whose strands separate to converge again, coiling (in three vertical 
planes through the axis of the system) into three similar volutes whose lower 
whorls rest on the ground and are bound together by a ring placed a little 
higher on the curve. (Robbe-Grillet 1965a, 94–95) ⁠] 
 
When given too much attention, either through meticulous description or 
other narrative treatment (e.g. consistent anecdotal conceptualization as in 
Nicholson Baker’s novel The Mezzanine), mundane objects fail to co-
produce presence, prompting a series of detached, perceptually feeble de-
scription-images in the former case (see Chapter 3), or imageless proposi-
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tional thought in the latter. However, one exception of sorts from this gen-
eral rule should probably be mentioned here: touch and cutaneous sensa-
tions, or static implications thereof (“hold X,” “feel X,” “X in hand,” and so 
forth), with their double position in between proprioception and exterocep-
tion, linking the body intimately to its environment. Here is one of the many 
brief mentions of cutaneous perception from Toussaint’s L’appareil-photo, 
followed by a slightly more elaborate one from the same source text: 
J’étais assis immobile dans la pénombre, et, dans la poche de mon manteau, je 
sentais le boîtier de l’appareil-photo qui faisait une petite bosse contre ma 
cuisse. (Toussaint 1988, 105) ⁠ 
[I was sitting motionless in the semi-darkness, and, in my coat pocket, I 
felt the camera case that jutted out against my thigh. (Toussaint 2008, 92) ⁠] 
 
Arrivant devant les bâtiments du centre commercial, nous poussâmes la dou-
ble porte vitrée de l’entrée et, accueillis par la bouffée de chaleur sèche d’un 
soupirail, nous nous engageâmes dans l’allée principal de la galerie mar-
chande. (Toussaint 1988, 64) ⁠ 
[Arriving at the shopping center, we opened the glass double doors at the 
entrance and, welcomed by a gust of dry heat coming up from a floor vent, we 
walked down the main strip of the mall. (Toussaint 2008, 56–57) ⁠] 
 
As one moves upwards along the mundane-extraordinary continuum, more 
and more verbal report is needed for the mere sake of brief mentioning – 
without specification, the comprehender would not know what the extraordi-
nary object is or that it is at all. The more elaborate a static description of an 
object, the higher the “risk” of conceptualization and defamiliarization. For 
the description to be potentially formative of presence, an anthropocentric 
and egocentric (experiencer-related: e.g., “John picked up his wallet.”) – as 
opposed to allocentric (object-related: e.g., “The wallet lay on the floor.”) – 
way of locating the object, should preferably apply throughout the text pas-
sage, however fuzzy this distinction may be when it comes to discourse. This 
means for instance that a non-manipulable object should not be described 
from several angles at once when the locomotion required for such sensory 
experience cannot be sensibly inferred, given the specific context. A descrip-
tion becomes truly evocative only when it captures what can directly be seen 
or otherwise perceived, rather than what we merely know or guess. Albeit 
rarely, the latter case does occur in my literary corpus: 
Ovoïde et renflée de baleines, elle [la coiffure] commençait par trois boudins 
circulaires ; puis s’alternaient, séparés par une bande rouge, des losanges de 
velours et de poils de lapin ; venait ensuite une façon de sac qui se terminait 
par un polygone cartonné, couvert d’une broderie en soutache compliquée, et 
d’où pendait, au bout d’un long cordon trop mince, un petit croisillon de fils 
d’or, en manière de gland. (Flaubert 1999 [1857], 56–57) 
[An oval splayed out with whale-bone, it [the cap] started off with three 
pompons; these were followed by lozenges of velvet and rabbit’s fur alter-
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nately, separated by a red band, ad after that came a kind of bag ending in a 
polygon of cardboard with intricate braiding on it [covered with intricate 
braiding]; and from this there hung down like a tassel, at the end of a long, too 
slender cord, a little sheaf of gold threads. (Flaubert 1995 [1950]: 16; my lit-
eral translation in nested square brackets) ⁠] 
 
The possibility to discern or infer so-called canonical perspective (see 
Palmer, Rosch, and Chase 1981) ⁠, i.e., a perspective facilitating canonical 
affordance (e.g. seeing an electric iron from above rather than from beneath), 
or at least human interaction of some kind, may also make a description eas-
ier to integrate into a veracious mental image. Finally, it seems that a par-
ticularly effective way for an author to have that image feed into a genuine 
flash of sensorimotor unity is by making the dynamizing reference to bodily 
movement or touch immediately after the object or environmental fragment 
has been described in visual or other exteroceptive terms, rather than before. 
The reason for this is that in such cases, the movement to be enacted is read-
ily disambiguated by the preceding text in terms of its dynamics, power, 
precision and sensory outcome, becoming thus in itself an ultimate point of 
uniqueness (see Section 2.3 above). See for example the following para-
graph, taken from La jalousie: 
En plein jour, l’opposition des deux couleurs grises – celle du bois nu et celle, 
un peu plus claire, de la peinture qui subsiste – dessine des figures compli-
quées aux contours anguleux, presque en dents de scie. Sur le dessus de la 
barre d’appui, il n’y a plus que des îlots épars, en saillie, formés par les der-
niers restes de peinture. Sur les balustres, au contraire, ce sont les régions dé-
peintes, beaucoup plus réduites et généralement situées vers le milieu de la 
hauteur, qui constituent les taches, en creux, où les doigts reconnaissent le 
fendillement vertical du bois. A la limite des plaques, de nouvelles écailles de 
peinture se laissent aisément enlever ; il suffit de glisser l’ongle sous le bord 
qui se décolle et de forcer, en pliant la phalange ; la résistance est à peine sen-
sible. (Robbe-Grillet 1957, 28–29) ⁠ 
[In broad daylight, the contrast of the two shades of gray – that of the na-
ked wood and that, somewhat lighter, of the remaining paint – creates compli-
cated figures with angular, almost serrated outlines. On the top of the handrail, 
there are only scattered, protruding islands formed by the last vestiges of 
paint. On the balusters, though, it is the unpainted areas, much smaller and 
generally located toward the middle of the uprights, which constitute the 
spots, here incised, where the fingers recognize the vertical grain of the wood. 
At the edge of the patches, new scales of the paint are easy to chip off; it is 
enough to slip a fingernail beneath the projecting edge and pry it up by bend-
ing the first joint of the finger; the resistance is scarcely perceptible. (Robbe-
Grillet 1965a, 48) ⁠] 
 
After an elaborate visual opening, the paragraph gradually slides into a com-
bined visual-tactile focus, only to be rounded off by a brief reference to tran-
sitive bodily movement, which ties the modalities together for a moment, 
creating a multimodal image of the railing as physically present within one’s 
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reach. Immediately after, Robbe-Grillet’s narrative brings the reader back to 
the realms of the purely visual again. This very reference to transitive bodily 
movement is not only typically economic when compared to the preceding 
exteroceptive renditions of the environment, it also exemplifies further prin-
ciples of presence cuing through bodily movement, to be outlined in what 
remains of this chapter: It is sudden, it is comparably isolated, and it is not 
even grammatically bound to a particular agent or time.  
2.5.3 Presence as (marked) occurrence 
 
In his writing on the ubiquity of perspective in discourse comprehension, 
cognitive linguist Brian MacWhinney (2005) ⁠ argues that, whereas reading 
“the cat licked herself” in isolation may only invite us to adopt what he calls 
a superficial, depictive mode of processing (corresponding to visual simula-
tion in Zwaan 2004 and, on the level of consciousness, to description-
imagery; see Chapter 3), reading the same sentence embedded in discourse is 
more likely to elicit what he calls a deeper, enactive mode in which the 
reader maps the cat’s paw onto her hand etc. (corresponding to the afore-
mentioned motor simulation, the basis of motor enactment-imagery). Along 
with the above Robbe-Grillet quote, the embedding MacWhinney makes up 
for his sentence may serve as a good example for further discussion: 
The cat spotted a mockingbird perched on the feeder. She crouched down low 
in the grass, inching closer and closer with all her muscles tensed. Just as she 
pounced, the bird escaped. Disappointed, she leapt up to a garden chair, raised 
her paw to her tongue, and began licking it. (MacWhinney 2005, 199) ⁠ 
 
Both MacWhinney’s example and the preceding Robbe-Grillet quote allow 
the reader to discern a unitary perspective, or even unitary focalization as 
some narratologists would have it, but grammatically they differ in person 
and tense, the former being impersonal. The stimulus sentences used in neu-
roscientific and behavioral simulation studies also vary in this respect. En-
actment seems not to be reserved for selected verb forms. What applies to 
tense is also true for verb aspect: There may be a difference between im-
agery distribution (motor vs. sensory-motor simulation) in punctual (“sliced 
an onion”) vs. iterative (“was slicing onions”) action, as well as in action that 
is current vs. past with respect to the now of the narrative (see Zwaan, L. J. 
Taylor, and de Boer 2010; Zwaan 2008), but simulation takes place in either 
case. Thus when Käte Hamburger, an influential narratologist whose work 
opens for a view of presence as the hallmark of literature at large, famously 
argues that sentences such as “Quickly intent, he took out a leather portfolio” 
(Hamburger 1973, 63) are exactly what makes one read a text as a literary 
narrative, she may be quite correct, yet her argument, grounded in the 
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grammatical categories of (the third) person and (past) tense, does not have 
to be. 
MacWhinney (2005, 199) ⁠ seems to propose consistent focalization 
through the cat (“each clause links to the previous one through the perspec-
tive of the cat as the protagonist”), or simply the fact that the reader has been 
following the cat for a while by the time the critical sentence is reached, to 
be the main cause of motor simulation (or enactment) in reading “[she] be-
gan licking it.” In opposition to this explanation, I would like to argue that 
the perspective intrinsic to the surrounding text and the prominence of a 
character in a particular passage is far less important than other circum-
stances: Apart from dynamic veracity and brevity of reference, which have 
already been treated (see Sections 2.3 and 2.5.2 above), these can be sub-
sumed under the tentative label of sudden modality shift. In MacWhinney the 
shift entails a transition from locomotion to transitive movement (beginning 
one sentence earlier with “she leapt up to a garden chair”), in Robbe-Grillet 
it entails a transition from non-movement (or at most a little inferred micro-
movement implied by tactile perception) to transitive movement. In both 
cases, the impact of the shift may be further reinforced by its emphatic posi-
tion at the end of a paragraph. Crucially, the shift in MacWhinney’s story 
will be preserved even if the last two sentences are replaced with a sentence 
referring to an animate subject other than the cat, and so will its sensorimo-
tor appeal: 
The cat spotted a mockingbird perched on the feeder. She crouched down low 
in the grass, inching closer and closer with all her muscles tensed. John raised 
the cup to his lips and took a sip of tea. 
 
Prospection and habituation are distinctive features of all literary reading 
(see also Olson, Mack, and Duffy 1981) ⁠. By means of integrating subtle 
cues, texts continuously modulate and tease the reader’s expectations. If 
MacWhinney’s story were rich in references to transitive bodily movement 
(e.g. “the cat was playing with a pine cone,” “she embraced the tree trunk as 
she observed the mockingbird”) from the very beginning, or if it consisted of 
such references exclusively, the critical sentence would not attract as much 
attention, its emphatic position notwithstanding. A quality of suddenness and 
immediacy, crucial as it seems for enactment-imagery to arise, would be 
missing then, the readers having become accustomed to the mode of transi-
tive movement by the time they would reach the sentence. While this would 
probably not hinder basic motor simulation, a strong phenomenal boost to-
ward the threshold of consciousness would be less likely. An interesting 
example of excessive recourse to transitive bodily movement can be found in 
one of the cue clusters in La jalousie. Not only does its density preclude 
enactment-imagery and presence; Robbe-Grillet’s way of putting discrete 
body parts (or their haptic extensions, i.e., tools currently in use) repeatedly 
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in the position of linguistic subject imposes an artificial allocentric perspec-
tive and objectifies the implied human individual, thus further challenging 
the movements’ presence-cuing potential: 
La main droite saisit le pain et le porte à la bouche, la main droite repose le 
pain sur la nappe blanche et saisit le couteau, la main gauche saisit la 
fourchette, la fourchette pique la viande, le couteau coupe un morceau de vi-
ande, la main droite pose le couteau sur la nappe, la main gauche met la 
fourchette dans la main droite, qui pique le morceau de viande, qui s’approche 
de la bouche, qui se met à mastiquer avec des mouvements de contraction et 
d’extension[.] (Robbe-Grillet 1957, 111–112) ⁠ 
[The right hand picks up the bread and raises it to the mouth, the right hand 
sets the bread down on the white cloth and picks up the knife, the left hand 
picks up the fork, the fork sinks into the meat, the knife cuts off a piece of 
meat, the right hand sets down the knife on the cloth, the left hand puts the 
fork in the right hand, which sinks the fork into the piece of meat, which ap-
proaches the mouth, which begins to chew with movements of contraction and 
extension. (Robbe-Grillet 1965a, 88) ⁠] 
 
To recall Smith’s metaphor of periodic diet, presence cues become effective 
only if moderately dosed. Not only should they appear periodically, once in 
a while, for a continuous sense of presence to arise. They should appear just 
once in a while, if presence is to be instantaneously elicited at all. 
Speaking of immersion in general, and its spatial facets in particular, nar-
rative theorist Marie-Laure Ryan makes the following remark: “Continuous 
presence [of immersion cues]48 becomes habit, habit leads to invisibility, and 
invisibility is as good as absence. For immersion to retain its intensity, it 
needs a contrast of narrative modes, a constantly renegotiated distance from 
the narrative scene, a profile made of peaks and valleys.” (Ryan 2001, 137) ⁠ 
Neuroimaging experiments (e.g. Raposo et al. 2009) have shown that when 
processed in context, motor verbs cause weaker cortical activation in the 
motor strip than when they are processed in isolation. The immediacy of a 
sudden reference to bodily movement may somehow make it operate more 
like an isolated utterance. Moreover, neither in Robbe-Grillet’s description 
of the railing nor in MacWhinney’s example, is transitive bodily movement 
overtly linked to a previously known overarching goal, or script (see Schank 
and Abelson 1977) ⁠, e.g., in the way “picking up a fork” may in some cases 
be subsumed under “having dinner.” The movements occur contingently, as 
it were. Although the framing of pre-scripted movement (e.g. “The cat 
                                                       
48 Ryan proposes three sorts of immersion cues, all pertaining to narrative structure rather than 
content: adverbial deictic shift, present tense, and second-person narration (Ryan 2001, 134–
139). Although simulation processes seem to operate independently of grammatical catego-
ries, these cues may somehow be at work in the prompting of presence in particular, combin-
ing readily with the content-related cues proposed in the present chapter. I elaborate on this 
idea elsewhere (Kuzmičová 2013a, 215). 
 
 84 
wanted to clean herself, so she raised her paw to her tongue, and began lick-
ing it.”) may be more productive at eliciting event-related potentials analo-
gous to those occurring in action preparation, the slight surprise effect elic-
ited by contingent, non-scripted movement may, on the other hand, have a 
reinforcing effect on simulation in a way similar to that of a sudden modality 
shift (see also Barthes 1989) ⁠. 
Discussing their results from their neuroimaging study of story compre-
hension, Nicole Speer and colleagues conclude that “Regions involved in 
processing goal-directed human activity, navigating spatial environments, 
and manually manipulating objects in the real world increased in activation 
at points when those specific aspects of the narrated events were changing.” 
(Speer et al. 2009a, 995). Although Speer et al.’s focus is much more fun-
damental and granular than mine, it points in the same direction: Where 
movement and dynamics occur as something new with regard to what im-
mediately precedes, somatotopic activation clearly takes place. I suggest that 
where they occur as comparably striking, simulation often grows into enact-
ment-imagery, and into presence. 
Outlining his theory of action ownership, Anthony Marcel (2003) ⁠ asserts 
that in real-world experience, a minimal sense of action ownership can al-
ways be traced to the instantaneous egocentric coordination of the senses 
accompanying every bodily action, i.e., every volitional movement. I suggest 
that in reading, conversely, reflexive enactment of transitive bodily move-
ment imposes upon the reader an instantaneously egocentric perspective, 
independent of focalization, whereof a flash of sensorimotor unity arises. As 
it happens, in post-Flaubert literary prose, it is quite unusual that references 
to transitive bodily movement do not occur at all. But the quality of presence 
elicited varies significantly depending on how often and in what constella-
tion they occur. 
2.6 Postscript 
 
A few concluding remarks remain to be added at this point: 
1: One could bring up presence cues other than references to transitive 
bodily movement. Apart from the aforementioned reality effect recognized 
by Barthes, these include proper place names, spatial deixis, the use of the 
definite article and various kinds of determinate pronouns (see also Ryan 
2001; Emmott 1997) ⁠. References to olfaction (e.g. old cigarette smell in a 
poorly ventilated hotel room), a sparsely theorized sensory modality, or inar-
ticulate sound, whether controlled by a human experiencer or not (e.g. the 
sound of gravel under one’s feet) also serve presence particularly well, as 
certainly do many other kinds of words and phrases. Similarly to the sen-
sorimotor cues that have been treated above, their impact depends on vari-
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ables such as syntax and position within paragraph or text, but also on the 
periodicity of cuing. The detailed description of these variables is, and in 
part already has been (e.g. Duchan, Bruder, and Hewitt 1995) ⁠, a subject mat-
ter for a separate investigation. 
2: Many empirical issues concerning embodied discourse processing at 
large, and thereby also motor simulation and its relationship to presence, 
remain to be resolved. Rolf Zwaan and colleagues (2010) have conducted 
experiments (reading-by-rotation tasks) to see if motor simulation arises only 
when the motor activity in question is reported to be overtly taking place in 
the narrative now, or if it equally arises when the motor verb refers merely to 
a person’s intention, or to something that happened in the past, off scene. As 
has previously been hinted, and against their initial predictions, the authors 
did find motor simulation to occur with past actions, similar for instance to 
Flaubert’s “Léon had unconsciously placed his foot on the bar of Madame 
Bovary’s chair.” However, they did not find it to occur with intended actions 
(e.g. “He wanted to lock the door.”) – which, so they hypothesize in the final 
discussion, may be accompanied by event-related potentials intrinsic to ac-
tion preparation rather than by full-fledged motor simulation. Importantly, 
the results indicate that on the behavioral, i.e., muscle level, motor simula-
tion is far from occurring by default with each and every motor verb. Rather, 
it seems to be modulated by what is currently happening in the imaginary 
world of the narrative. Nonetheless, the obtained results are inconsistent with 
regard to Zwaan et al.’s theoretical paradigm. 
What makes these empirical studies particularly interesting from the 
viewpoint of this chapter is that Zwaan and colleagues ground their reason-
ing in an unproblematic notion of the narrative now, against which they then 
test their predictions. From my point of view, on the other hand, the narra-
tive now corresponds to whatever becomes subject to the sense of presence, 
i.e., that which is to be elucidated as problematic. Technically, there happens 
to be no significant conflict between the two approaches, since all of Zwaan 
et al.’s stimuli are indeed brief and simple, and therefore easy to determine 
in terms of the narrative now. However, my speculation, grounded in the 
experience of reading complex literary narratives, may have the potential to 
account for some of the empirical inconsistencies. Suffice to posit, as I have 
been doing throughout this chapter, that one can derive the narrative now 
from the particular verbs and actions that are being processed (and enacted 
and vicariously experienced) and the context they are embedded in, rather 
than the other way around. 
With elementary cases like “He opened the door,” behavioral motor simu-
lation arguably occurs. With “He wanted to open the door,” it does not seem 
to occur. But what if the latter situation was worded in a more granular way, 
featuring a more precise reference to transitive movement, e.g., “He looked 
at the exquisite china door knob. He wanted to grasp it and gently turn, just 
for the pleasure of hearing it click”? Here the specificity of the intended 
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movement and its sensory outcome may be too compelling not to address the 
reader’s embodied understanding. And what if Flaubert had written “Léon 
wanted desperately to lean his foot against the bar of Emma’s chair”? Stud-
ies of neuronal mirroring have shown that the intensity of mirror and canoni-
cal neuron activation in action observation stands in direct proportion to how 
desirable the observed action is (see also Iacoboni et al. 2005) ⁠, and to its 
prominence within the human motor repertoire. All these factors may also be 
at play in the processing of motor verbs, regardless of whether the movement 
in question is actually being performed by a character on the scene or not. 
The same principles may apply to direct speech, yet another grey zone 
when it comes to the narrative now: “I opened it, he said.” or “As I was 
opening the door I thought of my grandfather, he said.” would probably in-
duce less enactment-imagery and instantaneous presence, if any, than “I had 
to use both my hands to turn that little china doorknob, he said,” and so 
forth. Interestingly, much of the presence elicited by Toussaint’s L’appareil-
photo seems to be grounded precisely in such borderline cuing, as repre-
sented by the digressive relative clauses in the following passage: 
 
[J]e remis ma chaussette en me maintenant en équilibre sur une jambe et, tan-
dis que, sur le point de tomber par terre, je sautillais sur place sur le trottoir 
pour garder un semblant d’équilibre, je me trouvai en présence d’un de mes 
hôtes à Milan, Il Signore Gambini, celui-là même qui l’avant-veille au soir 
était venu m’accueillir à l’aéroport et m’avait ensuite conduit en voiture à 
l’hôtel. Un homme charmant du reste, qui, le soir de mon arrivée, après 
m’avoir installé dans ma chambre, m’avait convié à venir boire un whisky 
avec lui au bar international de l’hôtel afin de me remettre divers documents 
ainsi q’un plan de la ville édité dans une petite brochure qu’il avait 
soigneusement annotée pour me faciliter la visite des différents musées de la 
ville, et qui, là encore, pendant que je remettais ma chaussure avec difficulté, 
s’inquiéta avec une extrême amabilité de savoir s’il pouvait m’être utile en 
quoi que ce soit (un pédicure, oh oui, m’écriai-je en lui prenant le bras). 
(Toussaint 1988, 18–19) ⁠ 
[I put my sock back on and, on the verge of falling, hopping in place on the 
sidewalk to keep my balance, I realized that I was in the presence of one of 
my hosts in Milan, Il Signore Gambini, the same man who came to the airport 
two nights ago to welcome me and drive me to the hotel. A charming man, to 
say the least, who, the night of my arrival, after showing me to my room, had 
invited me to have a whiskey with him at the hotel’s international bar, so as to 
give me various documents for work, as well as a map of the city printed in a 
small brochure that he had meticulously annotated in order to facilitate my 
visits to different museums in the city, and who, still there, while I was strain-
ing to put back on my shoe, asked me with the utmost amiability and with a 
look of concern if he could help me with anything (a pedicure, oh yes, I ex-
claimed grabbing his arm). (Toussaint 2008, 16–17) ⁠] 
 
The more distinct the transitive movement referred to, the greater is the in-
stantaneous presence potentially felt by the reader, and the closer the act in 
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question – whatever its logical temporal status – to the narrative now, expe-
rientially speaking. Unfortunately, reading-by-rotation tasks and similar 
experimental setups are based on very limited sets of movements and do not 
allow psychologists to study general motor simulation in complex literary 
discourse. 
3: What are then the possibilities of validating my introspective hypothe-
ses? Psychophysiological measurements of the kind used in guided mental 
imagery tasks, where people are trained and explicitly instructed to vividly 
imagine discrete situations, may be applicable in localizing motor enact-
ment-imagery, which may reveal itself as efferent leakage in the somato-
motor system (see Cuthbert, Vrana, and Bradley 1991) ⁠. Introspective self-
report, whether in the form of spontaneous verbal protocol or as question-
naire data (see also Note 39 to the present chapter), would be a necessary 
complement to any such behavioral setup. No paradigm would probably 
fully eliminate the risk of experimenter demand effect, and any paradigm 




Chapter 3. Description-imagery: reference 
without experience49 
it would be entirely false to believe that represented objectivities appear in 
full vividness when aspects belonging to them 
are themselves described in the text of a literary work. 
In fact, it is quite the opposite. 
(Ingarden 1973b, 267)  
3.1 Perceptual mimesis 
 
The present chapter focuses on description-imagery. In order to single out its 
most characteristic features vis-à-vis enactment-imagery, I will look closely 
into such description-imagery that is prompted by visual descriptions nar-
rowly defined. Considerable attention will therefore be given to delimiting 
visual description in terms of textual properties as well as defining the gen-
eral cognitive mechanisms (beyond imagery) involved in its processing. 
Although any one of the four imagery varieties outlined in Chapter 1 can 
hypothetically be prompted by any kind of textual stimulus, I will be work-
ing with a simplified opposition between visual description and description-
imagery on the one hand, and narrative narrowly defined (i.e. text represent-
ing action) and enactment-imagery on the other. In doing so, I will follow an 
important objective concerning previous literary scholarship on the nature of 
description. Namely, I will oppose the common assumption that detailed 
visual descriptions in literary prose necessarily prompt perceptually vivid 
visual imagery. Based on introspection as well as convergent support from 
cognitive science and other disciplines, I will argue that visual description 
(and the description-imagery it typically elicits), unlike narrative (and the 
enactment-imagery it typically elicits), often stands in no positive relation to 
real-world perceptual experience because it lacks a structural counterpart in 
                                                       
49 This chapter is an extended and revised version of my “Fidelity without Mimesis: Mental 
Imagery from Visual Description”, Currie, Gregory, Petr Koťátko, and Martin Pokorný (eds.), 




such experience. Focusing in particular on what may be considered proto-
typical visual descriptions, I will present an alternative way of defining de-
scription-imagery, and propose a number of text variables underlying the 
imageability or non-imageability of any such description. For the sake of 
brevity, I will sometimes be referring to description-imagery without qualifi-
cation, although a major part of my analysis concerns description-imagery 
prompted by visual descriptions specifically. Indeed, visual descriptions are 
the most likely prompters of description-imagery overall, and most instances 
of description-imagery thus coincide with description-imagery prompted by 
visual description. 
I have previously taken care to show that when we read literature, several 
varieties of mental imagery are at stake. One thing that bears repeating at 
this point is that not all of them, not even within the referential domain (see 
Chapter 1), are characterized by a striking resemblance to real-world percep-
tual experience. Among literary scholars, such resemblance is sometimes 
referred to as perceptual mimesis (see Scarry 1999). For lack of a better ex-
pression, I will adopt this term for the purposes of the present chapter. A 
piece of literary prose is perceptually mimetic insofar as it triggers referen-
tial images of the world as we apprehend it pre-verbally. For instance, if a 
verbal rendition of bright midday sunshine in high summer elicits the near-
experience of needing to squint, then the passage in question is likely per-
ceptually mimetic in the relevant sense. It should be pointed out, however, 
that I assume perceptual mimesis to involve the entire sensorimotor array, 
including the proprioceptive and kinesthetic modalities (e.g. the senses of 
limb and organ position, velocity, effort, acceleration and so forth) that are 
less frequently associated with perception proper. 
Insofar as a piece of literature succeeds in eliciting sensory (especially 
visual) images of its content, it is generally regarded as perceptually mi-
metic. In the common parlance of book reviewers, essayists and literary 
scholars, a particularly strong perceptual effect is usually attributed to visual 
description (Nünning 2007, 113; Wolf 2004, 339; Collins 1991, 116–118). 
To my knowledge, nobody has put this near-automatic conflation of percep-
tual mimesis, referential imagery, and visual description to closer scrutiny. 
Several authors (Grünbaum 2007, 311; Scarry 1999, 55; Esrock 1994, 38) 
have briefly countered the widespread assumption that there is a straightfor-
wardly direct relationship between the amount of visual detail provided 
through description on the one hand and the imageability of a text on the 
other. A few attempts (Burke 2011, 56–85; Scarry 1999; Collins 1991, 89–
118) have been made to account for the mechanics of visual imagery elicited 
by literature at large and by narrative in particular, but there is no systematic 
account of the imagery elicited by visual description (when elicited at all). 
This chapter aims at filling the gap. 
By way of introduction, I will provide an approximative definition of pro-
totypical visual description (Section 3.2) and present a further rationale for 
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characterizing the description-imagery it elicits (Section 3.3). In Section 3.4, 
I will proceed to the main body of my argument and make the following 
point: Unlike instances of narrative proper, prototypical visual descriptions 
and the description-imagery they elicit are not perceptually mimetic, because 
they lack an experiential correlate in the world as apprehended pre-verbally. 
At this stage of the argument, special emphasis will be put on the pre-
requisite of experientiality and, to a somewhat lesser degree, on the closely 
related pre-requisite of suspending the verbal. In Section 3.5, I will argue 
that even though these specific points of contrast preclude perceptual mime-
sis, they allow for a fruitful analogy between description-images and another 
kind of visual mental imagery, namely images from voluntary visualization 
(e.g. one’s purposeful image of what a particular bike model looks like). 
This analogy will be based on the following: Description-images, just like 
images from voluntary visualization (and in contrast to those images that are 
perceptually mimetic), are always expected, feeble, and essentially finite. 
Finally, in Section 3.6 and its subsections, I will further elaborate on the 
analogy in order to infer a tentative set of rules of imageability generally 
applicable to visual description. The proposed rules will be supported by 
introspective analysis, aided by extant analyses of voluntary visual imagery 
and by research on reading and language processing at large. References to 
other cognitive-scientific research, as well as to literary scholarship on the 
general topic of description, will be made throughout the chapter when ap-
propriate.  
Reduced to the most basic questions and answers, the main argument of 
the chapter can thus be summarized as follows: Is description-imagery per-
ceptually mimetic? (No.) If it has no correlate in perceptual experience, what 
other sort of experience does it resemble, if any? (The experience of volun-
tary visual imagery.) What makes prototypical visual descriptions difficult to 
image in the first place, and what makes the imageable ones imageable? 
(Visual descriptions in general tend to run athwart the experiential makeup 
of visual mental imagery, exceeding the limits of what can be accommo-
dated in a visual mental image. Visual descriptions only become imageable 
when they operate within these limits.) 
3.2 When is visual description? 
 
The notion of description is notoriously elusive and the task of defining vis-
ual description is made only slightly less complex by the restriction to the 
visual. To begin with, many properties relevant to vision have implications 
for non-visual perception and are therefore not strictly visual. For instance, it 
is not difficult to tell that a coffee cup is made of china based solely on tac-
tile exploration. Conversely, properties primarily defined through other sen-
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sory modalities (e.g. weight) can often be inferred from vision alone (al-
though such inferences can be erroneous). However, the verbal references to 
sensory properties that are the focus of this chapter always arrive embedded 
in literary discourse. And the type of literary discourse they are immediately 
embedded in tends to be noticed and recognized by the reader as an instance 
of description. When vision appears to be the predominant sensory modality 
from which the referred properties are derived, then it is noticed and recog-
nized by the reader as a specifically visual description. Following are the 
most fundamental implications of what has just been said. 
Description is not only a type of text, but also, by virtue of its intuitive 
noticeability, an autonomous mode of text processing. That is to say, there is 
more to visual descriptions than their typical features encoded in text. There 
is also something it is typically like to be reading a visual (or other) descrip-
tion. This experience in turn, albeit subject to many variables in its final 
quality, may be correlated with specific cognitive processes prior to con-
sciousness. However, most literary scholars define all description primarily 
in terms of its wording (see Bal 1982 for a brief review). Although some of 
them also view description as a distinctive cognitive activity on the part of 
the originator (Herman 2009, 89–100), few have made it explicit that its 
distinctiveness is necessarily reflected in a distinctive mode of reception 
(Hamon 1982, 159). Fewer still have tried to look more specifically into 
what this distinctive mode of reception might entail. I will now propose a 
few basic characteristics of visual description processing, while attempting 
to answer the following question: When, rather than simply what, is visual 
description? 
But before the answers begin to disentangle an important disclaimer is in 
place: I do not assume my notion of visual description processing to cover 
all possible visual description experiences. Depending on context and the 
instantaneous focus of the reader, visual descriptions as text-type can be 
experienced in a number of different ways. What I rather assume is a contin-
uum of possible description experiences where my notion of visual descrip-
tion processing constitutes one of two extremes. The opposite extreme con-
sists in description experiences indistinguishable, in terms of referential im-
agery and perceptual mimesis, from experiences of narrative proper (see 
Chapter 2, Section 2.2.5, for examples). As for my examples of visual de-
scription as text-type, certain types of visual descriptions, such as descrip-
tions of human characters, landscapes or other spatial settings, will be disre-
garded exactly inasmuch they seem more likely to prompt experiences of a 
less distinctly descriptive, i.e., more enactive, kind. 
In general, description can only exist against the background of other 
types of text and processing. In most cases, its other is indeed narrative, the 
dominant text-type of literary prose. It is by contrast to narrative that de-
scription is usually defined, and rightly so; it is the contrast to narrative that 
makes it noticeable in the first place. Description entails, first and foremost, 
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a marked pause in a chain of events. Description is thus commonly accused 
of slowing down the momentum of reading (e.g. Hamon 1981). Most at-
tempts to explain this effect point at the fact that fictional temporality is sus-
pended (e.g. Pflugmacher 2008) and the reader’s prospection subsequently 
blocked (e.g. Cobley 1986). Other, less obvious causes of the experienced 
slowness of description may include the (presumably taxing) initial shift 
from one mode of processing to another, or the actual deceleration of one’s 
reading pace as an effect of a higher concentration of content words (see Just 
and Carpenter 1980). 
In visual description in particular, this general sense of slowness may be 
further reinforced due to the cognitive cost of extensive referential imagery 
(when such imagery occurs) running parallel with baseline propositional 
processing. Visual imaging may even be, at least on the level of experience, 
more cognitively costly than referential imagery relating to the other, more 
immediate sensorimotor modalities (touch, smell and so forth) that are less 
directly interlinked with higher-order thought. Vision is, after all, the most 
analytical of our senses. Compared to non-sensory descriptions (referring to 
properties such as price, origin, affective value and so forth), visual descrip-
tions may be experienced as significantly slower not only because the de-
mands on visual imaging are so much higher, but also because non-sensory 
descriptions tend to bear a trace of narrativity. In many contexts, describing 
an object as “expensive” or “Japanese” is just another way of saying that a 
high price has been paid or that something has been brought all the way from 
Japan. Meanwhile, visual descriptions narrowing in on properties such as 
redness or rectangularity do not necessitate the conclusion that an object has 
actually been seen by somebody to have such-and-such visual properties. 
Another objection commonly raised against description, apart from its 
slowness, amounts to the contention that description is always superimposed 
and foreign with respect to the embedding narrative, an autonomous element 
similar to that of a citation (e.g. Hamon 1981). Although I do not suppose 
that readers necessarily experience descriptions as foreign or out of place, it 
seems intuitively correct to define visual description processing as informed 
by an overall sense of macro-level autonomy. This sense of autonomy is, 
once again, largely temporal in nature. Description is not only slow, but also 
temporally self-contained. More specifically, once narrative processing has 
given way to visual description processing, the reader temporarily loses track 
of, and sometimes any connection whatsoever with, the preceding narrative. 
An eclipse of awareness takes place as it were; the reader focuses on one 
type of content only, the basic content of visual description: “that something 
is there and like that” (Wolf 2007, 34). In real time, this could last a fraction 
of a second or several minutes. It has been proposed that description, in con-
trast to narrative, is primarily retrospective, adding but new information on 
things previously introduced in the course of narration (Cobley 1986, 398). 
From the viewpoint of the reader’s instantaneous attention, however, retro-
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spection may never go beyond the confines of each descriptive passage. In 
the vocabulary of phenomenology, visual description processing proper 
knows no retention beyond its own limits (see e.g. Varela 1999). 
Bearing its latent trace of narrativity, non-sensory description processing 
runs a perpetual risk of being truncated. The people whose presumed actions 
make an object describable as “expensive” or “Japanese” might likely coa-
lesce with the protagonists of the surrounding narrative, hence a possible 
connective, and a subsequent possible loss of autonomy. Sensory descrip-
tions are more reliably autonomous in this respect, suggesting no preceding 
narrative unless one (of perception) is explicitly mentioned or very strongly 
implied. Among the various types of sensory descriptions, visual descrip-
tions once again seem particularly well suited to sustaining autonomy. Be-
cause vision is the most analytical of our senses, visual properties seem to 
withstand abstraction (from a subject, from an object) much more easily than 
properties relating to other sensory modalities, especially to the ones involv-
ing proprioception (e.g. touch). Intuitively, it is easier to assume an unseen 
shape than an unfelt feel of a texture. Non-visual sensory descriptions, com-
parably rare as they are in any case, thus stand somewhere in between non-
sensory descriptions and visual descriptions. In actual literary prose, the 
three sorts nowadays often intermingle. But if one of them epitomizes what 
description entails in terms of processing, it is visual description. What vis-
ual description processing entails apart from a clean-cut contrast to narrative 
proper, and what is meant by narrative proper, will be explored throughout 
the rest of this chapter. 
Now that visual description has been tentatively defined via the corre-
sponding mode of processing, it is time to define it in its textual essence. As 
text-types, both visual and other description must be defined as gradients. 
Not only are there merely instances of less or more visual description. There 
seems to be nothing, or very little, but instances of less or more descriptive 
text (Mosher 1991; Genette 1976). While no visual description is thus 
strictly visual or exclusively descriptive, it is perfectly possible to tell what a 
prototypical visual description consists in. Doing so is necessary for any 
further analysis of visual description processing. Following is an example of 
a prototypical visual description: 
An oval splayed out with whale-bone, (the cap) started off with three pom-
pons; these were followed by lozenges of velvet and rabbit’s fur alternately, 
separated by a red band, and after that came a kind of bag ending in a polygon 
of cardboard with intricate braiding on it; and from this there hung down like 
a tassel, at the end of a long, too slender cord, a little sheaf of gold threads. It 
was a new cap, with a shiny peak. (Flaubert 1995, 16)50 
                                                       
50 [Ovoïde et renflée de baleines, [la coiffure] commençait par trois boudins circulaires ; puis 
s’alternaient, séparés par une bande rouge, des losanges de velours et de poils de lapin ; venait 
ensuite une façon de sac qui se terminait par un polygone cartonné, couvert d’une broderie en 
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Such concentration of visual descriptive features as displayed in Flaubert’s 
famous cap description, is rare. In other words, the prototypical visual de-
scription may not be the most typical, statistically speaking. Still it is one of 
the most frequently quoted passages among literary theorists of description 
(see Bal 1982). What are then the features that make it prototypical? Let us 
begin with the ones canonically attributed to description at large. Firstly, the 
passage ascribes “properties to entities within a mental model of the world” 
(Herman 2009, 90). Secondly, the entities and their properties are repre-
sented “in stasis, in simultaneous relation, and (they) are organized by spatial 
markers like adverbs of place.51 Verbs in the present, past, or past-
progressive tenses depict states” (Mosher 1991, 442). Thirdly, references to 
the properties are post-posited with regard to the central entity, which thus 
constitutes the “global introductory theme” of the description (Hamon 1982, 
159; my italics). Having recognized these (admittedly incongruous) salient 
features of description as text-type, let us now turn to the features that in my 
view are prototypical for visual descriptions in particular: 
Firstly, the passage isolates an inanimate object rather than a person, ani-
mal, landscape or other kind of complex spatial configuration. Inanimate 
objects tend to be comparably insignificant in fiction insofar as they are the 
least likely to have direct impact on the story (see also Barthes 1989). An 
inanimate object cannot be readily imaged (like landscapes or other spatial 
configurations) or identified with (like people or animals) inwardly, by pro-
jecting one’s body inside it, and with it one’s mind. An inanimate object is 
as close as one gets to objectivity, and therefore also to a description that is 
purely exteroceptive, visual. 
Secondly, the inanimate object described in the passage is a manufactured 
rather than a natural one, and like most manufactured objects described in 
modern prose, it is an object of daily use. Manufactured objects, i.e., arti-
facts, particularly artifacts of daily use and of mass production, tend to be 
intuitively viewed as devoid of meaning exactly because of their artificiality, 
their dissociation from nature. In cognitive anthropology, it has further been 
established that, in contrast to natural objects, manufactured objects are cog-
nitively processed and categorized primarily according to how they can be 
instantaneously used or useful (Atran 1990, 63). A bucket with two big holes 
near the bottom is not much of a bucket, but it would do as a portable baby 
seat. Once it is used as a portable baby seat, it simply becomes a portable 
                                                                                                                                
soutache compliquée, et d’où pendait, au bout d’un long cordon trop mince, un petit croisillon 
de fils d’or, en manière de gland. Elle était neuve, la visière brillait. (Flaubert 1999, 56–57)] 
In the present chapter, non-English (i.e. French) literature will only be quoted a few times, 
and it will primarily be quoted for the qualities of the English translations. The original 
French passages will therefore appear in footnotes rather than directly in the text. 
51 Or, in this particular example, by temporal adverbs functioning as spatial markers. 
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baby seat. Thus lacking in objective essence, manufactured objects are, to a 
higher degree than any other objects, little more than what they appear to be 
in a given situation. This makes them the perfect content for visual descrip-
tions, the descriptions of appearance. It is probably no coincidence that in 
the literary cultures and historical periods when literary narrative saw a rapid 
increase in visual and other description, it also saw an increased frequency of 
reference to artifacts and other consumer goods (Heuser and Le-Khac 2011; 
Wall 2006). 
What visual description is and what it is not, could be discussed end-
lessly. In this section, I have made the briefest attempt to suggest that visual 
or other description is not really there unless the reader is made aware. The 
potential of visual description is at work only when the reader has adopted 
the distinctive cognitive mode of visual description processing. When this is 
most likely to happen, can be inferred from the above prototype. All exam-
ples in this chapter will consist in visual descriptions bearing significant 
family resemblance to that prototype. I believe, however, that part of what I 
have to say about description-imagery from visual description may apply to 
descriptions quite remote in kind, visual or non-visual. Last but not least, it 
should be noted that the mode of visual description processing is assumed 
here to operate pre-reflectively, at the bottom of whatever attentional focus 
rides on top. Description-imagery is just one option. Other options include, 
firstly, higher-order interpretation (see also Chapter 1, Section 1.6.6; Chapter 
4), and secondly, focus on the verbal medium (possibly accompanied by 
verbal imagery). A closer analysis falls outside the scope of this chapter. 
3.3 Why visual description? 
 
For any account of perceptual mimesis of the visual kind, visual description 
would seem the natural place to begin. While narrative proper may be 
equally, or in fact more, efficient in prompting visual referential images, 
visual descriptions alone (when imageable at all) secure the highest possible 
fidelity of referential image with respect to the text. For instance, upon read-
ing about a “broom” with no further description, my mind may image what-
ever it pleases. Most often, it will image by default the kind of broom I am 
most familiar with from my firsthand experience of the world. Most often, 
this will be unproblematic. But what if the broom, or the story as a whole, 
turns out to be set in a foreign or otherwise distant context? In such a case 
my mental image may be proved incorrect anytime by a subsequent passage 
suggesting that the broom is to be ridden on by a medieval-style witch, or 
that it sweeps aboard a spaceship in zero gravity. Although my initial image 
is then by no means disqualified as mental experience, it fails to pertain to 
the storyworld in question. On the other hand, should my “broom” be de-
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scribed when first mentioned, its visual description may perhaps delimit my 
freedom of imaging, but it prevents me from conjuring incorrect images. 
Although some of the mechanics of readers’ visual referential imagery 
have previously been accounted for by literary scholars (Burke 2011, 56–85; 
Scarry 1999), none of the accounts has exposed or even acknowledged vis-
ual description’s unique potential to stipulate bottom-up rather than top-
down processing. Drawing implicitly on a romantic notion of imagination as 
essentially a free activity, these scholars have treated imagery without prop-
erly considering its prosaic debt to the specific wording of a text. Michael 
Burke, for instance, suggests that readers tend to furnish fictional interiors 
with visual images based on their childhood homes and that they often do so 
regardless of textual counter-evidence. Such “whimsical” top-down imaging 
may possibly be considered truly evocative in ways largely outreaching the 
domain of vision (e.g. in terms of its affective impact on the reader), but 
from the viewpoint of content fidelity, it could just as well be regarded as 
mere mind-wandering. To restate one of my opening formulations with a 
little more precision, a piece of literary prose is perceptually mimetic insofar 
as it triggers referential images of the world as we apprehend it pre-verbally. 
But the images must also be images of certain fidelity with respect to the 
text. Otherwise there would be no way of determining that they really arose 
as an effect of a specific passage in a specific text, rather than as an effect of 
literary reading in general, or language use in general, or for no particular 
reason at all. This is why visual description would appear to be highly rele-
vant to the study of perceptual mimesis. 
An intuitive grasp of this unique ability to specify the visual is probably 
what makes the common association of perceptual mimesis with visual de-
scription so appealing. When checked against random intuitions about actual 
practices of reading, however, much of its appeal vanishes. Indeed, visual 
description might make us image far less frequently and far less vividly than 
suggested by the rhetoric of book reviews and book promotion materials. For 
instance, there must be a reason why non-scholarly readers, so notoriously 
keen on vicarious experiencing, show a tendency to skim, or even skip 
(Allington 2011), particularly lengthy descriptions. Furthermore, when I ask 
fellow literary scholars for book recommendations featuring vivid visual 
descriptions of, for instance, manufactured objects, they invariably cite pas-
sages in which manufactured objects are simply mentioned without being 
described. This may well arise from the fact that visual descriptions of 
manufactured objects occur less frequently than simple mentions do, but 
only to a certain point. I have established in Chapter 2 (see especially Sec-
tion 2.5.2) that simple mentions often conjure imagery more reliably and 
more vividly than visual descriptions. My objective then was to account for 
the fundamental processes underlying the most multimodally saturated vari-
ety of referential imagery, i.e., enactment-imagery; the kind that results in 
the reader’s instantaneous sense of presence in the three-dimensional world 
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of a story. Now is the time to explain wherein the main difference between 
visual descriptions and simple mentions lies, and to finally analyze descrip-
tion-imagery in its own right. 
I now turn to the main difference between imagery from visual descrip-
tions and imagery from simple mentions, which, I would like to argue, is not 
one of degree, but one of kind. That is to say, whenever my mind conjures 
up a visual image of an object based on my processing of its visual descrip-
tion, the resulting experience does not amount to some weak variety of en-
actment or presence in the storyworld, or a weak variety of perceptual mime-
sis for that matter. In fact, the resulting experience is not at all perceptually 
mimetic. Images prompted by visual descriptions are essentially different 
from other readerly visual imagery because they are generated differently. 
While simple mentions and other narrative instances of fiction generate im-
ages by virtue of their experientiality, visual descriptions can only generate 
images by virtue of their imageability.52 The former part of this assertion will 
be elaborated in the next section, the latter part will be elaborated subse-
quently. The former images belong to the variety of enactment-imagery, the 
latter images belong to the variety of description-imagery. 
3.4 Why not perceptual mimesis? 
 
Why is vicarious experientiality not at work in the processing of visual de-
scriptions? A definition of perceptual experience is needed here. In line with 
the core ideas of Chapter 2 adopted from the framework of embodied cogni-
tion, underlying my assertion is an understanding of perception as precondi-
tioned by bodily interaction. For the sake of clarity, let me repeat the basic 
theses. Continuous interaction with our immediate environment, be it overt 
(action, i.e., bodily movement) or covert (psychophysiological processes 
related to pre-conscious or conscious action simulation), has lately been 
identified at various levels of inquiry to be the basis of our sensorimotor 
apprehension of the world. A textbook example of the inextricable link be-
tween interaction and perceptual experience are the clinical cases of so-
called experiential blindness. Congenitally blind patients whose vision has 
been restored by surgery tend to take physical objects for blurs in their visual 
field as long as they remain unable to couple their visual sensations with 
relevant sensorimotor patterns of interaction (Noë 2006, 5ff). At a non-
                                                       
52 When aesthetician Elaine Scarry (1999) subsumes all literature-induced imagery under the 
(further undefined) notion of perceptual mimesis, she fails to isolate description as a distinc-
tive text-type and mode of processing. Also, her examples of imageable prose are predomi-
nantly narrative rather than (visual) descriptive. 
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conscious level, there are indications that visual attention for objects in-
volves neurophysiological processes inherent to action preparation (Rizzo-
latti and Gallese 1988). There are countless convergent sources supporting 
this view of perception, spanning vast areas and methodologies of inquiry 
from isolated brain imaging studies of visual and linguistic processing (see 
e.g. Fischer and Zwaan 2008; Martin 2007) to comprehensive enactivist 
phenomenologies of the self (Gallagher and Zahavi 2007). Given the strong 
definition of perceptual experience proposed by the framework of embodied 
cognition, visual description construed as stasis and as subsequent temporary 
detachment from the object described (see also Grünbaum 2007) has no 
purely experiential correlate in the actual world. For in visual description, 
interaction has come to a temporary halt. 
That is not the case with simple mentions. Simple mentions of object 
names, unless we are dealing with a catalogue rather than with narrative 
proper, tend to be part of interaction insofar as they stand for grammatical 
subjects or objects attached to non-copular verbs, e.g.: 
In the kitchen closet I found a practically new broom(.) (Baker 1998, 20) 
 
This is a matter of syntactic fact rather than necessity. In not-very-elegant 
prose, the broom in this sentence could be minutely visually qualified, e.g.: 
In the kitchen closet I found a practically new bright red ridged plastic broom. 
 
The point is that simple mentions happen to adhere more closely to their 
referents as pre-verbally experienced. Upon reading the above sentences, the 
reader’s embodied mind has no problem identifying an interaction to enact 
(the firsthand act of opening a door and finding a broom in the penumbra of 
a closet), forming thus a multimodal enactment-image, an instance of pres-
ence, a mediated experience proper of a world out there. 
One could argue that all descriptions, along with the objects described, 
are likewise embedded in interactive situations because they belong to larger 
narrative wholes that always feature such situations. However, as suggested 
by the introductory definition of visual description as a mode of processing 
(Section 3.2), the surrounding story is relegated to outside the reader’s con-
sciousness as soon as a visual description is encountered and identified as 
such. Visual description processing means by definition an instantaneously 
experienced lack of continuity with any narrative (and interactive) embed-
ding, and consequently with any enacted firsthand experience. 
One could further object that by token of the theories of embodied cogni-
tion, even the seemingly most passive observation of the world entails covert 
interaction, and that visual descriptions are in this respect no different from 
the firsthand experience of such observation. One could say, in other words, 
that visual description simulates in the reader an act of firsthand yet passive 
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visual experience and that it is experiential in the same way as narrative ren-
ditions of overt interaction are, only less perspicuously. It may be particu-
larly tempting to say so with regard to descriptive passages that are framed 
by explicit or very strongly implied references to acts of perceiving. For 
instance, the context of the visual description of Charles Bovary’s cap (Sec-
tion 3.2) suggests that the cap is in fact being scrutinized by the boy’s con-
temptuous classmates. Yet again, as long as the reader’s mind remains aware 
of such framing, which seems particularly unlikely in a description of such 
flamboyance, we are not dealing with visual description processing, or de-
scription-imagery, proper. Rather, we are dealing with the kind of attentional 
focus that produces enactment-imagery, or the various in-between enact-
ment/description-images (see Chapter 1, Section 1.6.5). Should the same 
objection be raised so as to encompass all visual description regardless of 
framing, it must be countered by the following clarification: 
In the instant of switching, for a second or a fraction of a second, from 
narrative to the mode of visual description processing, the linguistic nature 
of reading robustly emerges toward the threshold of consciousness. The 
reader thus assumes, if barely reflectively, the stance of someone who is 
being informed that a certain object has certain visual properties. In line with 
this argument, several literary theorists (Cobley 1986, 397; Hamon 1981, 21) 
have noted that description often entails the increased presence of a notional 
narrator. Importantly, one has no way of simultaneously maintaining the 
stance of someone who is approaching an object of certain properties pre-
verbally, the inner stance of a perceiving experiencer. Instead, the properties 
are taken in as foregrounded information in a framework of communica-
tion.53 Whatever the actual syntax of the description in writing, the mental 
propositional “syntax” (if there was such a thing) of visual description proc-
essing would follow roughly this pattern: 
There is a broom. It is practically new and made of bright red ridged plastic. 
 
rather than: 
There is a practically new bright red ridged plastic broom. 
 
Unlike in the processing of (certain instances of) narrative proper, it be-
comes impossible under such circumstances to bracket off this quasi-
communicative dimension of visual description and achieve as it were a full, 
pre-verbal sense of presence. This results in the immediate noticeability of 
                                                       
53 This part of my argument seems to dovetail with Michael Riffaterre’s. Speaking of descrip-
tion in general, literary theorist Riffaterre maintains that description’s “primary purpose is not 
to offer a representation, but to dictate an interpretation” (Riffaterre 1981, 125). 
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visual description in the course of reading, its autonomy as a receptive mode, 
as well as in the skimming or skipping of descriptions by impatient readers, 
which goes hand in hand with another typical attribute of visual description 
as text-type: its low memorability. Unless the wording or subject of a visual 
description is perceived as particularly striking, one is often left with a sense 
of amnesia as soon as the description is over, not to speak of one’s minus-
cule chances of retaining the rough contents of a visual description beyond 
an immediately subsequent stretch of text. In language processing, memo-
rability and imageability are usually considered as closely interconnected 
(e.g. Marschark and Hunt 1989). 
In cognitive psychology, a pronounced trade-off has been found to oper-
ate in the (English) lexicon and its processing between referential imageabil-
ity on the one hand and phonological and orthographic uniqueness on the 
other (Westbury and Moroschan 2009). Words with the lowest number of 
direct phonological neighbors, i.e., words that differ the most in their struc-
ture from the rest of the lexicon, happen to denote referents with low or no 
imageability (e.g. “thought”). Conversely, words with highly imageable ref-
erents are the least conspicuous as to their structure (e.g. “broom”) and 
thereby also the most easily confused with other words (“room,” “boom,” 
“brook” etc.). Suggesting that marked “verbality” somehow interferes with 
referential imagery, these findings can be taken in support of the above as-
sumption that a sense of being verbally informed of perceptual facts is nec-
essarily discontinuous with a sense of direct perception. Overall, they further 
disclose how treacherous visual description is by nature. It is intuitively 
known by the reader to denote something quite familiar and easy to image, 
yet in the end it is always found to consist in a unique, unfamiliar54 concate-
nation of qualifiers. 
Besides, unless the qualifiers in question situate the object in uncommon 
context, e.g., by suggesting the kind of twig broom used by witches and oth-
ers in the Middle Ages, they also happen to be more or less tangential to any 
sort of interaction. In most visual descriptions they will be tangential by 
necessity, because those properties that really matter for interaction are al-
ready encapsulated in the central object name itself. Empirical studies have 
shown that in the cognitive processing (and thereby also in the linguistic 
labeling) of manufactured objects, each object category – broom, cup or 
flower pot – is delimited exactly by the particular subset of its properties that 
are immediately relevant to interaction (Rosch et al. 1976). For instance, any 
container that can be used for planting flowers, qualifies as a flower pot (see 
also Section 3.2). Thus it would make little sense to describe a flower pot by 
recounting the properties of being hollow and closed at the bottom. Indeed, 
                                                       
54 An interesting exception are visual descriptions by way of epiteton constans, which are 
always unified within a corpus and thus potentially familiar. 
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few straightforwardly prosaic descriptions take such course.55 In general, 
visual descriptions tend rather to exploit the countless accidental properties, 
those having no direct relation to how objects are essentially interacted with.  
The above-mentioned impossibility to bracket off the linguistic medium 
lies also in the very nature of isolated objects and their visual properties. In 
firsthand visual experience, as long as objects are principally apprehended as 
objects of interaction, visual properties are those that are self-evidently 
given. This may be why visual description seems to occur rarely in mundane 
oral narrative and conversation in general,56 and when they do, they may 
mostly be meant to foreclose baseline misconception, rather than help the 
interlocutor walk in another perceiver’s shoes. Unless I am describing an 
object for its purely aesthetic qualities, e.g., a work of art or a piece of cloth-
ing, the pragmatics of my infrequent spontaneous descriptions tends to be 
other than that of prompting imagery: I want the interlocutor to help me find 
my purse in the mess of my office, or to pick up the right kind of baby food 
at the grocery store. I want the interlocutor to know what these things look 
like, not necessarily to see them with the mind’s eye. 
Lastly, apart from being self-evident, the visual properties of an object 
given in firsthand experience are in most cases all simultaneous and one with 
the object itself. In comparison to narrative renditions of interactive situa-
tions, this puts visual description at a disadvantage vis-à-vis the inherent 
temporality of language and turns it once more into a gross abstraction from 
perceptual experience. Looking at the ancient broom in my childhood home 
kitchen, I can certainly conceive of its visual properties in a linear sequence, 
one by one. But I cannot do so without recourse to inner speech (see Chapter 
1, Section 1.6.6; Chapter 4, Section 4.3.2), without hearing my mind briskly 
articulate at least some of the sounds in “brown,” “wooden,” “shabby,” “or-
thogonal.” 
To sum up, the aim of this section was to isolate two fundamental charac-
teristics of visual description. The two characteristics taken together disqual-
ify visual description from perceptual mimesis and hence also from enact-
ment-imagery. Ultimately, the two characteristics taken together bear a sig-
nificant deal of responsibility for visual description’s lower overall image-
ability when compared to narrative. Firstly, I have shown that visual 
description, unlike narrative proper (see also Collins 1991, 129), defies first-
hand perceptual experience. Secondly, I have shown that referential imagery 
prompted by visual description, when prompted at all, is significantly less 
                                                       
55 The opposite cases generally signal an anti-representationalist authorial agenda, resulting in 
estrangement. 
56 One could say, with discourse theorist William Labov (1972, 370), that the visual properties 
of static objects are seldom reportable, i.e., they lack the quality of being inherently worth 
telling. Labov (1972, 389) also expressly notes the rarity of descriptive syntactic structures in 
his own material, the African American Vernacular. 
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pre-verbal in nature than any referential imagery prompted by narrative. 
While the latter characteristic is a matter of degree (at a certain level of 
awareness, the reader always knows that he or she is dealing with a piece of 
verbal fiction), the former is a question of description-imagery either bluntly 
being or bluntly not being experiential and perceptually mimetic. But to say 
that description-imagery in a very particular sense is not experiential is not 
to say that it does not amount to experience. What sort of experience it 
amounts to will be suggested in the following section. 
3.5 What other sort of experience? 
 
What did I mean by saying, at the end of Section 3.3, that visual descriptions 
can only generate imagery by virtue of their imageability? In part I was re-
ferring to their dissociation from firsthand perceptual experience. There is no 
experience in them; there is only the experience of them. But I was also hint-
ing at the one sort of experience to which imagery from visual description 
bears resemblance: the experience of (currently unseen) objects as visualized 
in a voluntary mental act of imaging. Voluntary mental imaging is the kind 
of imaging engaged in when one tries to image what an object (e.g. a par-
ticular bike model) looks like based on one’s memory or declarative knowl-
edge, or when one fantasizes about a perfect something.57 
It is not my intention to suggest that imagery from visual description is 
mimetic with regard to the above mental acts. Once again, unless the above 
mental acts are explicitly rendered in the text and retained as such in the 
reader’s focus, i.e., unless the mode of processing inclines toward narrativity 
and fails to be one of visual description proper (see also Sections 3.2 and 3.4 
above), the reader’s experience is clearly dissimilar from voluntary visualiz-
ing or indulging in fantasies. For instance, the acts of voluntary imaging are 
temporally open-ended, the imager possessing the ultimate power to extend 
their duration endlessly. Imaging in visual description processing, on the 
other hand, is always framed by the reader’s assumption that strict temporal 
constraints have been set beforehand. A visual descriptive stretch of text can 
easily turn out to feel somewhat lengthy to a reader, but a voluntary imager 
never continues imaging beyond what feels right for the moment. Further-
                                                       
57 Unlike philosopher Evan Thompson (2007), I assume that it is possible, although not neces-
sary, to image an object by an act of will without simultaneously enacting, on the level of 
consciousness, a firsthand perceptual experience of that object (see also B. Williams 1999, 
35). Voluntary visual images involving simulated perceptual experience, i.e., instances of in-
between enactment/description-imagery (e.g. images of what it is like to be looking at a par-
ticular object; see Chapter 1, Section 1.6.5), will be excluded from the present discussion for 
lack of analogy with description-imagery (see Section 3.4 above). 
 
 103 
more, while in the act of voluntary imagery it is the imager alone who is the 
originator of the experience and who thus largely exerts control over its con-
tent, imagery from visual description arises upon external instruction, with 
all the rigor and lack of control this entails. Given these and other discrepan-
cies, an important clarification must be made at this point: I am going to 
consider similarities between voluntary mental imagery and description-
imagery pertaining only to how the product (the image), not the act of pro-
duction (the imaging), is experienced. Separating the two phases of experi-
ence conforms to established phenomenological practice (Casey 2000, 38). 
The following questions may arise: Why voluntary visual images in the 
first place? Why not consider other sorts of visual images, such as the far 
more frequent products of compulsive imaging, the fleeting yet intense men-
tal images that can take us by surprise whenever we happen to think of, or 
talk or hear about, something highly imageable? One could even wonder 
whether these latter images really are not closer to description-images after 
all, given their uncontrolled character. But they are not. They differ from 
voluntary visual images and from description-images prompted by visual 
descriptions in several respects. Firstly, they differ in that they can, and do, 
take us by surprise. Voluntary visual images, on the other hand, are always 
expected, and the same is true of description-images prompted by visual 
description. As soon as a visual description has been encountered in a text 
and identified as such, the (modern) reader automatically assumes that visual 
imagery will somehow be addressed. This is not to say that one is never sur-
prised by the specific contents of an image prompted by a visual description, 
just like one can sometimes be surprised by the specific turns one’s volun-
tary imagery has taken. But one is never surprised that an image has arisen. 
Apart from always being expected, voluntary visual images as well as de-
scription-images tend to be experienced as markedly feeble (see also Casey 
2000, 3; Scarry 1999, 4). Their feebleness distinguishes them further from 
involuntary visual images. Surprise alone could be the reason why images of 
the involuntary, fleeting kind appear as much more saturated. However, the 
sheer possibility of surprise lies at the heart of a yet deeper difference, one 
that comes down to the question of perceptual mimesis.58 For instance, why 
am I surprised by the compelling image of the handlebar of my bike sud-
denly emerging in my consciousness as I let my mind wander freely on a 
tired afternoon? Why do I experience the image as strikingly vivid? I am 
surprised because initially I was thinking of something else than my bike and 
the visual details of its handlebar. Otherwise the image would have been 
expected. And I experience the image as strikingly vivid because this some-
                                                       
58 By contrast, Elaine Scarry (1999, 104) contends that all literature-induced imagery super-
sedes the feebleness of voluntary visual imaging. By way of explanation, she emphasizes that 
imagery in reading is involuntary inasmuch it is constrained by external instruction. 
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thing else that I was initially thinking about was in fact an instance of inter-
active perceptual experience: dropping off my son at daycare this morning, 
then biking to the station to catch the bus for the university. Consequently 
the involuntary image of my bike is an enactment-image of sorts. It has ex-
periential qualities comparable to the perceptually mimetic referential im-
agery prompted by certain instances of narrative. These qualities are absent 
in any visual image resulting from a voluntary attempt to visualize a static 
(see also Jajdelska et al. 2010) isolated object. At the same time, these quali-
ties seem to be constantly in demand, visual imagery being reflexively as-
sessed by the standards of perceptual experience (and description-imagery 
specifically being reflexively assessed by the standards of enactment-
imagery; see Chapter 1, Section 1.6.6). Hence the sense of enfeeblement 
inherent to description-images from visual description. 
The third and last feature to be recounted in this section is finitude. This 
feature too is best conceptualized upon comparison with involuntary visual 
images and enactment-images from narrative. It too derives indirectly from 
the lack of perceptual mimesis, in the following respect: Bearing traces of 
perceptual experience, involuntary visual images and enactment-images 
from narrative are residually dynamic. This is not the case for voluntary 
visual images or description-images from visual description, which are static 
through and through. Mental images of all kinds may be considered temporal 
insofar as they have a certain if minimal duration, yet only the dynamic ones 
contain a promise of something more than what is immediately presented. 
For instance, when I as a reader have experienced a visual image of a broom 
while imaginatively enacting the experience of retrieving it from a closet, 
my broom image tends to recur for a little while before it fades away com-
pletely. Sometimes it changes slightly between the various stages of recur-
rence and then it is no longer, strictly speaking, the same image as before. 
Nevertheless, an image of a broom does recur without a broom being men-
tioned anymore. It echoes throughout the dynamic extension of my covert 
enactment of the bodily movements involved when stretching my arm, 
grasping the broomstick, retrieving the broom. When such enactment is par-
ticularly strong, perhaps outright noticeable in the muscles of my arm and 
hand (see Chapter 2, Section 2.4), the image can keep recurring for a consid-
erable period of reading time. 
Alas, description-images from visual description, similarly to voluntary 
visual images of isolated objects, do not have the same tendency to deliver 
promises of surplus visual experience, or to promise anything in the first 
place. They must be cued anew if they are to recur. In their static nature, 
they are destined to yield to other, dynamic and interactive imagery experi-
ences at the very next intersection with narrative. Here are a few examples of 
how this can happen:  
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(The camera) was mounted on an altazimuth bracket above the back door. Its 
casing was of brushed aluminum. It had a purplish gleam in its eye. / [1] Gary 
returned the bottle to the liquor cabinet, moved to the sink, and ran water in a 
bucket. (Franzen 2001, 230) 
 
By a pile of magazines was a coffee cup – tall, in thin white porcelain, one of 
a set of six [2] bought by Patrice at Henri Bendel’s in New York. [3] Aldous 
raised it to his lips. (McEwan 2011, 97) 
 
In cases where the immediately subsequent narrative refers to a direct inter-
action with the central object, the initial description-image may be trans-
formed into a perceptually mimetic enactment-image, continuing its life in a 
new format. While Segment [2] in the latter passage bears but a vague re-
semblance to this scenario (suggesting a hypothetically direct interaction that 
involves, but is not limited to, the central object), Segment [3] provides a 
more clear-cut example of how description-images from visual description 
can live a narrative, enactive afterlife. In all other cases where visual de-
scription is interrupted by narrative, i.e., in the cases represented by Segment 
[1] above, images from visual description appear once and then vanish with-
out extension and the reader’s image experience is readily informed by this. 
The reader may thus experience that, apart from being expected and feeble, 
description-images from visual description are essentially finite, in ways that 
enactment-images from narrative are not.  
Needed or not as my above observations may have been in themselves, 
the ultimate aim of this chapter is to valorize them for more practical, predic-
tive purposes. They are meant to help determine what it might be that makes 
a visual description elicit description-imagery, in spite of the lack of percep-
tual mimesis. However, defined as expectedness, feebleness and finitude, the 
principal experiential features of images from visual description are still too 
broad to instruct a text-oriented analysis. In the next section, while I revisit 
visual description as text-type, a number of sub-features and further observa-
tions will be grouped with the above, in the following order: finitude (Sec-
tion 3.6.1), feebleness (Section 3.6.2), expectedness (Section 3.6.3). 
3.6 More on description-imagery and when it arises 
 
In assessing the readerly experience of narrative proper, it is possible and 
natural to explain enactment-imagery and -imageability by reference to 
structural analogies between text and firsthand perceptual experience (see 
Chapter 2), with a vast body of empirical perception research at one’s dis-
posal. In the absence of perceptual mimesis, functional analogies (or func-
tional discrepancies) can only be charted between text on the one hand and 
visual mental image on the other. Given the general elusiveness of mental 
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imagery, there is by contrast little empirical evidence to rely on, and intro-
spection becomes as indispensable as ever. 
Based on introspection, the idea that literature can be made imageable by 
emulating the inherent characteristics of voluntary imagery has previously 
been suggested by aesthetician Elaine Scarry. In Scarry’s (1999) account, 
literature becomes imageable by virtue of analogy when the predicaments of 
voluntary imaging are made explicit (e.g. when a character is struggling to 
visualize a cherished face), or alternatively, when objects of certain qualities 
(e.g. translucence, floral supposition) are represented. Even if Scarry did 
take notice of the idiosyncratic mode of visual description, there would still 
be significant differences between her approach and mine. Most notably, 
Scarry singles out imageable particulars such as the visual properties of be-
ing translucent or flower-like. Meanwhile, my Sections 3.6.1 and 3.6.2 be-
low aim at distinguishing between markedly imageable and non-imageable 
classes of visual properties, or parameters (e.g. color, shape), regardless of 
specific value (e.g. blue or yellow, rectangular or circular). The respective 
presence or absence of each and one of the selected parameters in an in-
stance of visual description will be set against the default parameters and 
limitations of the visual mental image (voluntary or prompted by visual de-
scription), and its effect on description imageability will be predicted. 
Albeit heavily dependent on the choice of visual parameters, it would be 
untenable to posit that description imageability is unaffected by the particu-
lar style of a visual description. For a variety of reasons, a detailed inquiry 
into imageable and non-imageable descriptive lexicon and syntax falls out-
side the scope of this chapter. Not only do visual descriptions often include 
an admixture of non-visual (e.g. affective) qualifiers by which the vividness, 
if not the content, of a resultant image may be co-determined. The question 
of stylistic quality becomes even more elusive when variance across lan-
guages, literatures and cultures is considered. This is why Section 3.6.3 will 
only consist in a cursory attempt to tackle the style of visual description, an 
attempt to tackle it in terms of quantity rather than in terms of quality proper. 
3.6.1 Default parameters (finitude) 
 
The experienced finitude of imagery from visual description is closely re-
lated to its experienced feebleness. The former will now serve as a back-
ground for positive characterization. The latter will subsequently frame an 
account of what properties a mental image from visual description does not, 
and in some cases even cannot have. 
The kind of image finitude discussed here may be further conceptualized 
by comparison to a picture. Description-images are picture-like at least in 
two relevant respects: Firstly, because of their static nature, they are experi-
enced as two-dimensional (see also Casey 2000, 92). It may be by virtue of 
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this resemblance that one of the most prominent types of so-called ekphrasis 
(i.e. the ancient rhetorical device of visual rendition) was the verbal repre-
sentation of (more or less) two-dimensional visual artworks. As objects, such 
artworks are largely defined by their complex pictorial surface, while they 
tend to be uniform in overall contour shape. Interestingly, the mundane ob-
jects visually described in modern literary prose that are presently in focus – 
brooms, cups, flower pots – depend more heavily on contour shape for their 
identity than on surface. This fact is reflected in the makeup of the corre-
spondent referential image. When I read a description of a flower pot or 
simply fancy to image one out of the blue, I may or may not be able to tell 
afterwards how porous the earthenware was, but I will always roughly know 
the slope of its wall. The contour of the flower pot may be incomplete (there 
may be no way of telling whether or not there was a rim at the upper edge), 
but it will always be there and it will always be perceived as final because 
the flower pot will be given to me in two dimensions. By contrast, the con-
tour shape of a flower pot imaged enactively during the processing of narra-
tive will be perceived as open to modification due to the possibility of inter-
action, by means of which a virtual third dimension is brought into exis-
tence. 
Secondly, mental images from visual description tend to be oriented in a 
way resembling of certain canonical types of pictorial representation. If their 
contour is to adhere to the object they represent, they cannot be, and obvi-
ously are not, multiperspectival like cubist paintings are. In their feebleness, 
they can hardly be said to comply with the standards of realist perspectival 
painting. They are imaged under a perspective nevertheless, and most often a 
markedly pictorial perspective at that, namely the one optimally revealing 
the distinctive contour shape of the object in question. In a description-image 
of a broom, the broom as an entity is given to me in the most perspicuous 
way: vertically, perhaps in a slight angle to the orthogonal axis, its bristles 
facing the bottom of my mental visual field (see Figure 5 below). This is 
how a broom is normally depicted when immediate comprehension is at 
stake, e.g., in pictograms or illustrated dictionaries.59 
Object orientation in involuntary images or in images prompted by narra-
tive, by contrast, is always situated. For instance, should I image the same 
broom as part of a perceptual experience, e.g., in enacting the act of sweep-
ing, the broomstick would become, in a rather compelling manner, dispro-
portionately short and thick in my mental image and the overall contour of 
                                                       
59 Also, very specific objects such as particular bike models may sometimes be imaged with 
recourse to one’s memory of actual pictures (e.g. as previously seen in a sports equipment 
catalogue) rather than of the objects themselves. I am grateful to Alice Jedličková for bringing 
this to my attention. 
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the broom would alter.60 Moreover, the image as a whole would no longer 
symmetrically occupy the center of my mental visual field, but rather gravi-
tate toward its lower right hand side (I am right-handed). Albeit compelling 
in the mental, such a broom image would seem highly indefinite and am-
biguous as to its content if transposed into an actual two-dimensional picture 
(see Figure 6 below). There are of course instances of perceptual mimesis in 
which brooms appear under the same perspective as depicted in pictograms 
or illustrated dictionaries. The difference is that in description-imagery, 



















Figure 5            Figure 6 
Broom contour in description-imagery   Broom contour in enactment-imagery 
(default)            (subject to situation) 
© Jim Shaw           © Schünnin  
 
An approximate contour filled with a sketchy surface as afforded by an 
initial orientation is all there is to visual mental images of isolated objects 
such as brooms, cups or flower pots. That is to say, they are all there is by 
default, at the very instant a reader has understood that an object description 
is about to begin unfolding, but before any post-posited visual attributes 
have been taken in. This particular stage of imagery is what I call the default 
                                                       
60 The perspective thus assumed would coincide with what cognitive psychologists call “ca-
nonical perspective”, i.e., a perspective by which typical interaction is facilitated (Palmer, 
Rosch, and Chase 1981). 
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description-image.61 It arises, for instance, with the underlined portions of 
the following examples: 
(T)hree dirty mattresses, each rolled up in a blanket: which occupied one cor-
ner of the room during the day, and formed a kind of slab, on which were 
placed an old cracked basin, ewer, and soap-dish, of common yellow earth-
enware, with a blue flower(.) (Dickens 1998, 551) 
 
My Austrian sniper’s rifle with its blued octagon barrel and the lovely dark 
walnut, cheek-fitted, schutzen stock, hung over the two beds. (Hemingway 
1962, 11) 
 
The tablecloth was thick, smooth and blue. Heavy Indian cotton, a thin tur-
quoise line through blue checks. Small frayed holes here and there. (Roberts 
1993, 14) 
 
Whatever parameters the reader brings in on top of contour shape and orien-
tation pertain less to the image as such (but see Section 3.6.2 below) than to 
the reader’s preconceived notion of the object in question. If the reader lives 
in a world where most brooms are brown, or if the reader assumes that most 
brooms are brown in the particular world of the particular narrative, then it is 
sheer conceptual knowledge that makes the reader tacitly believe that a fic-
tional broom is brown. Obviously, the particular contour and orientation 
imposed on one’s default description-image of a broom are mediated by 
conceptual knowledge as well. They happen to coincide with what one’s 
culture recognizes as prototypical. The main difference from other visual 
parameters, e.g., color, is that contour shape and orientation alone are neces-
sary for manufactured objects such as brooms to appear as what they are. As 
far as mental images of manufactured objects are considered, the other pa-
rameters are accidental. A purple emerald will no longer be an emerald, but a 
broom made of purple china will still appear as a broom unless its practical 
function is considered, which anyway never happens in visual description 
proper, where appearance is the only thing at stake (see also Section 3.2 
above). A strawberry turned upside down will lose nothing of its essence, 
but a flower pot turned upside down will suddenly appear somewhat less like 
a flower pot. This, along with a fair deal of introspection, is what lies behind 
the above suggestion that contour shape and orientation is all one really sees 
in, rather than reads into, the default description-image. 
                                                       
61 For objects mentally represented in enactment-imagery, by contrast, one cannot speak about 
a “default enactment-image” or “default parameters”, because enactment-imagery is necessar-
ily situated, and salient visual (and other perceptual) properties are thus determined by situ-
ational context. For instance, there is the broom as visually inspected, the broom as swept 
with, the broom as thrown out of the window, etc. 
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But what does the particular status of the two closely interconnected pa-
rameters of contour shape and orientation imply for imageability in cases 
when contour shape or orientation are explicitly mentioned in a visual de-
scription? Paradoxically, nothing much. Their centrality to the definition of 
each object category (and the relatively low variability of shape within each 
object category) seems to make the two parameters relatively useless, and 
perhaps even relatively little used, in visual descriptions. 
That a particular contour shape or orientation is mentioned usually im-
plies that several different contour shapes or orientations are afforded by the 
object category in question. While less typical contour shapes (rectangular 
flower pots) need not cause difficulty for imagery, less typical orientations 
(chairs lying on their backrests) tend to be more treacherous but mostly vi-
able thanks to our ability to perform mental rotation (Shepard and Metzler 
1971). Importantly, unless the object of the specific contour shape and orien-
tation is highly unexpected (spheric brooms, banana shaped coffee cups), it 
is accommodated by the initial mental image without resistance, but also 
without the reader taking particular notice (see also Section 3.6.3 below). 
It has been noted by Michael Burke (2011, 145), and partly also by the 
proponents of the classical theory of literary estrangement (Shklovsky 1990, 
1–14), that mental contents really become noticeable only when a mismatch 
takes place between the reader’s top-down preconceptions on the one hand 
and bottom-up textual input on the other. Once we adopt the same idea for 
description-imagery, the following conclusion avails: If contour shape and 
orientation are the only two default parameters in mental images of isolated 
objects, then explicit references to these parameters should represent the 
only kind of textual input that can induce a match or mismatch proper, i.e., a 
match or mismatch concerning the image as such. Yet paradoxically, match 
or mismatch seems to make little difference to contour shape and orientation. 
Mentioned or not mentioned, matching or mismatching, it is as if the two 
parameters were rarely noticed in their own right exactly because their pres-
ence in the mental image is inevitable anyway. Compare for instance the 
following passages: 
 
She carried the (...) dish on her upturned hands. (…) A big dish, roughly ob-
long in shape, with rounded shoulders. Its thickness and heaviness were em-
phasized by the bold strokes of its painted decoration, dark orange, dark pink, 
and navy blue. (Roberts 1993, 91) 
 
Gary (...) took the last of the six signs that a Neverest representative had sold 
to him. Considering the cost of a Neverest home-security system, the signs 
were unbelievably shoddy. The placards, roughly oblong in shape, were un-
evenly painted and attached by fragile aluminum rivets to posts of rolled sheet 
metal(.) (Franzen 2001, 225) 
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Above, a contour shape qualifier (“roughly oblong in shape”) was removed 
from the former passage and planted in the latter passage. In my view, nei-
ther one of the two mental images (of the dish, of the home-security sign) 
lost or gained any of its initial power, in spite of the fact that home-security 
signs are more likely than dishes to be roughly oblong in shape, and in spite 
of “roughly oblong” suggesting slightly different shapes for the two objects: 
an oval one for the dish, a rectangular one for the home-security sign. This is 
not to say that certain contour shapes or (especially) orientations are not 
more likely to be imaged than others. The point is simply that there is noth-
ing about descriptions referring to contour shape or orientation per se that 
makes them either imageable or non-imageable. This is not the case for those 
parameters for which any possible match or mismatch pertains not to the 
level of the image, but to the level of invested conceptual knowledge. Those 
are the non-default parameters. Among them, I will argue, some truly have 
the power to make a visual description imageable, while others are for vari-
ous reasons detrimental to description imageability. Tapping firmly into the 
conceptual, the non-default parameters overall seem more likely to become 
noticed, to capture one’s attention in the course of reading. The ones listed in 
the following section tend also to make a noticeable difference for one’s 
description-imagery. 
3.6.2 Other parameters, limitations (feebleness) 
 
The absence of each one of the below visual parameters adds to the per-
ceived feebleness of the default description-image. By recounting these pa-
rameters, I will thus continue recounting the many ways in which descrip-
tion-images, especially in the default, are experienced as feeble. However, 
there are countless aspects to what meets the eye in perception and I have no 
ambition to offer a comprehensive overview of all conceivable visual pa-
rameters. Rather, my intention is to propose a general way of classifying 
visual parameters according to their imageability, while identifying salient 
representatives of each category. Throughout the proposal, new distinctions 
will need to be drawn between the various levels of the notion of imageabil-
ity that are at play. A diagrammatic summary will finally be provided in 
Figure 7, where further examples of each category will also be proposed. 
My ultimate aim here is to pinpoint visual parameters that may have a 
pronounced impact, be it positive or negative, on the imageability of a visual 
description of an object as encountered in literary prose. In this respect, the 
only thing I have been able to establish thus far is that the parameters of 
contour shape and orientation do not seem to have much impact. On the 
other hand, the parameters of contour shape and orientation obviously are 
imageable, even more so than any others, given their privileged status in 
mental imagery. The ubiquitous notion of imageability thus begins to bifur-
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cate: First, there is the basic imageability of a particular parameter (image-
ability I) in itself. In this sense, a parameter either is or is not imageable de-
pending on whether it can be readily represented in a mental image. Then, 
there is the impact the same parameter may or may not have on the image-
ability of a visual description (imageability III, see below). Unlike contour 
shape and orientation, all the below parameters have a pronounced impact. It 
is assumed in what follows that a negative score on basic imageability auto-
matically entails a negative impact on description imageability. Meanwhile, 
a positive score on basic imageability does not, interestingly enough, guaran-
tee a positive impact. But let us begin with the easy cases. 
Some visual parameters, I would like to suggest, simply cannot be repre-
sented in description-imagery. Their presence in a visual description is then 
necessarily a hindrance to imagery. Rather than contributing to a visual pres-
entation, the words referring to these parameters leave other sorts of imprints 
(if any) on the reader’s consciousness, thus disturbing the referential image; 
they are reflected upon qua higher-order concepts or qua verbal expressions, 
or simply skimmed or skipped. Size is a salient example of this class of pa-
rameters. In explaining why size cannot be imaged, I will once more revisit 
Elaine Scarry. In her treatise, Scarry argues that blossoms are amongst the 
most easily imageable of all possible contents. For explanation, Scarry 
(1999, 47) refers to the typical size of a blossom, which she says is commen-
surable with the size of the physical space occupied by mental images, i.e., 
with the size of one’s forehead and the space behind it.  
Even though I do not share Scarry’s passion for flowers, and even though 
I do not posit that the mental visual field is experienced to span a stretch of 
physical space, my assumption about the non-imageability of size is 
grounded in a similar premise, namely, that the magnitude of description-
images is invariable across contents. That is to say, no matter how small or 
big an object in reality, its description-image is readily enlarged or dimin-
ished as if to nicely fill the blank of the mental visual field, leaving a per-
fectly proportionate margin (see also Sadoski and Paivio 2001, 48; Casey 
2000, 54).62 Evidence from empirical studies on experimenter-guided mental 
imagery concurs with this intuition. People have been found to consistently 
image smaller objects as if they were closer and vice versa (Kosslyn 1978). 
Because the blank to be filled is not physical in any respect, I am more in-
clined to view mental images as sizeless rather than uniformly sized. Either 
way, explicit reference to size, especially when absolute (e.g. “one foot 
long”) as opposed to relative (e.g. “long”), seems ostentatiously useless and 
distractive in visual description as far as the content of description-imagery 
is concerned. In the following examples, for instance, any hitherto conceived 
                                                       
62 This is not the case for objects mentally represented in enactment-imagery, which can be 
enlarged or diminished depending on the situation as well as on how large a portion of the 
surrounding storyworld is being imaged simultaneously.  
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mental image may recede or even disperse as soon as the reference to size is 
processed:  
He showed me one of (the guns), a smoothly jagged piece of metal over a foot 
long. It looked like babbitting metal. (Hemingway 1962, 182) 
 
Beyond stands the lamp, in the right corner of the table: a square base six 
inches on each side, a disk tangent with its sides, of the same diameter, a 
fluted column supporting a dark, slightly conical lampshade. (Robbe-Grillet 
1965a, 144)63 
 
Yet other visual parameters are imaged with great ease and tend to have a 
positive impact on the imageability of a visual description. Color is a salient 
example of this class of parameters. That visual mental images prompted by 
names of manufactured objects are generally experienced to appear in shades 
of white and achromatic grey unless a color is explicitly mentioned, is an 
insight based on introspection (see also Scarry 1999, 22). There are, how-
ever, empirical indications toward such a view of the default description-
image. For instance, a brain imaging study (Simmons et al. 2007) has identi-
fied a neural substrate common to the processing of object-color word pairs 
(e.g. “eggplant-purple”) and actual color processing. Interestingly, the same 
study has shown that object words decoupled from explicit color attributes 
do not activate the cortical areas in question. Non-consciously, objects seem 
to be processed as colorless. Nevertheless, while the stimuli in the above 
study consisted in both natural and manufactured object words, my own 
introspective hypothesis regarding conscious imagery does not extend be-
yond the latter. Rather, I am inclined to describe mental images prompted by 
names of natural objects – “eggplant,” “strawberry,” “emerald” – as tinted 
by the color typically associated with the object (see also Section 3.6.1). To 
be more precise, I am inclined to thus describe mental images prompted by 
the names of any objects that are very strongly associated with one particular 
color. These objects (and the specific colors they are associated with) vary in 
part across cultures and individuals. The group happens to coincide largely, 
but far from entirely, with the category of natural objects. It may include 
bricks, but not bell peppers. 
Whether default description-images of manufactured objects really are en-
tirely achromatic or just extremely feeble in hue, the parameter of color is 
essentially different from the parameter of size in that its experienced ab-
sence from the visual mental image is no necessity. Not only can color be 
easily accommodated by a visual mental image. It is often accommodated 
                                                       
63 [Au-delà se dresse la lampe, dans l’angle droit de la table : un socle carré de quinze cen-
timètre de côté, un disque de même diamètre, une colonne cannelée portant un abat-jour 
sombre de conicité très faible. (Robbe-Grillet 1959, 14)] 
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with benefit, boosting a description-image way beyond the threshold of the 
reader’s attention. The rare potential of externally induced color to inform 
visual imagery is further confirmed, as it were, by empirical research into the 
so-called Perky effect. In the initial Perky (1910) experiment, participants 
were asked to produce mental images of diverse objects (e.g. a banana, a 
book) while unknowingly facing a white screen on which dim pictures of the 
same kinds of objects were being projected. The original data suggests that 
exposure to pictures, generally speaking, affects the content of concurrent 
mental imagery. Further research (Reeves 1981) has shown, however, that 
the Perky effect is up to six times stronger when the target picture is colored 
compared to when it is achromatic. 
Finally, the basic imageability of color being beyond doubt, its positive 
impact on description-imagery is perhaps most easily avowed by recourse to 
practical examples. In my view, any mental image produced by these ran-
domly chosen visual descriptions fades drastically when references to color 
are thought away: 
Right at the back would be a narrow bed covered in ultramarine velvet and 
stacked with cushions of all colours. (Perec 1990, 24)64 
 
The sofa was upholstered in yellow and blue satin, shiny and tight, finished 
with rolled gold cord and tassels. A hard little matching satin bolster tucked in 
at either end. Gold claws at the end of twisted wooden legs. (Roberts 1993, 
54) 
 
To encourage him, Baxter at last takes the knife from his pocket. As far as 
Perowne can tell, it’s an old-fashioned French kitchen knife, with an orange 
wooden handle and curved blade with no sheen. (McEwan 2006, 215) 
 
The third and final category of parameters is those that may be perfectly 
imageable in themselves, but have a negative impact on the perceived im-
ageability of a visual description. The fact that such discordance is possible 
at all suggests that the notion of imageability, bifurcated as it already was for 
the purpose of the preceding analysis, in fact trifurcates. In between the basic 
imageability of each individual parameter and its impact on overall descrip-
tion imageability, there is the mediating variable of a parameter’s respective 
possibility or non-possibility to be accommodated in the general object im-
age (imageability II). This possibility or non-possibility comes down to the 
inherent makeup of description-imagery as specified above. Namely, it de-
rives from the prominence of contour shape in object imagery, and from the 
feebleness of the surface filling the space delineated by a mentally imaged 
contour. More specifically, the category encompasses whatever can be im-
                                                       
64 [Tout au fond, il y aurait un lit étroit, tendu de velours outremer, garni des coussins des 
toutes couleurs. (Perec 1965, 14)] 
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aged in its own right but cannot meet the mind’s eye when an object is im-
aged as a whole. The parameters belonging to this third category all reduce, 
in one way or another, to surface detail and to non-contour shape, i.e., to 
aspects of shape that do not inform the general object contour (as projected 
into the two dimensions of a description-image). One salient representative 
of this category is what I will henceforth call, for lack of a better expression, 
the parameter of visual complexity. The underlined portions of the following 
descriptions all roughly amount to visual complexity: 
The table is a metal disc pierced with innumerable holes, the largest of which 
form a complicated rosette: a series of Sʼs all starting at the center, like dou-
ble-curved spokes of a wheel, and each spiraling at the outer end, at the pe-
riphery of the disc. / The base supporting the table consists of a slender triple 
stem whose strands separate to converge again, coiling (in three vertical 
planes through the axis of the system) into three similar volutes whose lower 
whorls rest on the ground and are bound together by a ring placed a little 
higher on the curve. (Robbe-Grillet 1965b, 94–95)65 
 
A local craftsman had made the buffet for Thérèse’s grandparents. (...) A solid 
piece in worn pine, darkened with age, satin-smooth. Its top pair of doors was 
carved with reliefs of oakleaf garlands. Two fat swags that hung down, one on 
each door. (Roberts 1993, 11) 
 
The placards were unevenly painted and attached by fragile aluminum rivets 
to posts of rolled sheet metal(.) (Franzen 2001, 225) 
 
It is fair to say that reference to visual complexity, the verbal rendition of the 
detailed architecture of things, is overrepresented in literary visual descrip-
tions. Visual complexity thus adds to why visual descriptions, in aggregate, 
end up appearing so surprisingly non-imageable, given the reader’s intuitive 
readiness to see with the mind’s eye. It has previously been suggested by 
literary scholars and cognitive psychologists alike that in order to be image-
able, visual descriptions of various kinds (descriptions of faces; descriptions 
of complex spatial settings) need to preserve a holistic (Jajdelska et al. 2010) 
and unitary (Lopes 1995, 23) view of what is being described. Visual com-
plexity obviously flouts these principles, breaking objects into details of 
structure (such as fragile aluminum rivets) and details of surface (such as 
                                                       
65 [La table est un disque de métal percé de trous innombrables, dont les plus gros dessinent 
une rosace compliquée : des S partant tous du centre, comme les rayons deux fois cintrés 
d’une roue, et s’enroulant chacun sur soi-même en spirale à l’autre bout, sur la périphérie du 
disque. / Le pied qui le supporte est constitué par une triple tige grêle dont les branches 
s’écartent pour converger ensuite à nouveau, par un changement de la concavité, et 
s’enroulent à leur tour (dans les trois plans verticaux passant par l’axe du système) en trois 
volutes semblables, qui reposent sur le sol par leur spire inférieure et sont accolées ensemble 




perforations forming complicated rosettes). Any initial object image is then 
broken down accordingly. 
Although the reader may not cease to experience visual imagery while 
processing references to visual complexity, the images experienced are no 
longer experienced as images of the central object proper. A sense of discon-
tinuity obtains (see also Casey 2000, 91; Ingarden 1973b, 267), with nega-
tive consequences for the imageability of the visual description overall. De-
scription-imagery prompted by visual description, at least when discrete 
objects are considered, thus differs from perceptual experience and from 
perceptually mimetic mental imagery (i.e. enactment-imagery as typically 
prompted by narrative) in that nothing can be represented in it without si-
multaneously being represented as being in focus. If whatever is in focus 
optimally fills the visual mental field, then each mental image consists only 
and exclusively in whatever is in focus. Hence the necessary lack of continu-
ity between description-images of objects and description-images of object 
parts. 
In what remains of Section 3.6, as visual parameters recede to the back-
ground of the argument, the notion of imageability will once again be ap-
plied unambiguously. An interim diagrammatic summary of the present sec-
tion is therefore shown in Figure 7 below, in which the various levels of 












































 Never  No No Negative Size Volume 
Figure 7 Visual parameter imageability I-II 
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3.6.3 The principle of just amount (expectedness) 
 
That a mental image is expected to arise as soon as the reader has identified 
an object of visual description and switched into the relevant mode of proc-
essing, also entails an instant mobilization of the many preconceptions that 
may possibly have bearing on the prospective description-image. So, upon 
encountering the word “broom,” one is given a default broom image. At the 
very same instant, one gets pre-reflectively ready to begin processing refer-
ences to visual properties corresponding to one’s concept of the broom in 
question. That is to say, rather than ruling out the improbable (e.g. the possi-
bility that the broom is purple, made of china, and so forth), one’s mind 
takes the much more economic course of activating the concept of a suitable 
broom prototype (see e.g. Rosch et al. 1976). 
This is where the possibility of concept/image match or mismatch, previ-
ously mentioned in Section 3.6.2, comes in. And with it comes also one of 
the trickiest paradoxes concerning the imageability of visual descriptions as 
enclosed textual entities, namely, that one’s description-imagery runs a 
higher risk of being ruined by a matching than by a mismatching description. 
This is not to say that matching visual descriptions are a priori less image-
able than mismatching ones. My point is rather that for each description, 
there is a just, adequate amount of visual information afforded by the frailty 
of referential imagery, and that this amount is lower for descriptions which 
match the reader’s expectations than for mismatching descriptions. Defined 
from the reader’s perspective, matching descriptions are descriptions of 
properties that are known or expected beforehand, while mismatching de-
scriptions refer to properties unknown or unexpected. Accordingly, a princi-
ple of just amount may be formulated as follows: Visual descriptions are 
most likely to be imageable when they expand on visual properties that are 
unexpected to the reader, while condensing the expected properties. Other-
wise they become incomprehensible (when condensing too much the un-
known and unexpected) or redundant (when expanding too much on the 
known and expected). 
Unexpected properties are experienced as such either because the general 
concept is unfamiliar (e.g. the concept “phonautograph” for most contempo-
rary readers), or, more frequently, because the described exemplar does not 
match one’s ad hoc prototype. Below is an attempt to illustrate the principle 
of just amount by way of a first-person analysis of a passage consisting of 
two different visual descriptions linked to one and the same general concept, 
the ever so recurrent concept of a broom: 
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In the kitchen closet I found a practically new broom [1] (not one of the con-
temporary designs, with synthetic bristles uniformly cut at an angle [2], but 
one just like the kind I had grown up with, with smocked twigs bound to a 
wooden handle [3])(.) (Baker 1998, 20; abridged) 
 
Once I have reached the word “broom” (Segment [1]) in this passage, my 
mind schematically, and barely reflectively, images what apparently is my 
broom prototype. It happens to coincide with what the narrator later presents 
as the kind of broom he grew up with. However, upon the imminent descrip-
tion of that very kind of broom (Segment [3]), I am no longer prompted or 
able to form a mental image. Rather, I feel compelled by the visual descrip-
tion to instantaneously reflect on how that kind of broom is made and how it 
looks and how it does not look and in what way it is better or worse than 
other kinds of brooms. I do all this in a fraction of a second, but I am not 
really experiencing imagery.  
The reason for this may be that, because of my initial readiness to image 
the very same kind of broom, the visual description eventually provided of it 
appears excessive (see also Chapter 4, Section 4.2.4). Due to this excess of 
visual description, my concept of broom, so familiar and devoid of overt 
verbal mediation at the onset, becomes defamiliarized, estranged. It is inter-
fered with verbally. Any hitherto conceived mental image thus disperses. 
Obeying the trade-off between imageability and marked verbality (see also 
Section 3.4 above), it gives way to other strategies of visual description 
processing. 
 By contrast, as I initially do not expect to be reading about a broom of the 
modern kind, the visual description provided of that kind of broom (Segment 
[2]) is compelling enough to inform my mental imagery. As it mismatches 
my prototype and thus paradoxically avoids word/image interference, this 
description may have made me notice that there was a (different) prototype 
in the first place (see also Section 3.6.1 above). But the challenge imposed 
by its unexpected content sustains my mental imaging through a longer dura-
tion of time, despite the fact that it extends over roughly the same amount of 
text and comprises roughly the same sort of visual information. Indeed, this 
observation runs counter to the common assumption that there is a direct 
relationship between the amount of visual detail provided through descrip-
tion on the one hand and the imageability of a text on the other (see Section 
3.1 above). That expanded visual descriptions generally pose a cognitive 
difficulty is in fact empirically proven. For instance, when descriptions of 
spatial settings abound in detail, readers have been found to refrain from 
spontaneously tracking spatial information (Zwaan and Van Oostendorp 
1993). 
Whatever their content, excessive visual descriptions thus seem to make 
an impact similar to the one of non-imageable visual parameters: They are 
reflected upon in terms of higher-order conceptual meaning or, eventually, in 
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terms of their quality as verbal expressions (and they are possibly imaged 
within the verbal domain). Ultimately they may, and very often will, be sim-
ply skimmed or skipped. The point of felt excess seems to arrive shortly 
after a peak level of image saturation has been reached, i.e., shortly after a 
maximum of visual parameters have been accommodated simultaneously. 
 Importantly, my introspective account demonstrates that the point of felt 
excess may arrive much sooner with visual descriptions that happen to match 
the reader’s expectations when compared to mismatching descriptions, just 
as the peak level of image saturation is probably reached sooner in such 
cases. This striking frailty of matching description-images is even more so if 
we define image saturation as the opposite of experienced image feebleness, 
since one is intuitively prone to consider one’s default description-images of 
familiar objects to be less feeble (see also Baddeley and Andrade 2000), and 
more saturated as it were, than mental images of objects barely known. 
Granted, the contour shape of an object image that has been anticipated all 
along (e.g. the image of a broom just like the one in my mother’s kitchen) 
may be experienced as somewhat less incomplete, its surface somewhat less 
sketchy, its orientation somewhat more precisely given. And yet, unless it 
has been prompted by a narrative proper in the mode of enactment-imagery, 
it is destined to vanish all the more quickly. 
An attempt to summarize these various paradoxes underlying the princi-





Figure 8 Concept/Image match     Figure 9 Concept/Image mismatch 
(Expected visual properties)      (Unexpected visual properties) 
 
A Formation of default description-image 
A´ Concept replacement 
B Peak saturation 
C Point of excess 
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The expectedness or unexpectedness of each image is necessarily a matter of 
degree. Thus, given that there is no such thing as an absolute concept/image 
match or mismatch, and given the number of variables at work in a visual 
description, it would be extremely difficult to quantify the principle of just 
amount with any more concretion. Suffice to note that descriptive excess, 
along with the frequent occurrence of non-imageable visual parameters (see 
imageability II in Figure 7), is a major factor in visual descriptions’ rela-
tively low appeal for referential imagery. Conversely, imageable visual de-
scriptions not only tend to comply with the inherent makeup of the mental 
image by exploiting primarily the imageable visual parameters, but also obey 
the principle of just amount. 
3.7 Postscript 
 
There is of course much more to visual descriptions than the above parame-
ters. And there is endlessly more to their literary style than the quantity of 
properties spelled out. Not only are there parameters relevant to vision that 
have a strong potential to elicit enactment-imagery rather than description-
imagery (e.g. weight or surface texture, both associating direct bodily inter-
action). There are also ways of tapping into non-imageable parameters that 
make a visual description appeal highly to mental imagery, for instance by 
employing figurative language. Consider the following example: 
The camera was the size of a deck of cards. It was mounted on an altazimuth 
bracket above the back door. Its casing was of brushed aluminum. It had a 
purplish gleam in its eye. (Franzen 2001, 230) 
 
What might have deterred visual imagery if expressed in more mundane 
words (i.e. with reference to exact measures) becomes perfectly imageable 
here by virtue of image blending (see also Gleason 2009). The reader may 
not be able to make much use of the parameter of size per se, but the fusion 
of a camera image with an image of a deck of cards provides enough stimu-
lation with regard to other parameters that the non-imageability of size is 
easily overridden. Needless to say, this particular simile is still comparably 
mundane and stripped of affective connotations. But visual descriptions, just 
like any other discourse, can be steeped in metaphor and affective language 
(see e.g. Sternberg 1981; Riffaterre 1981), with various and presumably very 
complex consequences for mental imagery and imageability (Kimmel in 
progress). Another issue of relevance to literary style is descriptive syntax, 
for instance the question of how imageability is affected by the particular 
order in which visual properties are presented, or by the rhythm of the de-
scriptive sentence. And how is a description-image constituted in the proc-
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essing of descriptive sentences where visual attributes are pre-posited rather 
than post-posited with respect to the central object name (for an example, see 
Section 3.4 above)? All this remains to be explored. 
Even beyond the domain of stylistics, the caveats of an analysis such as 
the present one are countless and so are the possible directions for further 
study. Like the rest of this dissertation, this chapter is largely speculative. 
However, I have taken care to make all formulations as amenable as possible 
to intersubjective validation and empirical testing. It is possible that much of 
the above will eventually be disconfirmed, either based on the general read-
ership or, more radically, on pre-selected populations of readers who are 
particularly predisposed to experience mental imagery. For the time being, 
the analysis is justified by other theoretical projects such as Elaine Scarry’s. 
An elaboration on Scarry’s project, i.e., the identification of singularly im-
ageable properties, within the framework of my own is another desideratum 
that has had to be disregarded throughout this chapter. 
Finally, a call for a yet larger enterprise lurks in the conceptual network of 
the above argument, namely the call for a systematic, positive analysis of the 
other two attentional foci that can piggyback on visual description process-
ing. When is a visual description more likely to address higher-order mean-
ing-making or draw one’s attention to its linguistic structure (and possibly 
also verbal imagery) rather than elicit description-imagery? What are the 
mutual relationships between the three? Such a systematic analysis, should it 
be viable, would significantly contribute to the charting out of the regulari-
ties of literary reading overall. Literary theorist Philippe Hamon’s aphoristic 
remark about description “being the crucial point at which the readability of 





Chapter 4. The verbal domain: speech-
imagery, rehearsal-imagery, and 
interpretation66 
While phonological recoding may not be necessary 
for the comprehension of all print, visually processing print 
is regularly associated with auditory and articulatory activity 
in readers with hearing. (Sadoski and Paivio 2001, 123) 
4.1 Verbal imagery 
 
The present chapter maps the domain of verbal imagery, introducing and 
elaborating on the distinction between speech-imagery and rehearsal-
imagery that has been briefly outlined in Chapter 1 (Sections 1.6.3 and 
1.6.4). It differs from the preceding Chapters 2 and 3 in that it makes con-
nections between the imagery varieties in question and other, higher-order 
processes of reader response, which will be subsumed under the notion of 
interpretation (see also Chapter 1, Section 1.6.6). 
Translated into the language of narrative theory, this chapter is an attempt 
to account systematically for the phenomenon of voice in literary narrative in 
other than metaphorical sense of the term.67 It is generally acknowledged that 
verbal imagery, the reader’s sense of hearing the words on a page, matters in 
the silent reading of poetry (see e.g. Tsur 1996; Tsur 1992). Verbal imagery 
in the silent reading of narrative prose, on the other hand, is largely ne-
glected by literary and other theorists. When it is mentioned at all, ap-
proaches seem to diverge widely. Some (e.g. Derrida 1974, 27–73) come 
close to denying it altogether. Others (e.g. Miall 2006, 173–188) consider its 
workings only when particular sound patterns and expressions are to be 
                                                       
66 This chapter is an extended and revised version of my “Outer vs. Inner Reverberations: 
Verbal Auditory Imagery and Meaning-making in Literary Narrative”, Journal of Literary 
Theory 7:1, xx-xx (Kuzmičová 2013b). 
67 An established term in narratology, “voice” is commonly used as a metaphor for the 
reader’s construal of the ontological status of a narrative utterance (Is it Leopold Bloom 
speaking? Or is it an impersonal narrator?).  
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proven special and significant from the viewpoint of global interpretation. 
One solitary critic (Stewart 1990) turns verbal imagery into a full-blown 
interpretive strategy, but fails to provide a systematic account of its sponta-
neous occurrence, its felt qualities or underlying mechanics. Another one 
(Chapman 1984) accounts for the ways in which verbal auditory and other 
sound experiences can be encoded by writers in literary texts, but does not 
detail their effects on readers’ mental imagery. This chapter aims to fill the 
gaps. 
It should be noted that I do not believe the linguistic medium to be con-
tinuously in the spotlight of the reader’s attention. Nor do I believe that the 
medium is attended to most of the time, which may perhaps be the case in 
poetry. On the contrary, I agree with phenomenologist Roman Ingarden, who 
asserts that readers rather tend to focus on whatever the linguistic medium 
serves to represent (see also Chapter 1, Section 1.7), experiencing the “pho-
netic stratum” of language “only peripherally” (Ingarden 1973a, 12, 91). 
Attention in general, and attention for mental imagery in particular, evades 
empirical investigation. If we assume that there is an attentional trade-off 
(see also Kuzmičová 2013b) between full medium transparency and full 
medium awareness, Ingarden seems to suggest that conscious verbal images 
occur less frequently than conscious referential images. Alternatively, if we 
accept that mental imagery can sometimes be experienced as a blend of ver-
bal images and referential images (see also Chapter 1, Section 1.6.5), Ingar-
den’s view suggests that the verbal component is rarely dominant in the 
reader’s consciousness. 
Whichever of these two assumptions one wishes to emphasize, everybody 
has probably had the subjective experience of hearing the narrative they 
silently read. I suggest that this experience, albeit comparably subtle and 
probably scarce in some readers, occurs now and then with each and every 
narrative we read. This is a view held by many others. For instance, one of 
the points of criticism traditionally raised against the audiobook is its “denial 
of the reader’s inner voice invoked by the printed page” (Rubery 2011, 11). 
Similarly to the authors of these criticisms, I believe verbal imagery to be 
vital to any experience of literary reading worth the name (see also Rosen-
blatt 1994, 26), although I will not make a case here for that belief. Nonethe-
less, I do make a case for the idea that distinctions within the domain of ver-
bal imagery also apply to higher-order meaning-making, i.e., that discrete 
types of verbal imagery may be associated with discrete tendencies in spon-
taneous literary interpretation. 
The chapter is structured as follows: After an opening note on terminol-
ogy (Section 4.2.1) and a brief, selective review of psychological literature 
(Section 4.2.2), I will introduce what I take to be a key phenomenal distinc-
tion between the two types of embodied experience produced by such im-
agery. Representing two ends of one experiential continuum, these two types 
of verbal imagery will be referred to as speech-imagery and rehearsal-
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imagery. The basic distinction between speech-imagery and rehearsal-
imagery will be defined as follows: In speech-imagery, verbal imagery is 
experienced to originate outside the reader’s body. In rehearsal-imagery, 
verbal imagery is experienced to originate inside it. Having described the 
basic corporeal (Section 4.2.3) and temporal (Section 4.2.5) qualities of 
these experiences and presented a few suggestions as to how they may link 
with discrete narrative techniques (Section 4.2.4), I will extend the scope of 
my description so as to include their respective relationships to higher-order 
meaning-making, or interpretation broadly defined (Sections 4.3.1 and 
4.3.2). I will argue (with a brief reservation, in Section 4.3.3, regarding the 
case of the poetic) that speech-imagery agrees with interpretation inasmuch 
as it puts the reader in the position of a vicarious listener. Meanwhile, re-
hearsal-imagery may rather be incompatible with interpretation by virtue of 
slanting the embodied experience toward active speech production. But be-
fore this line of thought can be pursued, a much more basic question needs to 
be dealt with: What do we know about verbal imagery in general? 
4.2 Embodied qualities 
4.2.1 Terminology: VAI, simulation, verbal imagery, inner 
speech 
 
First a few remarks regarding terminology. In this chapter, verbal auditory 
imagery (from now on, VAI) stands for the sort of mental auditory processes 
commonly investigated in psychology and other cognitive sciences as a sub-
personal cognitive mechanism, i.e., without specific claims being made on 
the matter of the subject’s consciousness (but with the unspoken assumption 
that VAI is largely non-conscious; see also Chapter 1, Section 1.4). If we 
were to strictly follow the terminology established in Chapters 1 to 3, VAI in 
this sense should thus be referred to as mere verbal simulation (or represen-
tation), rather than imagery proper. However, because “simulation” is not an 
established term in research on the cognitive processes at issue (and “repre-
sentation” has the most diverse connotations for literary theorists), I have 
decided to preserve VAI as used by cognitive researchers to denote these 
processes, in all its vagueness and abstraction. 
Meanwhile, when referring to the ways in which these processes inform 
consciousness, I will be using the term verbal imagery (without the qualifier 
in the middle) as defined in Chapter 1 and, wherever possible, the two more 
specific terms speech-imagery and rehearsal-imagery. For the purposes of 
the present chapter, verbal imagery and its two varieties should be under-
stood to encompass more than just VAI plus consciousness. They will be 
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shown to feature felt embodied qualities as well as felt conceptual qualities. 
That is to say, there is something it is like to experience them not only in 
terms of imagery (my quasi-auditory uptake of the strings of letters on a 
page), but also in terms of what this particular kind of imagery suggests to 
me in my quest for meaning (my thoughts about what these strings of letters 
may convey). The former qualities will be the main subject of the present 
Section 4.2, while the latter qualities, as interlinked with the former, will be 
the main subject of Section 4.3. 
An equivalent to VAI, the term inner speech, is sometimes used in psy-
chological literature on language processing (e.g. Abramson and Goldinger 
1997). Inner speech would have been a possible alternative to VAI and 
might have helped to avoid terminological confusion, had it not been fre-
quently used in developmental and other research to denote something quite 
different, namely, verbal thought (e.g. my mental verbalizing as I am trying 
to solve the problems scrutinized in this chapter; see also Chapter 1, Section 
1.6.6). This latter use of the term was first introduced by psychologist Lev 
Vygotsky (1987), whose ideas on the interrelations between thought and 
language will eventually prove useful for my argument. The term inner 
speech, when used below, will thus remain reserved for verbal thought and 
must not be confused with VAI or verbal imagery. 
4.2.2 The psycho(physio)logy of verbal imagery: some 
fundamentals 
 
Before verbal imagery is discussed with regard to the experience of literary 
narrative, any potential skepticism should be addressed from an empirical 
perspective. For those who may be skeptical about the grounding of verbal 
imagery in the reader’s body, taking it perhaps to be the product of some sort 
of disembodied inferencing alone, there is abundant empirical evidence that 
VAI and verbal imagery in activities other than reading is accompanied by 
specific patterns of auditory cortical activation (for a review, see Hubbard 
2010). Moreover, VAI is affected by impairments in cortical areas involved 
in actual speech reception and production (Baddeley and Logie 1992, 183–
184). As for the more tangible sites of embodiment, VAI is affected, for 
instance, when one’s tongue and lips are prevented from covert articulation 
(so-called subvocalization or subvocal rehearsal). Experiments have been 
conducted in which subjects were found to perform poorly on a verbal im-
agery task when chewing on candy, compared to control groups engaged in 
other concurrent tasks. Interference was also found when subjects had to 
perform a willed verbal imagery task while exposed to noise (Reisberg et al. 
1989). In another series of experiments, concurrent humming, a bodily activ-
ity involving the vocal cords, was found to disable judgment as to whether a 
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mentally imaged consonant was voiced or unvoiced (J. D. Smith, Wilson, 
and Reisberg 1995). 
For those who may be skeptical about the occurrence of VAI in silent 
reading specifically or about its effect on reading performance, there is still 
more evidence to be taken into account. In another experimental setup, sub-
jects’ ability to judge whether complex written sentences were meaningful or 
not decreased significantly when they were unable to rehearse the sentences 
subvocally due to a concurrent articulatory task (Baddeley and V. Lewis 
1981). More generally, studies have shown that differences in phonetic 
length (i.e. the time required for pronunciation) between words of identical 
orthographic length (e.g. “bat” vs. “bad”) affect the time these words take to 
process in silent reading (Abramson and Goldinger 1997). Prosodic elements 
such as rhythm, stress, and intonation, although overtly absent from normal 
text, have also been found to impact reading performance. An experimental 
study has shown that overt prosodic markers (bold type for sentence stress) 
enhance children’s text comprehension (Beggs and Howarth 1985). In short, 
there are countless experimental contexts in which VAI, and conscious ver-
bal imagery, has proven to depend (in speakers of English) on lower-order 
embodied processes and/or to have a pronounced effect on silent reading 
(see also the evidence cited in Chapter 1, Section 1.3). 
Whether phonology always plays a role in silent reading or whether se-
mantic content can also be accessed directly from orthography is the subject 
of debate. Some authors (Van Orden, Pennington, and Stone 1990) suggest 
that the phonological route cannot be bypassed, although it surfaces only 
when comprehension becomes especially difficult. However, the prevalent 
view seems to be that veridical phonology is indeed normally bypassed in 
silent reading (which is, after all, much faster than reading aloud) except in 
cases when comprehension becomes especially difficult (J. D. Smith, Wil-
son, and Reisberg 1995). But the kind of comprehension in question has 
little to do with the intricacies of literary interpretation. Rather, the above 
researchers refer to baseline cognitive operations (henceforth referred to as 
baseline comprehension) such as the processing of unknown vocabulary, or 
the disambiguation of homographs (i.e. words of different meaning but iden-
tical in spelling), or complex syntax. 
Both views, the view that VAI is noticeable only when baseline compre-
hension is challenged and the view that VAI is not at work at all unless base-
line comprehension is challenged, run into various problems when checked 
against the practices of literary reading. It is a fact that literary narratives, at 
least when contemporary to the reader, tend to pose relatively little difficulty 
for baseline comprehension as compared to expository text. On the other 
hand, although we have yet to receive systematic empirical evidence, it is 
also fair to say that VAI, or rather verbal imagery proper, is much more fre-
quently noticeable to the reader of literary compared to non-literary prose. 
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Consistent with this estimate may be the findings of cognitive psycholo-
gist Rolf A. Zwaan. Zwaan (1993) conducted a series of experiments in 
which readers were presented with a number of simple but well-composed 
narratives. For each one of the narratives, the readers were made to believe 
that they were reading either a piece of journalism or literary prose. In the 
literary condition, the readers took longer to process the text and showed 
better memory for surface structure (i.e. memory for the precise wording of 
the text). Given that the two texts were identical, it is plausible that the in-
crease in reading time and memory performance was partly due to additional 
verbal imagery, although Zwaan himself does not offer this particular expla-
nation. After all, subvocal rehearsal is known as the ultimate auxiliary to 
both short-term and long-term memory (Baddeley and Logie 1992). 
4.2.3 Speech-imagery vs. rehearsal-imagery 
 
What are the basic varieties of verbal imagery as it occurs in the reading of 
literary narrative? What are their essential qualities? These are the central 
questions of this subsection. 
The fundamental quality of all verbal imagery is that the linguistic me-
dium of a written narrative enters the reader’s awareness qua audible dis-
course. Although the exponents of poststructuralist philosophy would not 
agree, this is a perfectly natural experience. In readers with intact hearing, 
the first and for a long time only contact with language in life is of the oral 
kind. Verbal language, we are reminded by phenomenologist Don Ihde, is 
therefore “normatively embodied in sound and voice” (Ihde 2007, 150; see 
also Sadoski and Paivio 2001, 118–124). This description of verbal imagery, 
however apt, is not very discriminating. But as we begin to study verbal 
imagery experiences as they occur in the reading of literary narrative, they 
soon fall into two distinct varieties, or more precisely, position themselves 
between two ends of a continuum. 
Consider (the below description of my experience of) the following pas-
sage: 
[I: David] 
The breeze from the sea was blowing through the room and [David] was read-
ing with his shoulders and the small of his back against two pillows and an-
other folded behind his head. He was sleepy after lunch but he felt hollow 
with waiting for her and he read and waited. Then he heard the door open and 
[Catherine] came in and for an instant he did not know her. She stood there 
with her hands below her breasts on the cashmere sweater and breathing as 
though she had been running. 
“Oh, no,” she said. “No.” 
Then she was on the bed pushing her head against him saying, “No. No. 
Please David. Don’t you at all?” 
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He held her close against his chest and felt it smooth close clipped and 
coarsely silky and she pushed it hard against him again and again. 
“What did you do, Devil?” 
(Hemingway 1995, 45; my italics) 
 
Once again, in this thrice quoted passage from Ernest Hemingway’s novel 
The Garden of Eden, Catherine, the young wife of a writer named David, has 
just had her hair cut in a wish to become more physically like her husband. 
Now she is showing off her extravagant (it is the 1920s) haircut to David, for 
whom all this is unexpected. 
Did David’s question (“What did you do, Devil?”) resonate in verbal im-
agery the first time I read it, and how? Just before I go on describing the 
image I experienced, an important clarification is necessary: It is in no way 
presupposed that the experience to be described has normative validity with 
respect to the sentence in question. Obviously, susceptibility to conscious 
mental imagery, including verbal imagery (see also Chapman 1984, 224), 
varies across readers and so do readers’ instantaneous moods and inclina-
tions. The sentence may be imaged differently by others, or it may not give 
rise to verbal imagery at all. The point I will primarily be trying to make is 
rather that if there is a verbal image for others in this case, or any other case, 
the experience of it can always be placed on a continuum between two ex-
tremities. And for this particular sentence, my own experience coincided 
well enough with one of these extremities. 
There is, however, a secondary point behind my choice of literary pas-
sage. Despite individual differences, I assume that a moderate degree of 
intersubjective consensus is possible and I will indeed eventually (Section 
4.2.4) propose a way of tracing my experience, as well as its polar opposite, 
to a generic class of textual cues, i.e., to objective features of the text. How-
ever, my proposal will be probabilistic rather than categorical. That said, it 
should be clear that I do not assume the verbal imagery triggered by discrete 
literary narratives to be the same across all readers, at least not on the level 
of isolated sentences or fairly small groups of sentences. Yet isolated sen-
tences and small groups of sentences must form my literary examples, be-
cause there is nothing more than an isolated sentence or a small group of 
sentences to any one instance of verbal imagery. Unfortunately there is no 
way to emulate, within the present scholarly genre, the experience of con-
tinuously dipping in and out of the different varieties of verbal imagery in a 
larger stretch of literary prose. 
The variety of verbal imagery at work in my experience of the above sen-
tence has previously (Chapter 1, Section 1.6.3) been introduced as speech-
imagery. The embodied qualities of speech-imagery, as exemplified by my 
experience of the above sentence, can be described as follows: The acoustics 
of the sentence flowed into my mind with notable ease. It feels as though I 
heard it pronounced by David, even though David is just a construct of mine 
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based on the preceding narrative. It feels as though I heard it voiced by 
David, even though I have difficulties describing in retrospect the very voice 
I heard when I was reading the sentence. The only voice I would be able to 
describe somewhat reliably is, again, a construct of mine based on the sparse 
information on David gleaned from the text thus far. My impression is that 
David’s voice is rather deep, sonorous, of an appropriate volume for a self-
conscious but considerate middle-aged American (I do not know yet that the 
character was raised in East Africa). I may even have felt David’s voice 
resonate throughout the upper part of my body, perhaps with an admixture of 
what may have felt like my own whisper. Nevertheless, my vocal muscula-
ture most certainly felt immobile. The verbal image positively originated in 
David, or in an amalgam of people I have met whom I pre-reflectively imag-
ine David to resemble, even though it was embodied in me. 
For what I perceive as a pronounced contrast to speech-imagery, consider 
now (the below description of my experience of) the following passage:  
[II: Ruth] 
My name is Ruth. I grew up with my younger sister, Lucille, under the care of 
my grandmother, Mrs. Sylvia Foster, and when she died, of her sisters-in-law, 
Misses Lily and Nona Foster, and when they fled, of her daughter, Mrs. Sylvia 
Fischer. Through all these generations of elders we lived in one house, my 
grandmother’s house, built for her by her husband, Edmund Foster, an em-
ployee of the railroad, who escaped this world years before I entered it. It was 
he who put us down in this unlikely place. He had grown up in the Middle 
West, in a house dug out of ground, with windows just at earth level and just 
at eye level, so that from without, the house was a mere mound, no more a 
human stronghold than a grave, and from within, the perfect horizontality of 
the world in that place foreshortened the view so severely that the horizon 
seemed to circumscribe the sod house and nothing more. 
(M. Robinson 1981, 3; my italics) 
 
The end of the verbal imagery spectrum to be represented by my spontane-
ous experience of this latter passage corresponds to what I have previously 
(Chapter 1, Section 1.6.4) termed rehearsal-imagery. The literary passage is 
part of the opening paragraph of Marilynne Robinson’s novel Housekeeping, 
and I experienced it very differently from the Hemingway quote in terms of 
verbal imagery. (Verbal images may have occurred from the start but I can 
most distinctly remember them for the highlighted clauses.) This time a 
slight resistance was perceptible so that the verbal image seemed to lag be-
hind my visual uptake of the words. The flow felt slower on average than 
that of a speech-image. Sheer text quantity cannot be the only cause of this, 
since the text feels just as slow upon the rereading of a short isolated portion 
commensurable in length with “What did you do, Devil?” The main over-
arching difference, however, lies in the scope of felt embodiment. While the 
speech-image was felt to originate in a vocal apparatus other than my own 
(that of an imaginary David), this rehearsal-image (or series of rehearsal-
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images), as the label may readily suggest, was felt to originate in my subvo-
cal rehearsal, in my own mouth and throat. It felt as though my tongue and 
vocal cords articulated, enacted the sounds of at least some of the words. 
Even my lips may have moved slightly on several occasions. This time it 
was not only the strictly auditory component of the image that resembled of 
my whisper, but also its kinesthetic component (i.e. motor activity in my 
mouth and throat). If there was a voice in this case, it was positively my own 
and nobody else’s. It was me who uttered those words in spite of there being 
a Ruth to do the telling, the telling of her story and the story of her family, to 
me. 
In contrast to the preceding speech-image, I would not be able to tell here, 
no matter what kind of inferencing I use, how the sentences in question were 
pronounced. With David I would be able to report in retrospect the approxi-
mate pitch, tonality or pace of his question, one indicating surprise and per-
haps even a mixture of pleasure and fear. And I would have the feeling that 
this is really what I heard. That perceptual properties such as these can read-
ily be encoded in silent reading, on a cognitive level prior to consciousness, 
has been empirically validated (see Kurby, Magliano, and Rapp 2009 for a 
review). With Ruth, who speaks to me through my own body only, I would 
not be able to report much more than the generic distribution of stress be-
tween syllables, and some of the places where I paused for longer than usual 
and took a breath. The contents of such a report would probably largely co-
incide with that of other readers’. This may seem strange at first, given that 
rehearsal-imagery is channeled by one’s own covert articulation. But in 
normal overt speech (unless we are professionally trained in vocal perform-
ance), we do not access our voice from the outside either. The only way of 
accessing it in its clear, undistorted form is by listening to a recording, an 
experience which many people find horrid precisely because it strips away 
the inner resonance throughout their body (see also Ihde 2007, 136). In re-
hearsal-imagery, such resonance is key. It cannot possibly be bypassed. In 
speech-imagery, on the other hand, it can be bypassed quite easily. For in-
stance, I could have read David’s “What did you do, Devil?” without paying 
attention to the above-mentioned resonance in my torso, and still hear 
David’s manly bass.68 
While the analogy with self-perception in overt speech does not properly 
explain why one is less aware of diction in rehearsal-imagery than in speech-
imagery, it reminds us that an experiential dissociation between speech pro-
duction and speech reception is not really as strange as it may seem. In fact, 
a similar dissociation has been corroborated for VAI. It has been established 
                                                       
68 This kind of experience is common in the reading of narratives, personal letters etc. written 




that in various tasks involving reading and other forms of language process-
ing, our brain can simulate speech production without necessarily simulating 
the auditory output and vice versa. Or as psychologists have it, the “inner 
voice” and “inner ear” subsystems of the phonological loop, even though 
they sometimes operate in partnership, seem to be cleanly separable (J. D. 
Smith, Wilson, and Reisberg 1995). Translated into such terms, rehearsal-
imagery amounts to a first-person awareness of both the inner voice and 
inner ear, while speech-imagery offers a first-person awareness of the inner 
ear only. The awareness of voice in speech-imagery is third-person, as if the 
voice came from the outside. 
The above has provided a brief introduction of speech-imagery and re-
hearsal-imagery and their lower-order embodiment. Individual differences in 
response to the two passages notwithstanding, experienced readers hopefully 
recognize the general distinction. In Section 4.2.4 I will further elaborate on 
the distinction and make a few cursory proposals toward its grounding in 
narrative technique. 
4.2.4 Situated speech vs. non-situated language: verbal imagery 
cues in text  
 
When are speech-imagery and rehearsal-imagery, respectively, likely to 
arise? The reading of literary narratives is a dynamic and multilayered proc-
ess, and any attempt to categorically link isolated text cues to varieties of 
verbal imagery, or even to verbal imagery in general, would be a simplifica-
tion. As previously mentioned, the account to be presented in this section 
can only be approximate and probabilistic. One of its upshots, on the other 
hand, is that it runs independently of common narratological distinctions 
such as first-person vs. third-person narration, intradiegetic vs. extradiegetic 
narration, or internal vs. external focalization. This set of tools has been 
deemed more or less indispensable by narratologists tackling the notion of 
voice (for a review, see Aczel 1998), i.e., one’s construal of the ontological 
status of a narrative utterance. Unlike these narratologists, I do not assume 
readers to seek a specific unitary speaking self whenever one is not readily 
available. More crucially, my take on voice is literal, not metaphorical. 69  
Since the above narrative passages were chosen for prompting (in me) the 
two varieties of verbal imagery at about their cleanest, it makes good sense 
to start by comparing these passages. What are the most obvious differences 
                                                       
69 The potential to prompt either variety of verbal imagery in silent reading may be reflected 
in spontaneous voice modulation when a text passage is read aloud (for a critical analysis of 
traditional narratological categories that relies, among other things, on the practice of voice 
modulation in reading aloud, see Skalin 2008, 250-251). 
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in narrative technique that could have bearing on verbal imagery? And are 
the cues in question necessary for either verbal imagery variety to arise? 
At first glance, there is a clear contrast between a markedly oral (David) 
and a markedly written (Ruth) style. Although neither of the passages is 
difficult in terms of baseline comprehension, Ruth’s narrative is much more 
syntactically complex than David’s question. “Devil” may not be the most 
typical address for a wife on honeymoon, but there is still a spoken and 
spontaneous quality to David’s question, so typical of Hemingway’s prose. 
What Ruth is saying, on the other hand, is ostentatiously constructed, even 
elevated on the lexical level. The degree of perceived orality is certainly an 
important factor in verbal imagery. But is it fair to say that perceived orality 
is a necessary precondition of speech-imagery, or that perceived literariness 
is a necessary precondition of rehearsal-imagery? I believe not. To provide a 
counterexample to the first assumption, it may be perfectly usual to engage 
with Hamlet’s central soliloquy through speech-imagery, even though he 
speaks Shakespearian blank verse (see also Rossholm 2004, 234). As a coun-
terexample to the second assumption, replace David’s “Devil” with a literary 
address of your choosing. The context preserved, does it do much to the 
overall sound of his utterance? 
Secondly, one could point out that, unlike Ruth, David (and also Hamlet) 
has grown to become a familiar persona70 by the time of the utterance in 
question. Although we have already been given impressive detail of Ruth’s 
family background, the sort of information which we do not have access to 
(yet) for David, we know nothing about what she is like as a person, what 
her occupation is, where she is coming from in any other than literal sense of 
the expression. We do not have the slightest clue of how old her physical 
voice may be. This lack of personal background may have joined forces with 
the markedly written character of the narrative in arousing my rehearsal-
image. 
But did it necessarily have to be so? I would indeed experience speech-
imagery later on in Ruth’s narrative, in spite of its relative stylistic consis-
tency. Then does this mean that rehearsal-imagery exclusively occurs in text-
initial positions, or when a new speaker is introduced? Or does it mean that 
so-called extradiegetic narrators (e.g. whoever is telling us that Catherine 
“came in and for an instant he did not know her”) cannot be perceived as 
personalities of their own and experienced through speech-imagery? My 
answers to all these questions are negative. We may lack objective informa-
tion about Ruth as a character, but we have been with her long enough to 
have a clue about what kind of speaker she is (rather solemn but far from 
humorless). Similarly, we may pre-reflectively attribute personality to extra-
                                                       




diegetic narrators (Currie 2010, 86–107), not to speak of biographical 
authors (Claassen 2012), based purely on how a story is told. Even in the 
case of David, we have probably learnt more about the character from the 
length and rhythm of his utterances than from what we have been expressly 
told about him. We have had the possibility to realize how quick-witted he 
is, an insight that may have readily affected the actual speed with which his 
utterances are processed, as suggested by empirical studies showing that the 
speed of silent reading can vary with the characteristics of an imagined 
speaker (J. D. Alexander and Nygaard 2008). 
A third obvious difference at work between the two passages is best con-
ceptualized by the classic distinction between so-called narratorial showing 
and telling. Whereas we know nothing about the circumstances of Ruth’s 
narrative, a fact by which voice and style-of-speech attribution may be made 
difficult, David’s utterance is perfectly framed by its where, when, and why. 
David’s utterance is shown at least as much as it is told and its speech-image 
may very well be accompanied by a referential image (enactment- or de-
scription-imagery or anywhere in-between) of the event. It is delivered in 
direct discourse, the narrative strategy considered typical of showing (see 
e.g. Lubbock 1921). That direct discourse is especially well-suited for elicit-
ing speech-imagery is intuitively self-evident, but it has also been corrobo-
rated by neuropsychological studies employing neuroimaging and eyetrack-
ing technology. For instance, it has been found that in silent reading, direct 
discourse yields stronger activations in the temporal voice areas of the audi-
tory cortex, compared to content-equivalent indirect discourse (Yao, Belin, 
and Scheepers 2011). Also, behavioral studies investigating depth of proc-
essing have shown direct discourse to yield more vivid representations in 
readers’ memory, compared to indirect discourse (Bohan et al. 2008). 
In contrast to David’s direct speech, Ruth’s narrative, albeit first-person, 
reaches us via its own telling only. Yet again, it is by definition never the 
case that we know the circumstances of extradiegetic narration, and still it 
can be perceived to communicate through a personal voice, potentially giv-
ing rise to speech-imagery. Hence, the distinction between speech-imagery 
and rehearsal-imagery cannot be fully reduced to a distinction between 
speech in showing vs. speech in telling. 
The three above variables, i.e., orality vs. literariness, familiarity vs. un-
familiarity, and showing vs. telling, can all be subsumed to mark different 
degrees and aspects of linguistic situation or situatedness. Language is situ-
ated qua speech when it is perceived as spoken (orality) and consistent with 
its source (familiarity) and its extralinguistic context (showing). If written 
language is, as Ihde seems to suggest (see Section 4.2.3 above), at some 
level always pre-reflectively assessed by the standards of voiced speech, 
then the modeling of linguistic situation would seem to be a key process in 
the reading of literary narrative, because voiced speech as we know it is 
normally quite situated. In voiced speech, we normally know who is talking 
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to us or at least why, when, where this is happening. Although we get to 
overhear snippets of strangers’ conversations and unidentifiable fragments of 
news on daily basis, or even receive (initially) anonymous calls at the front 
door or on the phone, we tend to experience these as confusing or even un-
canny. The typical opening question of a cell phone conversation with a near 
person aims exactly at disambiguating situation in a most literal sense of the 
word: “Where are you?” 
Indeed, empirical research into reader response confirms what some (e.g. 
Coste 1990, 164) have long been proposing just in theory, i.e., that readers 
routinely attempt (successfully or not) to construe narrators of all narra-
tological varieties as if they were partners in conversation. For instance, 
experimental studies conducted by Marisa Bortolussi and Peter Dixon have 
shown that, unless contradictory information is made explicit, narrators are 
assumed by readers to share their personal worldview and world knowledge 
(Bortolussi and Dixon 2003, 60–96). When there is textual evidence to the 
contrary, readers tend to report difficulties in grasping the basic causalities 
of the story. 
Assuming this innate inclination toward situatedness, it would seem that 
speech-imagery may be generally preferred to rehearsal-imagery. My expe-
rience of rehearsal-imagery described above was not entirely unlike what 
one may experience when trying to concentrate on a difficult piece of ex-
pository writing in a noisy room, mouthing the words over in a desperate 
attempt to penetrate their meaning. Even though baseline comprehension is 
rarely an issue in literary narrative, a certain sense of medium opacity is 
inherent to rehearsal-imagery. That is to say, rehearsal-imagery entails a 
temporary dipping out of the linguistic situation, and a higher-level aware-
ness of the language being processed qua medium. After all, the more palpa-
bly one’s body is active in the sheer act of linguistic mediation, acting itself 
as a physical medium of sorts, the more palpably one becomes aware of lan-
guage qua medium in the more abstract sense of the word. Conversely, 
speech-imagery in turn may dispense with, or even preclude, such aware-
ness. What strikes me about David’s utterance as I hear him say “What did 
you do, Devil?” is its naturalness, not its artificiality. 
These are of course extremely short-lived, protean and fragile phenom-
ena, subject to the reader’s temperament and, crucially, to the unique dynam-
ics of each particular text (and reading session). For instance, David’s “What 
did you do, Devil?” would have lesser or other impact if it were surrounded 
by direct discourse exclusively (see also Section 4.3.2 below), if it were bur-
ied visually in additional text on the same line, and so forth. For any kind of 
cue to yield an effect, a certain degree of visibility is necessary, and visibility 
tends to decrease with insufficient variation in the text overall. Having said 
that, experienced readers hopefully recognize not only the general distinction 
between speech-imagery and rehearsal-imagery, but also the possibility 
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(however limited) of tracing speech-imagery and rehearsal-imagery to dis-
crete verbal forms.71 
The question of perceived mediacy brings back into focus the fact that my 
rehearsal-image of Ruth’s narrative appears much earlier in the global text 
than my speech-image of David’s utterance. It is certainly true that any liter-
ary style takes time to penetrate and get accustomed to (some styles take 
longer than others), and that attention and medium awareness is at its height 
at the beginning of a novel. For this reason, rehearsal-imagery may indeed 
be especially common in text-initial positions, or other emphatic positions 
(e.g. at the beginning or end of paragraphs or chapters). But this is not to say 
that rehearsal-images do not occur elsewhere. My experience says that they 
do. 
So how does one tackle this experience once it has been established that, 
as far as verbal imagery is concerned, it is rehearsal-imagery (rather than 
speech-imagery) that is the marked, mediated case, the one that needs ex-
ploring? How can the textual cues of rehearsal-imagery be traced, if the con-
cept has only been defined in negative terms so far, as a lack of orality, a 
lack of familiarity, a lack of narrative showing? In other words, when does 
the language of literary narrative become conspicuously non-situated so as to 
give rise to rehearsal-imagery? I would now like to propose a fourth, less 
obvious and more reader-centered variable at work in the two passages. 
While the previous three variables were related to qualitative differences in 
narrative technique, the fourth one comes down to the reader’s awareness of 
narrative quantity. While the previous three variables were neither sufficient 
nor necessary, the forth one, although probably not sufficient, may indeed be 
necessary. Needless to say, all are a matter of degree rather than categorical 
distinction.  
By awareness of narrative quantity (or simply narrative quantity) I refer 
to an elusive phenomenon commonly mentioned in literary journalism but 
rarely investigated in scholarship, namely to the reader’s sense that a story, 
or some circumscribed part of it, is being told in (so and so) many words. 
Narrative quantity is exactly what I had become aware of as Ruth’s poetic 
rendition of her grandfather’s first home began to resonate through my inner 
voice and ear. Still I did not consider the rendition excessive (see also Chap-
ter 3, Section 3.6.3), or stylistically flawed. My attention only briefly (for a 
fraction of a second at most), and barely reflectively, turned to the fact that a 
considerable amount of narrative resources was being spent on a particular 
                                                       
71 For a further list of more particular, content-related text cues potentially productive of 
speech-imagery (e.g. graphic encoding of lisps and accents; overt narratorial commentary on 
the manner of characters’ speech), see Chapman 1984. Chapman also acknowledges the fact 
that these cues can become counterproductive when used excessively (Chapman 1984, 31, 
62). 
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topic. With David’s utterance, one is never given a chance to make such 
observations. 
In my Ruth example, the awareness of narrative quantity arose from the 
degree of instantaneous elaboration (reinforced by the aforementioned com-
plexity of syntax) on what may be termed the “grandpa’s first home” topic. 
In other cases, it may alternatively arise from recurrence (e.g. if grandpa’s 
first home were described repeatedly throughout the global narrative, in the 
same or other words). Readers may not generally expect Grice’s (1991) con-
versational maxims of quantity72 to be followed in literary narrative. Yet I 
believe that some narratives (the meticulous descriptions of Alain Robbe-
Grillet, the trying digressions of Lawrence Sterne) eventually trigger an 
awareness of narrative quantity in all readers, regardless of their degree of 
literary edification. Further I believe that such awareness arises now and 
then during the reading of each and every narrative, although occurrences 
may not fully overlap across repeated readings. This means that in spite of 
literature’s essential freedom from the imperatives of everyday communica-
tion, Gricean or others, readers do have instincts as to what narrative quan-
tity is adequate for a topic under given circumstances. Fortunately, non-
professional readers are less shy than literary scholars in confirming this 
intuition firsthand. Empirical research into reader response has proven them 
keen to dismiss a literary narrative, or a portion thereof, on the basis of its 
being too detailed (Allington 2011). 
Awareness of narrative quantity temporarily decouples speech from situa-
tion and makes it appear non-situated, as if it were non-speech, some sort of 
raw linguistic material. This is not to say that such awareness automatically 
entails rehearsal-imagery. Rehearsal-imagery overall may be a far less fre-
quent occurrence than awareness of narrative quantity. Awareness of narra-
tive quantity may, however, be necessary for rehearsal-imagery to arise, 
given what rehearsal-imagery is. It is the active embodiment, in one’s own 
articulatory apparatus, of displaced discourse that comes from the outside of 
one’s body; a first-person transformation of raw language into situated 
speech. It is doubtful whether there are any regularities at all as to when 
one’s awareness of narrative quantity produces the rehearsal-imagery effect 
and when it does not. It is also doubtful whether the typical cues toward such 
awareness can be established intersubjectively beyond the limit cases (the 
meticulous descriptions of Alain Robbe-Grillet, the trying digressions of 
Lawrence Sterne, and so forth). Obviously, it is a matter of individual tem-
perament whether and where such awareness arises in response to a particu-
lar narrative passage. It may arise more readily on a first reading than on a 
                                                       
72 1. Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current purposes of the 




second, or vice versa. It may be subject to the reader’s instantaneous mood 
or other external circumstances. 
To a larger extent than most other cues, the cues toward narrative quantity 
thus occur in the reader as much as they occur in the text, and therefore they 
are subject to vast individual and cultural variation. But this is not to say that 
the effect they produce is of little importance in the overall aesthetics of 
literary reading. The latter in turn, however, is not to say that their only ef-
fective function lies in the determination of aesthetic value, as critics (pro-
fessional or lay) of literature might make one believe with their lamentations 
over “wordy, descriptive stuff” (Allington 2011, 324) and the like. Hopefully 
my choice of literary example has shown clearly enough that there is no 
necessary link between narrative quantity and rehearsal-imagery on the one 
hand and the impression of stylistic failure on the other. My positive evalua-
tion of Robinson’s style persists, rehearsal-imagery notwithstanding, or 
partly even as a result of this imagery. 
4.2.5 The dynamics of speech-imagery and rehearsal-imagery 
 
Before moving on to Section 4.3 and to the respective implications of 
speech-imagery and rehearsal-imagery for interpretation, one more aspect of 
their cuing should be brought into focus. Compared for instance to static 
description-images (see Chapter 3), verbal images are particularly difficult to 
tackle theoretically insofar as they are more extended over time and the con-
tent of each one of them necessarily changes over its duration. While the 
spatial contents represented in a description-image may remain identical 
throughout the (typically brief) image experience, verbal imagery is not only 
markedly linear by virtue of representing sound, but also markedly dynamic 
by virtue of representing language. The following questions thus avail: Once 
it has been suggested when verbal imagery is likely to arise, what is there to 
be said about how it arises? Can anything specific be said at all about the 
inherent dynamics of speech-imagery and rehearsal-imagery?  
Let us begin with rehearsal-imagery. In Section 4.2.4 above, when de-
scribing the experience of narrative quantity underlying my rehearsal-image 
of Ruth’s narrative, I say that I had become aware of narrative quantity as 
Ruth’s poetic rendition of her grandfather’s first home began to resonate 
through my inner voice and ear. The sequence of tenses matters in this for-
mulation. It follows from the nature of narrative quantity, defined as a sud-
den awareness of a certain amount of narrative resources being spent on a 
particular topic, that the experience emerges with a delay. That is, the onset 
of a rehearsal-image is certainly not simultaneous with the very introduction 
of the topic in question. It takes some (and sometimes considerable) amount 
of discourse for one to take notice of narrative quantity. This much is obvi-
ous. But there is yet another sense in which rehearsal-imagery may seem to 
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lag a few paces behind itself, as it were. Namely, rehearsal-imagery is also 
inherently delayed because it tends to operate by backward projection. 
What I mean by backward projection cannot be properly explained with-
out recourse to the larger issues of attention and consciousness. Evidence 
from experimental psychology indicates that readers’ processing of text is 
generally very shallow. For instance, surprisingly few readers spontaneously 
notice the errors in questions such as “After an air crash, where should the 
survivors be buried?” or famously, “How many animals of each sort did 
Moses put in the Ark?” (see Emmott, Sanford, and Dawydiak 2007 for a 
review). Nevertheless, literary scholars often make it sound as if readers’ 
awareness of linguistic choices made in a text were constantly preeminent, 
without pockets of inattention. Louise M. Rosenblatt, for instance, speaks of 
a “continuing awareness” of the text, wherein the reader pays “attention to 
all that these words, and no others, these words, moreover in a particular 
sequence, summon up” (Rosenblatt 1994, 29). 
Varying interpretations of Rosenblatt’s statement are possible, some 
stronger than others. On a very strong interpretation, one that equals text 
awareness to verbal imagery, Rosenblatt suggests that verbal imagery runs 
from page one until the end, but also that it is replete in the sense that within 
each verbal image, no single word is omitted. We know (as did probably 
Rosenblatt) that the former implication is not true, but what about the latter? 
It is a fact that silent reading in general is much faster than reading aloud. 
However, when asked about the nature of their verbal imagery, silent readers 
tend to report having heard uninterrupted speech. How can this be? An es-
tablished explanation is that their experience is distorted in retrospect. Their 
focus on verbal imagery makes them believe they heard uninterrupted 
speech, whereas in fact they only heard a selection of key words (Field 2003, 
29). Given such an explanation, what appears to have occurred in between 
those key words is merely a product of conceptual filling-in. 
There is also an alternative account of the internal workings of verbal im-
agery, one implied by a theory of consciousness proposed by psychologist 
Susan Blackmore. If attention works the way Blackmore suggests, for most 
of the duration of what one takes to be a verbal image, one really does not 
hear anything, neither key words nor any others. In her argument against the 
general idea of a replete and continuous stream of consciousness, Blackmore 
uses the following example from everyday auditory perception: 
In a noisy room full of people talking you may suddenly switch your attention 
because someone has said ‘Guess who I saw with Anya the other day – it was 
Bernard’. You prick up your ears – surely not – you think. At this point you 
seem to have been aware of the whole sentence as it was spoken. But were 
you really? The fact is that you would never have noticed it at all if she had 




What Blackmore proposes is that most of the time, one’s mind is busy proc-
essing such a plenitude of parallel input that there is no point in trying to 
determine which of it was conscious or not. In her view, what we take to be 
the contents of a continuous stream of consciousness is just our backward 
projection of attention toward what in fact were, in the time of processing, 
non-selected stimuli. In other words, Blackmore does not believe in con-
sciousness traditionally defined. Whatever one may think of Blackmore’s 
theory, it elucidates some of the general mechanics of literary reading, for 
instance, the surprise one may experience at recognizing an (initially) incon-
spicuous sentence repeated verbatim from a hundred pages prior in a novel 
(see also Ingarden 1973a, 102). It feels strange to realize that one read this 
very sentence some hundred pages ago, since one does not remember notic-
ing it then. 
What does Blackmore’s theory, and the above example, add to our under-
standing of rehearsal-imagery in particular? My suggestion is that rehearsal-
imagery is elicited in a manner similar to one’s auditory perception of 
Blackmore’s sample sentence, except on a somewhat larger scale. That is to 
say, the actual verbal image really begins later than what the reader might 
guess. Given the notoriously treacherous dynamics of sentence comprehen-
sion (Sadoski and Paivio 2001, 113–117), the reader may not know before-
hand that a sentence being read will result in an awareness of narrative quan-
tity. And yet the entire sentence, plus a previous sentence in relation to 
which the current sentence is felt to be an added quantity, resonates through-
out her rehearsal-image. When reading Ruth’s narrative, I became aware of 
my rehearsal as I reached the word “grave,” but the contents of the rehearsal-
image seemed to encompass as much as “so that from without, the house 
was a mere mound, no more a human stronghold than a grave.” This is what 
I mean by backward projection. 
A relevant question is how much of a time lag there can possibly be be-
tween the onset of a rehearsal-image and the initial processing. Since readers 
barely notice, it cannot be too long. The answer to this question coincides 
with the answer to the following: What is the typical unit of rehearsal-
imagery? What may be experienced as one rehearsal-image? The answer has 
already been hinted at: one or two sentences (or rhythmical/syntactic units 
corresponding to the length of a typical sentence). This estimate is based on 
introspection, my own and other theorists’ (e.g. Ingarden 1973a, 34), as well 
as on empirical findings regarding short-term memory for coherent spoken 
discourse, which has been proposed to span between ten and twenty words 
(Wingfield and Butterworth 1984). Obviously, the highlighted parts of 
Ruth’s narrative contain more than twenty words. Besides, Ruth’s narrative 
continued to resonate with me beyond the above excerpt. (That is why I have 
previously taken care to describe my experience of the passage in the plural, 
as a concatenation of several rehearsal-images.) This means that rehearsal-
images are not assumed here to operate by backward projection only. They 
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are not necessarily experienced as twenty word units in perfect isolation 
from each other. Once they have been taken notice of, they may be propelled 
for another while solely by the reader’s attention, and regardless of possible 
shifts in topic. Strictly speaking, rehearsal-images thus operate bidirection-
ally, backward as well as forward. 
For the sake of contrast, let us now briefly turn to speech-imagery. The 
general difference may be that speech-images do not operate by backward 
projection beyond the usual constraints of sentence comprehension, i.e., not 
on a scale larger than suggested by Blackmore’s sample utterance. Firstly, 
they do not depend on previous discourse cumulation. Secondly, they are, as 
proposed above, essentially situated. And by virtue of their situatedness, they 
implicate the reader as participant in ways largely overreaching baseline 
comprehension. More specifically, the reader is cast in the position of some-
one who gets to overhear, as it were, somebody’s speech in conversation. 
Often the speech is literally situated to such an extent that the physical set-
tings are specified. That entails for instance that any referential imagery of 
the situation (e.g. one’s visual image of David in his nicely ventilated room, 
asking “What did you do, Devil?”) must temporally coincide with the 
speech-image in order for the situation to make sense. But this relative punc-
tuality of speech-imagery seems to apply more generally, even when no set-
tings are explicitly given. Since speech-imagery is linked to a sense of hear-
ing somebody speak, the image simply has to run close behind the reading 
eye. It is implausible that one refrains from parsing, say, the famous last line 
of F. Scott Fitzgerald’s The Great Gatsby into smaller units, only to replay it 
later for the mind’s ear when it is finished. One does not likely hear Nick 
Caraway utter “So we beat on, boats against the current, borne back cease-
lessly into the past” (Fitzgerald 1999, 180) in a single speech-image. Rather, 
one hears him first utter “So we beat on, boats against the current,” and then 
continue: “borne back ceaselessly into the past.” 
Although a typical speech-image may span about the same amount of lin-
guistic input as a typical rehearsal-image, I am prompted to say that speech-
images probably are more granular than rehearsal-images, in the sense that 
they can be constrained to a single word. Certainly, single words depend for 
their meaning on the surrounding discourse, so that David’s “Devil” is 
unique precisely inasmuch it is meant to denote his wife, and to do so in a 
particular situation. However, one probably does not need to hear (as I be-
lieve I did) the entire sentence resonate in a speech-image in order to enjoy 
the acoustic quality of such a singular address. It may be enough that one 
merely knows what the rest of the sentence was. This intuition is consistent 
with findings from experimental psychology. A qualitative-quantitative sur-
vey of mental imagery conducted by Stephen Kosslyn and colleagues (1990) 
has shown an inverse relation in auditory images between reported vividness 
(positively correlated with typicality) and length of duration. The briefer an 
auditory image, the more typical and vivid it tends to be. Given that part of 
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the difference between speech-imagery and rehearsal-imagery can indeed be 
defined in terms of higher levels of vividness (positively correlated with 
typicality) in speech-imagery, which is phenomenally richer (vividness; see 
also Chapter 1, Section 1.6) as well as more oral (typicality) in character, 
these findings may corroborate the relative granularity of speech-imagery. 
To sum up, in speech-imagery, onset (and termination) is probably more 
abrupt and immediate, and backward projection less pronounced, compared 
to rehearsal-imagery. The experienced direction of movement is simply for-
ward, with little initial lag to be noticed. In a rehearsal-image, the general 
feel is that of hearing (oneself utter) what one has just read. In a speech-
image, one hears (somebody utter) what one is just reading. This difference 
has consequences for cases when a rehearsal-image shades off into a speech-
image and vice versa. This might happen, for instance, if David were tedi-
ously outspoken about his evaluation of Catherine’s new haircut, or if Ruth’s 
description of her grandfather’s first home suddenly gained a strikingly oral 
quality. Because of the mutual incompatibility of their inherent dynamics, 
even the smoothest transition from one verbal imagery variety to another 
will be marked by a rupture, a palpable glottal stop in between the two. 
Despite the differences in inherent dynamics, I believe that in a majority 
of cases, even speech-imagery tends to arrive in phrases rather than in iso-
lated words. In a majority of cases, the following description by Ihde, origi-
nally formulated to characterize verbal thought, may fit speech-imagery as 
neatly as it fits rehearsal-imagery: A verbal image “does not show itself a 
word at a time any more than does my voiced speaking. It bursts forth in 
rapid totalities that present themselves as an uneven ‘flow’. (…) One does 
not attend to words as such but to a larger ‘singing’ of phrases and sen-
tences.” (Ihde 2007, 140) 
4.3 Conceptual qualities 
4.3.1 Terminology: meaning-making, implication, interpretation 
 
How are the two varieties of verbal imagery related to meaning-making in 
general and interpretation in particular? That is the key question of this en-
tire section. But before I go on to look for answers, the question itself needs 
clarification. 
Let us begin with what I mean by meaning-making. Meaning-making 
stands for text comprehension at large, that is, the reader’s continuous activ-
ity of converting graphic signs into semantic wholes of various kinds. How-
ever, the route between a graphic sign, e.g., a printed word, and its meaning 
is by no means unidirectional. And it is (among other things) precisely VAI, 
 142 
the very basis of verbal imagery, what sometimes comes in between as an 
intermediary with the power to reverse directions. Heteronyms are a typical 
case in point. In isolated words such as “content,” “desert,” or “lead,” mean-
ing remains ambiguous unless (covertly) embodied in sound. But verbal 
imagery can make a difference even beyond such baseline operations. One 
and the same sentence or group of sentences can elicit (speech-)imagery in a 
number of different intonations, including those barring, or significantly 
modifying, literal understanding. One could read David’s “What did you do, 
Devil?” as an expression of irony and ostentatious pretense of surprise. One 
could experience one’s verbal and other imagery of the situation in a way 
strongly suggesting that David could not care less about his wife or her hair-
cut, for instance if David’s enunciation sounded clearly overdone (typically 
for an ironic speaker) or conversely if it lacked in prosody (typically for a 
disinterested speaker). This interpretation may be grounded in the qualities 
of the imaged sound alone. Alternatively (perhaps more often), the nature of 
the imaged sound may depend on a preconceived interpretation. 
Therefore, an important proviso is in place with regard to the notion, 
spelled out in my opening question, that verbal imagery and meaning-
making are related to one another. Although I will refer later to various “im-
plications” of verbal imagery for interpretation, I certainly do not assume a 
single direction of causality between the two. Rather, I believe them to mu-
tually affect one another, sometimes simultaneously, sometimes taking turns. 
For this reason, terms like “concurrencies” or “correlations” would perhaps 
be less confusing. However, my choice (implications) is motivated by its 
polysemous nature, wherein both verbs of origin, i.e., “imply” and “impli-
cate,” have a distinct role to play. Needless to say, meaning-making and 
interpretation do not have to combine with verbal imagery. As previously 
mentioned, the experience of verbal imagery may be relatively scarce in 
some readers. On the other hand, since there cannot be reading without 
meaning-making, there cannot be verbal-imagery without concurrent mean-
ing-making of one kind or another. That is why I will once again start with 
the two varieties of verbal imagery, only to link them with distinct aspects of 
meaning-making, rather than proceeding the other way around. 
Last but not least, the above proviso calls for a working definition of in-
terpretation. For many literary scholars, the term interpretation denotes a 
highly specialized intellectual activity, one requiring years of prior academic 
study. According to this view, interpretation is synonymous to systematic 
text analysis, which in turn cannot be fully pursued unless a text has been 
read in its totality. Furthermore, the personality of such a reader-interpreter 
is allegedly sidestepped to give way for objective insight regarding the text 
alone. This is not what I mean by interpretation. Firstly, given my focus on 
verbal imagery, I am only concerned with what happens in the fluent, unin-
terrupted course of reading. How post-reading analysis of the scholarly kind 
may be affected by (distant memories of) verbal imagery is a matter of too 
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wild a guess. Secondly, given my focus on spontaneous fluent reading, the 
meaning-making processes involved are assumed to largely outreach ana-
lytic, objective knowledge. The kind of meaning at stake is to be understood 
quite broadly, so as to include any response toward the personal relevance of 
the story for the individual reader and other forms of “lived” or “experi-
enced” signification (see e.g Miall 2006; Seilman and Larsen 1989). As one 
empirical study into the effects of pedagogical interventions has shown 
(Fialho, Zyngier, and Miall 2011), this is how the general concept of inter-
pretation may be widely understood amongst first-year (Canadian) university 
students of literature. In class assessment for literature classes where per-
sonal, affective response to text was expressly encouraged, these students 
reported more focus on “analysis and interpretation,” compared to their as-
sessment of classes encouraging impersonal, analytic commentary only. The 
systematic downplaying of experience in interpretation, and its strict separa-
tion from interpretation, is a professional habit acquired at higher levels of 
instruction. 
As a matter of course, interpretation also comprises any activities per-
formed by readers of advanced literary expertise, provided the reading is 
uninterrupted. At the other end of the spectrum of complexity, it may com-
prise operations as basic as the processing of a simple garden path sentence 
(e.g. “The old man the boat.”). For what is important in my distinction be-
tween meaning-making in general and interpretation in particular is not the 
complexity of the intellectual process as such. Rather, interpretation is meant 
here to stand for any meaning-making brought to a conscious level of 
awareness. In short, this is the difference: All meaning-making is amenable 
to backward introspection, in the sense that the reader always (or almost 
always) has an answer, if asked in retrospect, to the question “What does X 
(a word, a sentence, a sequence of sentences and so forth) mean?” Only in 
interpretation as presently defined, however, is this question palpably present 
in the very course of processing X. It may not be present literally. The reader 
may not be thinking the exact words “What does X mean?” But it is present 
indirectly, by virtue of reminiscences, associations, and dormant ideas cross-
ing the reader’s mind in response to X. If nothing else, it is present as a 
vague feeling in the reader that X is somehow meaningful, and that a ques-
tion such as “What does X mean?” may be worth asking in the first place. 
Furthermore, because baseline comprehension is rarely an issue in literary 
(as compared to expository) narrative, the sort of meaning thus invoked in 
interpretation mostly falls beyond the literal, the baseline, the self-evident. 
So how are the two varieties of verbal imagery related to interpretation? 
Here is a brief version of my answer: Speech-imagery and interpretation 
mutually enhance one another. Rehearsal-imagery, on the other hand, im-
plies that interpretation is instantaneously obstructed (and vice versa). This is 
not to say that one cannot interpret, with a certain delay, a stretch of text 
previously experienced through rehearsal-imagery. If this were the case, too 
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much meaning would be lost in reading, in spite of the constant retrospec-
tive/prospective oscillation of the reader’s attention. My intention is rather to 
suggest that the two experiences (rehearsal-imagery and interpretation) are 
unlikely to occur simultaneously. Elaboration follows in Section 4.3.2. 
4.3.2 Speech-imagery vs. rehearsal-imagery: implications for vs. 
against interpretation 
 
Even with a loose definition of interpretation such as the above, the two lit-
erary quotes hitherto used, i.e., David and Ruth, may perhaps not be consid-
ered rich enough examples of interpretation’s subtleties. Although both con-
tain symbolically charged expressions (“Devil”; “mound,” ”stronghold,” 
”grave”) for the literary scholar to use in a hermeneutic venture, the events 
and existents they refer to are admittedly quite particular and straightfor-
ward, even mundane. Therefore, I will now introduce a third speaker, Eduard 
Huml: 
[III: Eduard] 
HUML: (---) At the same time, the moving force of every activity is that 
which might be described as ambition – in the broadest sense of the word – 
full stop. Regarding ambition, one must again distinguish between two kinds – 
dash – I mean colon – 
BLANKA: Colon? 
HUML: Yes, colon: a healthy ambition and an unhealthy one – full stop. By 
healthy ambition we understand a really fruitful, profound interest in a defi-
nite object – man’s natural desire to fulfill himself within the sphere of his in-
terest – full stop. On the other hand, when a desire to use one’s resources does 
not stem from inner motives, but is merely a means towards achieving certain 
superficial values – such as power, money, publicity etc. – we talk of un-
healthy ambition – full stop. (Halts, ponders, then turns to BLANKA.) Listen, 
Blanka, what do you actually think of me? 
(Havel 1993, 146; my italics) 
 
Let us forget that Eduard Huml, unlike David and Ruth, is a stage play char-
acter (the above passage will be treated here as experienced in solitary silent 
reading), and that he started his literary life not speaking English, but the 
Czech of Václav Havel’s The Increased Difficulty of Concentration. The 
latter is inessential to what I have to convey, the former may be of tangential 
interest. This interest concerns the fact that stage plays in general may, in a 
certain respect (the nearly exclusive use of direct discourse), seem intuitively 
better fitted for prompting speech-imagery than other genres. This intuition 
may prove unsupported, however, in yet other respects (one’s habituation to 
direct discourse as a consequence of its ubiquity; the constant visibility of 
the medium, with its capitalized character names and intrusive stage direc-
tions). 
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In any event, the sentences highlighted above did give rise, for me, to 
speech-imagery.73 Reading them for the first time, I could suddenly hear 
Eduard dictate his theses for transcription in a tired yet confident voice, with 
two interruptions, two extensive glottal stops: one (naturally) for the stage 
directions and one (due to narrative quantity) during Eduard’s enumeration 
of “superficial values” – “power, money, publicity etc.”. In order to better 
illustrate the connection to interpretation, let me introspect a little more on 
how the experience evolved: I am reading The Increased Difficulty as quoted 
above, a play I am familiar with from a show performed in Czech several 
years ago. I know the cultural background fairly well. The conceptual and 
stylistic precision of the text is admirable to me, yet my enjoyment of it does 
not, as yet, go too far beyond such admiration. As far as I can remember, any 
verbal imagery experienced over the preceding pages belonged to the variety 
of rehearsal-imagery, even though ideas of universal human concern, quite 
similar to the present passage, have previously been spelled out. As a matter 
of fact, I have had to struggle on one or two occasions to stay on task. Then, 
as I am reading the first highlighted passage, I become very interested in 
what is being said. I get a deep sense of relevance, and, in a fraction of a 
second, a multitude of dormant questions simultaneously arise: Where do I 
stand between the healthy and the unhealthy?; How common are the healthy 
in politics?; Is “using one’s resources” any different from “being trustworthy 
in a very small matter” (Luke 19:17), and is it always a good thing? And 
crucially: Is Eduard meant to be indirectly commenting his own position? 
What does it take in the storyworld of the play to be healthy? What is Eduard 
referring to? What does his utterance mean? 
Once again, I am not saying that in order to think all this, one necessarily 
has to experience verbal imagery. My point is rather that the only possible 
variety of verbal imagery to be experienced as one is thinking it, is speech-
imagery. Let me reformulate before elaborating. At every moment in the 
course of reading, the language of a text fluctuates between being felt as 
mine, internal to the reader, and not mine, external to the reader (see also 
Rosenblatt 1994, 53). It always comes from the outside, as it was written 
down and printed under circumstances over which the reader (typically) 
exerted no control. At the same time, it is the reader’s mind, and nobody 
else’s, what endows it with its emergent meaning, from the most basic to the 
most advanced semantic levels. Now, in a number of ways, the reader’s 
mind is thoroughly grounded in the reader’s body (see Chapter 1), and under 
                                                       
73 When contrasted with Ruth’s evocative house description, which prompted rehearsal-
imagery, there is something nearly counterintuitive about Eduard’s abstract reflections 
prompting speech-imagery, since heightened medium awareness (typical for rehearsal-
imagery rather than speech-imagery) is normally associated with abstract rather than concrete 




some conditions (see Section 4.2 above), its embodiment of the type non-
conscious VAI becomes conscious qua verbal imagery. Quite naturally, the 
fluctuation between mine and not mine is then reflected in such embodied 
experience. 
Quite naturally, then, the distinction between mine and not mine cuts 
along the line between rehearsal-imagery (mine) and speech-imagery (not 
mine). That is, during rehearsal-images, with their palpable activation of the 
articulatory apparatus, I am arguably more deeply implicated in linguistic 
production as a (vicarious) speaker than during speech-images, which rather 
put me in the position of a (vicarious) listener. The voice that reaches me in 
a rehearsal-image is mine at best, whereas the voice of a speech-image is 
never mine: It is instead David-ish, Eduard-ish, Hamlet-ish, and so forth. 
All assumptions considered, my idea regarding the link between interpre-
tation and speech-imagery (and, conversely, the rupture between rehearsal-
imagery and interpretation), is the following: There may be a trade-off be-
tween one’s degree of openness to interpretation and one’s bodily appropria-
tion of the language, in the sense that the more one is engaged in what X 
could mean, the less one can possibly be engaged in the physical saying of 
X, and vice versa. As soon as I became really interested in what Eduard has 
to convey, I made myself comfortable to listen. Prior to that, my sheer read-
ing of The Increased Difficulty required more labor, hence the preponder-
ance of rehearsal-images. With reference to the title of this subsection: 
Speech-imagery implicates the reader qua listener, while rehearsal-imagery 
implicates the reader qua speaker. But the latter happens at the expense of, 
that is against, interpretation. These are the points to be elaborated now. 
There may be a very prosaic explanation for this trade-off, most likely 
with reference to cognitive load and/or attention: For instance, it has been 
suggested by psychologists that subvocalization (which becomes palpable in 
rehearsal-imagery only) is present particularly, or even exclusively, when 
processing becomes difficult (see Section 4.2.2 above). If spontaneous inter-
pretation arises only at points of the reader’s imminent interest, which is far 
from implausible (see e.g. Scarinzi 2008), then it is possible to conceive of 
an inverse relation between interpretation and rehearsal-imagery on the ob-
vious basis that interesting passages are less likely to be perceived as diffi-
cult to process. Another way of accounting for such an inverse relation 
would be one bringing in the variable of attention. That is to say, we could 
speculate that subvocalization is always present in verbal imagery, with 
more or less constant intensity, but that it is reliably relegated outside aware-
ness as long as the reader is busy engaging in interpretation, as a result of 
attentional constraints. Also, interpretation resembles speech production in 
that it yields propositions generated in one’s mind and by oneself. This re-
semblance to speech production makes interpretation quite likely to interfere 
with inner reverberations especially (see also Chapter 1, Section 1.6.6). 
Clearly, these are just some of many possible suggestions.   
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Whatever the correct answer, the primary scope of this chapter lies not so 
much in explanations and non-conscious processes as in phenomenal experi-
ence, in the feeling of things rather than their psycho(physio)logical under-
pinning. So why should my feeling of actively emulating speech be largely 
incompatible with reflecting, spontaneously and simultaneously, over what 
is being said? To answer this question, let us consider yet another intuition: 
Rehearsal-images bring not only the voice, but also the meaning, the thought 
lying behind (and emerging from) the expression in question, towards the 
“mine” end of the mine/not mine continuum. Speech-images yield the oppo-
site effect. In analogy to ordinary overt speech, when the voice is mine, then 
the thought is mine as well. It is only when the voice is not mine that I am 
left to wonder what the underlying thought and meaning might be. 
Other speakers are always ambiguous to some extent, requiring some in-
terpretation. Meanwhile, as the firsthand speaker, the originator of a com-
pleted clause or sentence, one is unambiguous to oneself (pace psychoanaly-
sis), irrespective of the fact that one may often be quite surprised74 at the 
turns one’s speech has taken. At least this is how it feels. When I have fin-
ished a sentence, I may feel inspired by the emergent meaning to continue in 
ways previously unforeseen, or I may simply want to try and make myself 
more precise, but I am not really reflecting, on equal terms with my inter-
locutors, on the many coexistent meanings of what I am saying; I know all 
too well what they are (or at least that is what my mind is inclined to be-
lieve). They are the situation from the midst of which I am speaking. This is 
why a simple question such as “What do you mean?” can be baffling, and 
why it can be painful and estranging to hear other people paraphrase, or even 
repeat verbatim, what one has said or written. This is why it may be natural 
not to interpret an utterance that one has been bodily involved in shaping 
through rehearsal, and to perceive an utterance as voiced by another speaker 
as soon as it triggers interpretation (or vice versa). 
Indirect support for this intuition may be gleaned from various sources. In 
empirical studies of reader response, some indications have been received 
toward an inverse relation between reader-speaker identification on the one 
hand and perceived ambiguity of speech content on the other. For instance, 
Maria Kotovych and collaborators (2011) have found that first-person intra-
diegetic narrators who are explicit about the motives of their actions (i.e. 
who build up a transparent speaker personality) are somewhat paradoxically 
rated by readers as more difficult to identify with, compared to first-person 
intradiegetic narrators who refrain from revealing their motives. That is, 
their speech may be more likely to be perceived as external (not mine) to the 
reader, and its meaning (at least when it comes to the motives behind their 
actions) may be more likely to be viewed as ambiguous, in need of interpre-
                                                       
74 In everyday speech, when we begin a new sentence, we rarely know its exact structure 
beforehand.  
 148 
tation.75 But reader-speaker identification is certainly a complex and layered 
phenomenon, and there is much more to it than rehearsal-imagery. For in-
stance, one could also argue that my speech-imagery of Eduard’s dictation 
made me identify with Eduard’s concerns exactly by virtue (rather than in 
spite) of triggering interpretation, because interpretation is arguably never 
(not even in the most rigorous literary scholars) entirely decoupled from the 
private concerns of the individual reader. 
Compared to Eduard’s above exposition of the concept of unhealthy am-
bition, other theses of his from just a few pages prior (e.g. Havel 1993, 139), 
which concern the relativity of human values and which I remember sponta-
neously imaging in rehearsal-imagery, appeared transparent and stable as to 
their meaning. They were felt to mean exactly what they declared (“it would 
be mistaken to set up a fixed scale of values, valid for all people and in all 
circumstances and at all times” and so forth), nothing more and nothing less. 
That is why there is no real use here in quoting them extensively. At the 
point of reading, interpretation of these theses did not seem worthwhile to 
me (but again, my articulatory apparatus was busy mouthing them over). 
Their felt transparency was unaffected by my (liminal) awareness of the fact 
that their meaning was necessarily my own guesswork to some degree, along 
the lines of Tolstoy’s memento, quoted by Lev Vygotsky, that people who 
think in isolation are always so tightly “attached to their own thought” that 
they tend to fail perceiving alternative meanings (Vygotsky 1987, 269). 
What is true of the interpretive ineptitude of isolated thinkers, may be gener-
ally true of literary reception in the fleeting instances of rehearsal(i.e. iso-
lated)-imagery.  
This difference between a perceived stability vs. dynamism of meaning in 
rehearsal-imagery vs. speech-imagery, respectively, may be further illumi-
nated with more help from Vygotsky himself and his influential theory of 
inner speech (henceforth abbreviated as IS in order to avoid confusion with 
speech-imagery). As stated in Section 4.2.1, Vygotsky’s notion of IS is not 
the same as verbal imagery. Rather, it denotes what has elsewhere been re-
ferred to as verbal thought, i.e., subvocal conceptual thinking that appears, to 
the thinker, to feature acoustic-linguistic qualities. Vygotsky’s main argu-
ment with regard to IS is that it is essentially dialogical, a product of the 
internalization of social (rather than so-called egocentric) overt speech. At 
                                                       
75 Narrowing down reader-speaker identification to the perceived transparency of a speaker’s 
motives, one could further speculate about the two varieties of verbal imagery, respectively, 
linking to the two traditionally opposed explanations of the human ability to attribute mental 
states to others (so-called theory of mind; see e.g. Currie 1996). So-called theory theory, 
according to which mental states are attributed on the basis of higher-order inferencing, caters 
well to speech-imagery. Meanwhile, rehearsal-imagery, in its resistance to interpretation, may 
rather link to so-called simulation theory, according to which the attribution of mental states is 
direct, non-inferential, non-interpretive. 
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several points in outlining the phenomenal characteristics of IS, Vygotsky 
comes close to describing the essence of speech(i.e. dialogical)-imagery as 
defined against rehearsal(i.e. non-dialogical)-imagery. 
In IS “the word dies away and gives birth to thought,” Vygotsky says in 
his figurative idiolect, and continues: “(IS) is a dynamic, unstable, fluid phe-
nomenon that appears momentarily between the more clearly formed and 
stable poles of verbal thinking, that is, between word and thought” (Vygot-
sky 1987, 280). Elsewhere, he observes that IS appears to be “nearly word-
less” (Vygotsky 1987, 274). What would a parallel between IS and speech-
imagery tell us? Here is one of many possible suggestions: Compared to 
rehearsal-imagery, which may be analogously labeled as “nearly thought-
less” insofar as it forecloses interpretation, a reader experiencing speech-
imagery may be less focused on wording proper. By virtue of evoking a 
whole array of possible meanings, the particular words that reach us in 
speech-imagery, once processed, may be quicker in receding to outside 
awareness (Vygotsky’s “dying”) due to the load of concurrent meaning-
making. Because of the experiential intensity of such meaning-making rela-
tive to the plain, straightforward, “literal” meaning-making associated with 
rehearsal-imagery, the words chosen may seem comparably insignificant, or 
even arbitrary. More than the words, situation is what matters. 
In rehearsal-imagery, on the other hand, this impression of comparable 
arbitrariness is less likely, because meaning is felt to be more firmly tied, 
even constricted as it were, to wording proper (in the sense that I felt Edu-
ard’s theses about the relativity of human values to mean exactly what they 
declared, nothing more and nothing less). This distinction may also lie be-
hind what I introspectively observed above (Section 4.2.5) as the relative 
granularity of speech-imagery. Focusing on the many dynamic meanings 
stirred up in the mind rather than on the wording, one may be more likely to 
experience speech-imagery as more fragmentary, catching a word or phrase 
here and there, rather than hearing entire sentences.  
As previously mentioned, readers’ memory for the exact wording and 
syntax of a text is commonly referred to, among cognitive psychologists, as 
memory for surface structure (e.g. Kintsch et al. 1990). Memory for surface 
structure is distinguished from memory for textbase (i.e. propositional con-
tent) and situation model (i.e. mental representations formed, in the course of 
reading, of the events and existents referred to in the text). Even though 
memory for surface structure is generally poor, it may indeed be slightly 
stronger, given what has been established, following rehearsal-imagery 
compared to speech-imagery. Perceived literariness (as defined against per-
ceived orality), which is likely to enhance rehearsal-imagery (see also Sec-
tion 4.2.4), has in itself been found to positively affect memory for surface 
structure (Zwaan 1993). Moreover, subvocalization is always beneficial to 
memory for words in general (see also Section 4.2.2). Speech-imagery, on 
the other hand, may be more efficient in securing memory for textbase 
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and/or situation model, which ought to be richer whenever interpretation, or 
a potential therefore, is felt to be at play. 
I have noted above that in rehearsal-imagery, meaning is felt to be more 
firmly tied, even constricted as it were, to wording proper. Rather than refer-
ring to some non-conscious cognitive substrate, this was intended primarily 
as an introspective observation, an account of how it might feel to experi-
ence rehearsal-imagery. There are empirical indications from verbal imagery 
research, however, that such feelings may be traceable to discrete lower-
order processes. That is to say, there are real ways in which an instance of 
VAI can be either more firmly or more loosely tied (prior to attention) to its 
meaning. Psychologist Daniel Reisberg and collaborators (1989) conducted a 
series of experiments in which subjects were instructed, under various condi-
tions, to form various kinds of verbal imagery. The principal research ques-
tion was whether verbal imagery is analogous to speech perception by virtue 
of being subject to reinterpretation (e.g. reversal in parsing from “life” to 
“fly” during fast repetition), or whether it is, similarly to visual mental im-
agery, inherently unambiguous.76 
The results obtained from these experiments differed largely across condi-
tions. To the authors’ surprise, when subjects were instructed to image a 
verbal auditory stimulus as if it were pronounced by a friend, reinterpretation 
rates were higher compared to when the same stimulus was imaged as if it 
were pronounced in the subject’s own voice. In other words, auditory images 
of one’s own speech (corresponding, in my nomenclature, to rehearsal-
imagery) were perceived as less ambiguous – more “rigid” as the authors put 
it – than auditory images of another’s speech (corresponding, in my nomen-
clature, to speech-imagery). Although the general theoretical framework of 
these experiments diverges from my own, they prove that all verbal imagery 
is not equally open to interpretation, and this particular finding is consistent 
with what has been proposed above about meaning-making in speech-
imagery vs. rehearsal-imagery. 
Willed verbal imagery of the kind investigated in psychological experi-
ments is a valuable source of insight relative to verbal imagery in the reading 
of literary narrative. Yet another such source, as already shown earlier in this 
chapter, is verbal thought a.k.a. inner speech, Vygotskian or other. Not only 
does verbal thought itself constitute a major component in the contents of 
post-1900 literary narrative (the famous stream of consciousness technique 
in modernist writing), a fact that is helpful in propelling the current cognitive 
boom (see Cohen 2010) in literary scholarship. As a first-order rather than 
                                                       
76 For experimental studies suggesting the resistance of visual mental imagery to reinterpreta-
tion, see the work of Chambers and Reisberg (1985), where subjects are reported to consis-




second-order (i.e. imitative) phenomenon, verbal thought is also endlessly 
more complex than verbal imagery. This means that there is endlessly more 
to be observed regarding its similarities or dissimilarities to either variety of 
verbal imagery than previously suggested. For instance, while verbal thought 
resembles speech-imagery by virtue of the relative insignificance of exact 
wording, it is also quite similar to rehearsal-imagery insofar as it is always 
perceived as “mine,” both bodily and conceptually. Or, as Ihde observes 
with typical concision: 
(I)t remains the case that thinking is my activity. Hence my inner speech, just 
as my spoken speech during the actual time of occurrence, does not and can-
not appear to me as “coming from elsewhere.” Rather it remains primitively 
identified with the thinking activity itself. This means that there is necessarily 
a phenomenological distinction between the representation of an imagined 
voice of someone else coming from elsewhere and the imaginative presence 
of my inner speech. But both presences remain imaginative activities of free 
variation and both, I believe, properly belong to auditory imagination. 
(Ihde 2007, 214; Ihde’s italics) 
 
In the following section, a brief remark will be presented concerning how the 
divide between speech-imagery and rehearsal-imagery, so similar to Ihde’s 
divide between “imagined voice” and “inner speech,” may be probed and 
tried when a narrative expression is noted for its poetic quality. 
4.3.3 Speech and rehearsal: The dual scope of the poetic 
 
I opened this chapter by stating the obvious: Whereas verbal imagery in the 
silent reading of narrative prose is largely neglected, its importance in poetry 
(both classical and modern) has always been taken for granted. Apart from a 
couple of metaphors, the prose of my three literary examples is conspicu-
ously non-poetic. That is to say, it refrains from frustrating general linguistic 
expectations for written prose, and yet it clearly made me aware, in various 
ways and to varying degrees, of the linguistic medium. This seems to con-
tradict the widely circulated stylistic theory of so-called foregrounding, 
which is based on a notion of literary (more specifically, poetic) language, 
initially adapted from the structuralist critic Jan Mukařovský and signifi-
cantly broadened by English and other literary scholarship. In one of its 
more influential versions, advocated by Goeffrey Leech and Mick Short 
(2007, 41), foregrounding theory suggests that all literary language including 
narrative prose, whenever spontaneously noticeable qua medium, necessarily 
deviates from the reader’s unspoken stylistic norms (see also Chapter 1, Sec-
tion 1.7). 
With a little goodwill, this may at best accommodate my description of 
rehearsal-imagery as typically offset by narrative quantity, since narrative 
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quantity may be termed a deviance of sorts from the reader’s immediate 
expectations. But what about speech-imagery? Despite all that has been said 
about the relative arbitrariness of wording in speech-imagery, the sound in 
my mind’s ear of David’s “What did you do, Devil!” was nevertheless a 
palpable reminder of the linguistic medium. At the same time, the utterance 
felt far from unnatural or unexpected. In short, Hemingway’s (Robinson’s, 
Havel’s, and many other prose writers’) virtuously transparent and yet 
somehow conspicuous linguistic choices point at a serious problem in fore-
grounding theory, one likely stemming from the fact that the original notion 
of foregrounding was designed for the study of poetry alone. Statistical devi-
ance is not necessary for the linguistic medium to be at the forefront of one’s 
awareness.  
However, the very transparent styles of Hemingway, Robinson and Havel 
as previously quoted point at a general weakness in my own theory of verbal 
imagery as well, my random selection of literary examples being perhaps 
more slanted and less random than desirable. The weakness of the theory is 
exactly that it probably does not hold for poetry broadly defined, i.e., for 
markedly innovative linguistic structures (across generic boundaries).77 In 
order to better explain which part of the theory it is that may not hold, let me 
quote one last literary example. This time it is Hemingway’s Catherine, 
David’s wife, speaking to her husband and triggering verbal images in my 
mind: 
[IV: Catherine] 
“Do you think it would be fun if I went back to being a boy again? It wouldn’t 
be any trouble.” 
(---) 
“No. Not now.” 
“Thank you for the not now. Should I make love this time as a girl and 
then do it?” 
“You’re a girl. You are a girl. You’re my lovely girl Catherine.” 
“Yes I am your girl and I love you and I love you and I love you.” 
“Don’t talk.” 
“Yes I will. I’m your girl Catherine and I love you please I love you al-
ways always always–“ 
“You don’t have to keep saying it. I can tell.” 
“I like to say it and I have to say it and I’ve been a fine girl and a good girl 
and I will again. I promise I will again.” 
“You don’t have to say it.” 
“Oh yes I do. I say it and I said it and you said it. You now please. Please 
you.” 
(Hemingway 1995, 55; my italics) 
 
                                                       
77 This definition of the poetic is not meant to encompass all instances of what is commonly 
referred to as poetry.  
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In the final sentences of this dialogue, Catherine speaks poetry proper, art-
fully deviating from English syntax spoken and written. The very last sen-
tence recurs later on in yet another exchange between her and David (He-
mingway 1995, 86), an incantation as it were. It is clear from the context that 
Catherine has much to convey by her utterance. The utterance is deeply situ-
ated in her turmoil of erotic sassiness and devotion, and a good fit for spon-
taneous interpretation. Meanwhile, its ungrammaticality makes it non-
situated, disclosing language as raw building material. Moreover, the 
stressed ambiguity of “please” when syntactically misplaced, especially in a 
dialogue revolving around sex, would probably not go unnoticed in an inter-
pretation of the scholarly, analytical kind. Then what variety of verbal im-
agery did the utterance give rise to? 
Theoretically, one would be inclined to suggest that it is difficult to spon-
taneously form a vivid speech-image, even at will, of an utterance deviating 
to such a degree that it obstructs baseline comprehension. Rather, a re-
hearsal-image, similar to what one may experience when struggling to pene-
trate a piece of expository writing (see also Sections 4.2.2 and 4.2.4), would 
seem more likely to occur. For an utterance such as “You now please. Please 
you.” is not only non-imageable in terms of mere auditory input, it is also 
non-imaginable in a broader sense of the word, in terms of its conceptual 
purport. That is to say, an utterance this deviant is not only unlikely to have 
been previously heard by the reader. It is also an utterance that most readers 
will probably identify, if barely consciously, as somewhat unlikely overall. It 
simply does not make sense (unless recited in a way disregarding the tradi-
tional punctuation, inserting dramatic pauses in between the words). In anal-
ogy to the visual non-imageability of, say, square circles, this utterance 
ought to be difficult to merely image in the mind’s ear inasmuch as one has 
difficulty imagining that it is uttered (for the basic distinction between imag-
ing and imagining-that, see Casey 2000, 41–44). 
In line with this intuition, a rehearsal-image was indeed what occurred 
when I first read Catherine’s affirmations. My reading pace had slowed 
down notably for my articulatory apparatus to silently mouth them over. On 
the other hand, the apparent nonsensicality of Catherine’s syntax made her 
perplexed situation all the more compelling, endowing it with hints of sur-
plus meaning (toward innocent domestic play as well as a not-so-innocent 
mental disorder). Hence, in one of those fortuitous scenarios when linguistic 
deviance appears fully motivated (a scenario which I deem relatively infre-
quent, contrary to assumptions common within literary academia), Cather-
ine’s voice was clearer to my mind’s ear than ever before, echoing in a 
speech-image as well. Distinctive personal styles being notoriously conta-
gious, her poetic idiolect could have easily impacted my own speech and 
thought for a brief period after reading. Corporeally, it was neither mine nor 
not mine, and yet it was both.  
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Throughout decades of modern literary theory, various kinds of binary 
oppositions have been declared to collapse (or to collapse more distinctly) as 
a symptom of poetic as compared to prosaic or non-poetic language (see also 
Chapter 1, Section 1.7), from the classical content/form divide78 to the struc-
turalist combination/selection principles and beyond. My own distinction 
between speech-imagery and rehearsal-imagery may thus be seen as yet an-
other addition to the list. The typically poetic experience may be defined as 
one in which the reader cannot tell whether sound and its meaning is coming 
from the outside or the inside, and which part of the reading body, the ear or 
the throat, is its primary locus. This duality in turn (along with the usual 
factors of prosody and other sound patterning) may contribute to the relative 
prominence of auditory experience in the silent reading of poetry, and to the 
exclusion of narrative prose from the scholarly discussion of auditory im-




To sum up briefly, this chapter proposes a way to describe the experience of 
verbal imagery in the reading of literary narrative by locating it between the 
two poles of speech-imagery and rehearsal-imagery. Speech-imagery puts 
the reader in the position of a vicarious listener, feeding on activity in the 
mind’s ear alone. Rehearsal-imagery, on the other hand, reaches the mind’s 
ear via covert articulatory activity in the reader’s mouth and throat. While 
speech-images represent text as situated speech and may accommodate per-
ceptual detail of the imaginary voice, rehearsal-images rather represent text 
as raw language, where the only perceptual qualities to be explored are those 
of first-person subvocal speech production. On the level of higher-order 
meaning-making, the two types of imagery link with the presence or absence 
of spontaneous interpretation, respectively. 
This chapter has done for verbal imagery what the previous two chapters 
together did for referential imagery. Similarly to Chapters 2 and 3 combined, 
it has identified the two opposite ends within one of the domains of imagery 
(see Chapter 1, Section 1.6.5): 1) The immediate end, corresponding to 
speech-imagery in the verbal domain and to enactment-imagery in the refer-
                                                       
78 The content/form divide also maps onto my distinction between speech-imagery and re-
hearsal-imagery, to the extent that wording may appear more arbitrary (see Section 4.3.2) in 
speech-imagery compared to rehearsal-imagery. Encouraging interpretation, speech-images 
may thus be perceived as more form-transparent and/or content-laden, while the opposite 
applies to rehearsal-images. 
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ential domain, and 2) the mediate end, corresponding to rehearsal-imagery in 
the verbal domain and to description-imagery in the referential domain. 
While speech-images are onset quickly and without effort in creating the 
sense of auditory perception, rehearsal-images appear comparably labored as 
they have to be mediated by subvocalization. Analogously, while enactment-
images always arise unexpectedly, emulating the most vivid direct experi-
ence possible, description-images defy perceptual immediacy by their very 
nature. Speech-images are fit to contain more perceptual information (pitch, 
timbre, tonality) compared to rehearsal-images, just like enactment-images 
may give us a much fuller experience (of the environment as an interface for 
action) when compared to the picture-like nature of description-images. 
But despite these analogies, the two domains of imagery – the referential 
and the verbal – remain fundamentally distinct, and this is also reflected in 
the reversal of roles for the motor and kinesthetic modalities. In the referen-
tial domain, vicarious kinesthetic activity in the reader’s body elicits a sense 
of immediacy and facilitates enactment. In the verbal domain, the sense of 
immediate auditory perception is suppressed, rather than enhanced, by the 
kinesthetic experience of subvocal rehearsal, constitutive of rehearsal-
imagery. While vicarious doing helps readers experience the storyworld, 
vicarious talking seems rather to remind them of its artificiality.  
However, this chapter has also outgrown the scope of the two previous 
chapters in that it attempts to link mental imagery to higher-order meaning-
making. Yet it has not gone far enough in this respect. Some will likely ob-
ject to my simplistic notion of interpretation. To name just one possible ob-
jection, I have purposely underestimated, for the sake of brevity, the number 
of intentionality levels that may be simultaneously present in the reader’s 
interpreting mind. As speakers, the characters or narrators of a literary story 
are not autonomous. They are constructed by an author (and sometimes also 
mediated by a narrator), and at some level of awareness, the reader always 
knows this (see also Claassen 2012). At times, the reader may thus have the 
impression that there is more than one voice to an utterance, more than one 
diction (say, an Eduard-ish and a Havel-ish one), and that its possible mean-
ings multiply (and perhaps diverge) accordingly. Also, what may appear as 
tedious narrative quantity at one of these levels of intentionality, giving rise 
to rehearsal-imagery, may seem perfectly natural and situated as an utterance 
at the other level. Moreover, one of the distinctive attractions of good story-
telling is that the levels sometimes hardly separate, remaining all simultane-
ously prominent in the recipient’s experience. Throughout the chapter, my 
descriptions of the two discrete varieties of verbal imagery obviously fail to 
account for such subtleties. 
Yet other aspects of my hypotheses have had to remain fully disregarded, 
most notably the question of their intersubjective validity. Individual differ-
ences in susceptibility to imagery are known to be significant. Moreover, 
verbal images are probably more difficult to research empirically than refer-
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ential imagery. Their two basic dimensions, the embodied and the concep-
tual one, could perhaps be operationalized separately in a reader response 
questionnaire and then crosschecked for correlation, but the process of stim-
uli selection would be highly complicated due to the fragility of verbal im-
agery’s inherent dynamics as well as the large number of context variables. 
While the occurrence of referential imagery (e.g. visual, olfactory, gustatory, 
or even nonverbal auditory images) may be relatively easy to predict on the 
basis of text content, verbal imagery is less tightly interlinked with meaning 
than it is with sound, and sound may follow with any word. Verbal images 
are thus potentially everywhere and therefore relatively unpredictable, with 
the exception of the few regularities proposed in Sections 4.2.4 and 4.3.3 
above. Due to the essentially temporal and dynamic nature of verbal im-
agery, an experimental study of verbal imagery will probably require fairly 
veridical staging of the fluent reading scenario, with its rhythmical dipping 
in and out of impressions and experiences, and this will be a great methodo-
logical challenge. But any attempt whatsoever at empirical validation is 
more than welcome. The latter applies to every single hypothesis presented 
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